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Abstract
Indonesia has a long history of conflict that has often led to violence. Even to-
day, small-scale violence persists. Existing studies on Indonesia have identified ethnic
grievances, economic motives and institutional changes as some of the main drivers of
conflict. While such studies are important to understand the antecedents of conflict at
the macro level, there is a need to dig deeper into the consequences of conflict at the
micro-level to understand its effect on individual behaviour. Thus, the objective of this
thesis is first to further investigate the antecedents of violence in post-conflict Indonesia
and, second, to examine the effect of the conflict experience on individual behaviour.
To achieve these objectives, this study conducted a secondary data analysis at the sub-
national level and a lab-in-the-field experiment in Aceh, where the last large conflict in
Indonesia ended in 2005.
The sub-national analysis of secondary data uses ethnolinguistic fractionalisation
weighted by linguistic similarities to objectively measure ethno-cultural diversity. The
analysis finds this variable to have a curvilinear (inverted-U shape) relationship with
violence—a result that is robust to different measures of violence and fractionalisation, as
well as to the use of instrumental variable method and additional covariates. This finding
aligns with past studies on ethnic grievances and conflict, although the relationship is
non-linear, rather than linear. Most Indonesian districts have levels of diversity lower
than the turning point on the inverted-U; hence, ethno-cultural diversity currently has
negative effects in the country.
Experimental studies on the effect of conflict on individual behaviour have mostly
focused on the prosocial. However, the research agenda is now turning to antisocial be-
haviour to capture the dark side of human nature. In the lab-in-the-field experiment, this
study used an antisocial behaviour game to examine out-group bias between Acehnese and
Javanese participants, as the Aceh conflict witnessed inter-ethnic violence between these
two groups. In the game, participants could choose to pay to destroy other participants
payoffs (for no reason other than spite). The study found that one in four participants
destroyed in general, with the Acehnese destroying more against the Javanese. Interest-
ingly, such antisocial behaviour was higher among women who experienced conflict, which
aligns with previous studies findings that women experience the worst stress symptoms
from conflict. Prior to the field research in Aceh, the same experiment was conducted
ii
with Indonesian migrants in Melbourne, Australia, to identify the antecedents of this sort
of antisocial behaviour among Indonesians who have not experienced conflict. Here, the
study did not find differential behaviour against out-group members, but found antisocial
behaviour to be strongly associated with negative beliefs about the other.
These findings have important policy implications, including suggesting potential
avenues for improvements in conflict management by promoting intercultural dialogues.
They also highlight the need to fully address the grievances of both women and ethnic
minorities to ensure lasting peace.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The first part of this thesis introduces the research background and objectives (Chapter
1) and briefly elaborates the history of conflict and violence in Indonesia to provide the
overall context of the research (Chapter 2). This first chapter provides an overview of the
economics of conflict and methods to achieve the thesis’s research objectives. Following
best practice in the field, a lab-in-the-field experiment was conducted to observe the
consequences of past conflict on behaviour. Additionally, a sub-national level analysis
was used to understand the antecedents of violence. Therefore, the thesis adopts two
approaches simultaneously to study conflict.
1.1 The Context of Indonesia
This thesis examines the antecedents and behavioural consequences of conflict in Indone-
sia. The country has suffered from large-scale and significant conflict since its declaration
of independence in 1945. The four-year revolutionary war against the Allied-backed Dutch
only ended in 1949, after the Netherlands recognised the country. Afterwards, Indonesia
experienced several insurgencies during the 1950s, an anti-communist purge during the
last half of the 1960s, state terrorism throughout the Suharto era (1968 to 1998) and com-
munal violence during the transition era (1998 to 2004). The end of the Aceh insurgency
in 2005 has brought the country a period of relative peace, with frequent yet small-scale
violence (Barron, Jaffrey, & Varshney, 2016).
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The country’s rich cultural diversity, with 964 ethnic groups and more than 700
languages spoken by 260 million people, has been exploited by elites and violence spe-
cialists to ignite ethno-communal violence (Barron, 2019; Tilly, 2003). Between 1998 and
2004, the country witnessed clashes between Muslims and Christians in Maluku, clashes
between Madurese and Dayak ethnic groups in Kalimantan, and anti-Chinese violence in
the country capital of Jakarta. The effect of cultural diversity on conflict could operate
through the mechanism of group grievances. The government-sponsored policy of settling
the Javanese—the largest ethnic group in Indonesia—into the outer islands in the late
1970s through the 1980s may have generated grudges among local ethnic groups, who
felt that the migrants were robbing their natural resources. Existing conflict could also
amplify underlying group grievances, as in the case of the Aceh insurgency, where inter-
ethnic relations were strained by suspicions that ethnic Javanese people provided military
intelligence for the national government (Schulze, 2004).
The availability of violence datasets during the past decade has resulted in a pro-
liferation of studies seeking to understand the factors associated with violent conflict.
However, most of these studies focused on incidents during the transition era, particu-
larly ethnic conflict, and there remains the question of whether cultural diversity may
have influenced violence during the post-conflict period (2005 onwards). Nevertheless,
identifying the antecedents of violence is one of the many ways to understand the dynam-
ics of conflict. Another approach is to unveil the consequences of conflict on individual
behaviour, where only a handful of studies on Indonesia exist. In addition, unlike the
previous approach, where researchers typically use secondary datasets on violence, be-
havioural research through experiments is more time and resource consuming, as the data
must be elicited either in the field or in the laboratory. In particular, it remains unknown
whether the last large insurgency in the country, the Aceh civil war, has had an effect on
today’s behaviour.
The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) campaign started in 1976
and was led by remnants of the Darul Islam rebel group, who were defeated by the
military a decade before. Aceh has rich natural gas deposits that caused grievances, as
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the centralised model envisaged by the national government dictated that a significant
portion of the resource revenue be transferred to the country capital (for redistribution to
various parts of the country). Around 30,000 people were killed during the Aceh conflict
(MSR, 2009). After the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami hit the region, a peace agreement
was finally reached in 2005. Women were almost completely side-lined during the peace
negotiation process, with no female representatives present during the early negotiations,
which resulted in the complete absence of discussion on women or gender issues. Women
witnessed or experienced violence, such as rape and sexual abuse, during the conflict
(Amnesty International, 2004). After more than a decade of relative peace, it is unknown
whether traumatic war experiences affect women differently, and if this is reflected in their
behaviour.
Combining the two approaches is expected to generate substantive and important
policy lessons for decision makers, based on a better understanding of the complexities of
post-conflict intercommunity dynamics and behaviour. Critically testing the relationship
between cultural diversity and violence will contribute to a clearer picture of how the
country’s rich culture may not necessarily lead to violence. A lab-in-the-field experiment
with subjects who lived in Aceh during the conflict will provide evidence for improved
policy to strengthen intercommunity relationships.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides an
overview of the economics of conflict, followed by the purposes and methodology of the
research in Section 1.3. Finally, Section 1.4 presents the structure of the thesis.
1.2 An Overview of the Economics of Conflict
This section provides an overview of how conflict is studied in the social sciences, and
examines the approaches used by economists to study conflict. However, before elaborat-
ing on these, the first sub-section discusses the two terms of ’conflict’ and ’violence’ to
provide a clear exposition of how they are used in this thesis.
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1.2.1 Concepts
This thesis focuses on the economics of conflict, yet one of the analyses devotes attention
to the antecedents of violence. Conflict, of course, does not always involve violence (such
as in industrial actions or lawsuits). Consequently, the use of these terms is contingent
on the context of the discussion. Broadly speaking, in the literature review (Chapter 2, 3,
5), the definition of these terms follows their original (or common) use in the literature.
For example, in cross-country studies, the word ’conflict’ typically refers to wars with
significant number of casualties. In other cases (e.g., on economic models of conflict),
the word should be interpreted more generally. When discussing conflict in Indonesia,
the word usually corresponds to large, extended violence (e.g., insurgency or extended
inter-ethnic violence).1
However, in the empirical investigations (Chapter 4, 6 and 7), some of the opera-
tional variables are derived from the original. For example, the National Violence Moni-
toring Survey (NVMS; data from which are used in the secondary data analysis) defines an
incident as violence if it is both intentional and can be observed physically (SNPK, 2019;
World Bank, 2018); however, the operational variable ’intensity of violence’ is defined as
the number of violent incidents per million people.2
In short, in this thesis, the terms are used in the way that they appeared in the
original literature. It is only in the empirical investigations that some new variables (with
different names) are defined, if necessary.
1.2.2 Conflict Study in the Social Sciences
Social scientists’ study of conflict can be divided into several disciplines. Classical so-
ciologists, such as Marx and Weber, theorised that class division is the source of social
conflict (Weber, 2014), while modern sociological theory on conflict focuses on the role of
power (Mills, 1999). Political scientists sometimes model conflict as a contest for political
1Therefore, following the end of the Aceh insurgency in 2005, the years from this time onwards are
often referred to as the ’post-conflict period’.
2Moreover, the data can be further disaggregated into different types of violence: violent conflict,
violent crime, domestic violence, separatism and violence in law enforcement. The definition of the terms
used from these data can be viewed on the World Bank’s website (external link).
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Figure 1.1: The study of conflict in the social sciences
power (Moore & Lanoue, 2003) or analyse it from various institutional lenses (Hall & Tay-
lor, 1996). In contrast, anthropologists occasionally study peace building in post-conflict
societies (Millar, 2018).
Figure 1.1 presents the study of conflict in the social sciences.3 In practice, some
social scientists conduct their research using methods from different disciplines; therefore,
the branches should not be seen as independent from each other (this is shown by the
dashed lines in the figure). For example, economic sociologists place weight on the role
of social networks in economic outcomes (Granovetter, 1976). Meanwhile, in political
sociology, researchers study how the various components of a society—such as religion
and ethnicity—can bring about social capital, which may influence political struggles
(Coleman, 1990; Colletta & Cullen, 2000).
In economics, conflict is often viewed as the result of rational decision making of
agents trying to maximise their payoffs (Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007; Hirshleifer, 2001;
Wa¨rneryd, 2014). Some economists use contest games—where agents compete (spend
resources on arming) to increase the probability of winning a conflict (for a review, see
Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007; Konrad, 2009)—and experiments are often conducted to
test theoretical predictions (Abbink, Brandts, Herrmann, & Orzen, 2010; Durham, Hir-
shleifer, & Smith, 1998). However, the assumption of rational choice is criticised for
3This is by no means complete. The branches are only meant to provide examples, rather than an
exhaustive list of disciplines/sub-disciplines. Also, psychology was excluded intentionally from the figure,
as it has been argued to underpin the behaviour of agents studied by these three branches of social
science. For example, political psychology is used to study the behaviour of conflict perpetrators and the
judicial system, while economic psychology (behavioural economics) can be used to study the effect of
violent conflict on preferences and the limit of human cognitive process (bounded rationality).
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reducing conflict to a simple market (bargaining) problem, which ignores the construc-
tion of grievances (Keen, 2000; Vahabi, 2009). In addition, different social norms and
institutions shape human interactions differently, including the use of violent means to
enforce norms (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009).
Empirical approaches to studying conflict in economics can be divided into macro
and micro studies (Figure 1.2). Macro studies are typically used to identify the common
factors associated with conflict and are usually conducted using country- or cross-country-
level data. This approach is appealing because of the widely available conflict datasets,
such as the armed conflict data hosted by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace
Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) and the Global Terrorism Database. However,
this approach has been criticised as lacking explanations of the mechanisms that drive the
results and as being prone to endogeneity problems (where the factors that contribute to
conflict are determined by the variables omitted from the equation) (Blattman & Miguel,
2010).
The second analytical approach to conflict economics—micro studies—is generally
used to understand individuals or groups in conflict situations. It can also be in the form
of a case study of organisations or events (e.g., Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). Analysis
at individual or group level can occur through behavioural research (e.g., experiments)
or non-behavioural study (e.g., crime economics). Further, the behavioural study of con-
flict can be categorised into two major types: ’macro’ and ’micro’ (see the bottom two
boxes in Figure 1.2). In ’macro’ behavioural studies, researchers are interested with co-
ordination and collective action problems that focus on mass social phenomenon, such as
riots (Abbink & Dog˘an, 2018), power struggles (Durham et al., 1998) or anarchy (Powell
& Wilson, 2008; A. C. Smith, Skarbek, & Wilson, 2011). Such studies are similar in
spirit with (Schelling, 1978) ’macrobehaviour’, where individuals’ actions shape the social
(group) aggregate. In contrast, ’micro’ behavioural studies focus on observing behaviour
at individual, rather than aggregated, levels. For example, in antisocial behaviour ex-
periments, individual participants engage in a game where they have the opportunity to
destroy each other’s money (Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001).
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Behavioural research through experiments has relatively strong internal validity in
establishing the causal mechanism, as the researcher can change elements of the environ-
ment and follow strict protocols that ensure the experiment’s replicability. Further, they
can be used to test theoretical models and complement field data (Abbink, 2012). More
importantly, laboratory procedures can also be brought to the field, where participants
are taken from the general population. Such experiments are useful when researchers wish
to observe behaviour that is affected by the surrounding socioeconomic environment and
institutions (Charness, Gneezy, & Kuhn, 2013; Harrison & List, 2004).
Overall, the economic study of conflict has unveiled several important findings that
can be broken down into two streams of research: the antecedents and consequences
of conflict. As noted previously, empirical investigations that seek to link conflict with
its drivers are usually plagued by endogeneity problems, which renders it difficult to
establish a strong case for causal identification. Therefore, those drivers should be seen as
antecedents (or correlates), rather than causes of conflict. Conflict also have behavioural
or non-behavioural consequences, where experiments are often used to investigate the
former.
Regarding the antecedents of conflict, economists and other social scientists typically
found greed, unaddressed grievance and institutions as factors that drive conflict in most
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cross-country studies. Yet the question remains how they are related to within-country
conflict and violence. Specifically, there is a demand for a deeper understanding of the
role of grievances and institutions at country level.
Regarding the behavioural consequences of conflict, Bauer et al. (2016) proposed
several theoretical explanations in the context of prosocial behaviour after civil wars, yet
it remains unclear whether they are relevant in explaining antisocial behaviour, such as
spite. Antisocial behaviour experiments could serve as a point of departure for research in
post-conflict regions, as they capture negative behaviour that erodes community cohesion
and is inherent in real conflict. In addition, most post-war experiments have been lim-
ited to within-community interactions, which does not say much about intercommunity
relationships.
1.3 Research Objectives and Methodology
1.3.1 Research Objectives
The previous section has presented an overview of the economics of conflict literature and a
number of research opportunities. Regarding conflict antecedents, a deeper understanding
(and with better identification) at the country level is needed to enable improved policy.
This is relevant for Indonesia, as the country’s rich cultural diversity is often exploited to
ignite violence, yet existing studies have not critically addressed its potentially endogenous
problem. Regarding the consequences of conflict, knowledge of the long-term effects
of war on antisocial behaviour would contribute to the ongoing discourse in the post-
conflict literature. It is also relevant to Indonesia, as the last civil war (the Aceh conflict)
marred intercommunity relationships, and it remains unknown whether the conflict has
had consequences for individual behaviour.
Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the antecedents of violence and the conse-
quences of conflict experience on antisocial behaviour. Specifically, it used two approaches
to achieve these aims. First, it sought to identify common factors that contribute to
violence at sub-national level in post-conflict Indonesia. Second, it examined the conse-
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quences of the Aceh conflict on behaviour using a lab-in-the-field antisocial experiment.
Together, the thesis provides an extensive economics study of conflict that sheds light on
the current dynamics of intercommunity relationships and behaviour.
1.3.2 Methodology
This thesis employed two approaches (secondary data analysis and lab-in-the-field exper-
iment) to attain the two research objectives. Analyses of secondary data was used to
answer the first objective (antecedents of violence), while data from the lab-in-the-field
experiment were used to answer the second objective (consequences of conflict). The
following provides an overview of these two approaches.
An analysis of violence using secondary data at sub-national (district) level was
conducted by focusing on the role of cultural diversity, while also controlling for economic
and institutional factors. In the empirical model, a combination of violence and other
supporting data was used in the regressions. Focus was given to the construction of
cultural diversity and tackling the potentially endogenous problem. In addition, the model
was further scrutinised by adding more controls, using alternative measures of violence
and using different econometric specifications.
While secondary data analysis is important for identifying the antecedents of vi-
olence, it can be argued that violent conflict affects people and, therefore, having an
understanding of its consequences on behaviour is equally, if not more, important. There-
fore, a lab-in-the-field experiment was used to elicit antisocial behaviour using a modified
version of the joy-of-destruction (JoD) minigame (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011; Abbink &
Sadrieh, 2009). Participants’ behaviour was elicited using the strategy method, in which
they were asked to make decisions about different types of co-participants based on their
ethnicity and gender.
Good conduct of an experiment should generate meaningful data to establish the
causal direction. However, regularities in an experiment do not necessarily translate
to external validity, and more sessions with a larger sample size are often demanded.
Moreover, when an experiment is conducted in the field instead of the laboratory, the
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researcher can lose some control over the environment. Therefore, pilot sessions were
conducted to identify potential problems during implementation.
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into four parts. Part I introduces readers to the thesis and the
overall context. After this first chapter, Chapter 2 explores Indonesia’s history of conflict
and violence. While this chapter mostly consists of historical accounts of conflict, it also
encapsulates the general findings from qualitative studies (mostly outside economics) used
to inform the empirical model and interpret the results.
Part II reviews the literature on the antecedents of conflict and the empirical find-
ings on Indonesia. Chapter 3 provides an extensive list of economics of conflict literature,
both cross-country and in Indonesia. The chapter not only complements the previous his-
torical chapter (in informing the empirical investigation), but also provides the necessary
theoretical foundation. Chapter 4 examines the factors associated with violence using
regression analysis. It also critically examines the cultural diversity variable—how it is
measured and how to tackle endogeneity—and tests the prediction of a theoretical model
of conflict.
Part III elaborates the literature review on antisocial behaviour and the experi-
mental results. Specifically, Chapter 5 reviews the literature in the following ways: how
antisocial behaviour (spite) is theorised, how to elicit the behaviour in experiments, what
are the general results, and what are the antecedents of such behaviour. Next, the two
empirical chapters provide the behavioural evidence from participants who live in conflict
and non-conflict regions. The first experiment (Chapter 6—Melbourne) is a precursor to
the second (Chapter 7—Aceh), where the original design of the experiment was tested
with participants who were much less likely to encounter conflict. Besides some prac-
tical knowledge on ways to improve the experiment’s implementation in Aceh, the first
experiment also identified the factors associated with antisocial behaviour. In contrast,
participants in the Aceh experiment were much more likely to be directly affected by con-
flict. The Aceh study provided evidence on the lingering effects of conflict on antisocial
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behaviour. It also highlighted the current state of intercommunity relationships in the
region.
Finally, Part IV (Chapter 8) summarises the thesis. The chapter discusses the
study’s main findings, contributions to the literature, policy lessons, limitations and di-
rections for future research.
Chapter 2
The History of Conflict in Indonesia
This chapter discusses the history of conflict in Indonesia to provide the context for this
thesis. Historical accounts indicate numerous large-scale conflicts and violence since the
pre-colonial period. However, systematic efforts in surveying conflict and violent incidents
have only been made since early 2000, which sparked a number of quantitative studies
at the sub-national level. These studies are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3,
Section 3.4, since this chapter focuses on the descriptive and qualitative aspect of the
country’s conflict history. Together with Chapter 3, the findings from this chapter lead to
identification of the roots of violence—economic opportunities, ethnic/group grievances
and institutions—which are used as controls in the empirical investigation in Chapter 4.
Finally, this chapter provides an overview of the Aceh conflict—the largest insurgency of
the last 50 years—which serves as the background for the experiment in Aceh (Chapter
7).
2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the events following Indonesia’s proclamation of independence in
1945, where the country underwent several phases—from the Sukarno era to the Reformasi
era—in which different types of conflict emerged. Before independence, the history of
violence in what is now known as Indonesia can be traced back to the pre-colonial period
(before the 17th century). During this era, labour served as an important factor of
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production, and wars were sometimes aimed at moving people from the conquered to
the victor’s region (Ricklefs, 2001). The country was under colonial occupations and
the effect of these occupations was devastating for the local population. For example, the
Dutch colonial army killed around 125,000 people between 1871 and 1910, with more than
half of the casualties being Acehnese people (Nordholt, 2002).1 In addition, in Java, the
increasingly stratified social order within the indigenous population created inequality
and poverty, which caused violent resistance from the population in late 19th century
(Ricklefs, 2001).
This chapter aims to provide the context of the thesis, as well as identifying the
factors associated with conflict and violence in modern (post-independence) Indonesia by
reviewing a number of qualitative studies. The selection of the literature does not follow
a strict rule, but emphasis is given to those studies that considered events from the past
50 years, from Suharto’s era (1966 to 1998) to the Reformasi (1999 to today), as it is
often argued that remnants of Suharto’s authoritarian rule are still affecting the current
socio-political environment (see, e.g., Hadiz & Robison, 2013). To provide a coherent
narrative and consistent timeline, the sections are presented in chronological order and
relevant studies are used to explain the occurrence of conflict or violence in each period.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 examines the
Sukarno era, where conflicts were mostly in the form of major internal conflicts. Section
2.3 summarises events during Suharto’s era, where a number of violent incidents were
perpetrated by the state. Secessionist movements emerged, including the Aceh conflict,
during this era. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 divulge events during the Reformasi era, with the
former focusing on large ethno-communal violence during the early years of Reformasi
(the transition era), and the latter concentrating on small-scale violence during the more
recent years (the post-conflict period). Finally, Section 2.6 discusses the common themes
found from the history of violence in Indonesia, as well as the way forward.
1The colonialism also resulted in a number of rebellions by local kingdoms, such as in Makassar (1666
to 1669), Maluku (1817), Java (1825 to 1830), Bali (1846 to 1849), Kalimantan (1859 to 1863) and Aceh
(1873 to 1904).
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2.2 The Sukarno Era
Under Sukarno’s leadership, the newly born nation embarked into a turbulent revolu-
tionary war against the Allied-backed Dutch, which ended in 1949 after the latter ac-
knowledged Indonesia’s sovereignty. The war resulted in the death of between 45,000
and 100,000 people from the Indonesian army (Vickers, 2005).2 After the revolutionary
war, the history of violence during the leadership of Sukarno was related with political
struggles, as the country was in search of the ’right’ system of government. During these
times, the parliamentary democracy was in place which created frequent turnovers in
government’s cabinets.
The first serious internal conflict occurred when the People’s Democratic Front,
which comprised left-wing parties, took control of Madiun City in East Java on 18 Septem-
ber 1948. This was followed by at least four major internal conflicts during the parlia-
mentary democracy era (1950 to 1968), as summarised in Table 2.1.
The Darul Islam (DI) movement was the longest and most widespread rebellion
in the history of Indonesia; with geographical coverage from West Java, Central Java,
Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and Aceh and took more than 40,000 lives (Vickers, 2005).
The movement also became the seed of the Free Aceh Movements (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka,
GAM) in the mid-1970s. While the aspiration to have an Islamic state was one of the
objectives of DI, three other factors contributed to the struggle (van Dijk, 1981): (i)
the demobilisation of guerrilla groups following the proclamation of independence; (ii)
centralised control in economic and governance, and (iii) class struggle as a result of
changes in the agrarian structure.
The Republic of South Maluku was an interesting offshoot of Indonesia’s political
experiments as the movement was driven by former Dutch soldiers that were native of
Maluku islands in the eastern part of modern-day Indonesia. The combination of their
distrust with the muslim-majority Indonesian government and their loyalty to the Dutch
had led to the uprising which peaked in September to November 1950 where the Indonesian
army invade the islands. The fighting was mostly ended by the end of 1950 and the
2The number of civilian casualties ranged from 25,000 to 100,000.
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Table 2.1: Major internal conflicts, 1945 to 1968
Location Period Casualties
Madiun Affairs East Java 1948 8,000
Republic of South Maluku Maluku 1950 to 1963 Up to 5,000 died
Islamic State (Darul Islam/DI) West Java, South
Kalimantan, South
Sulawesi, Aceh
1948 to 1962
}Upto40, 000diedThe Charter of the Common Strug-
gle
North Sulawesi 1957 to 1961
The Revolutionary Government of
the Republic of Indonesia
Sumatra 1958 to 1961
Source: UCDP/PRIO database, Ricklefs (2001) and Vickers (2005).
Netherlands did not want to pursue the issue further.
The Charter of the Common Struggle in North Sulawesi and The Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of Indonesia in Sumatra were separate insurgencies but tied
with the same dissatisfactions against the central government. There were clandestine
supports for the movements from the United States of America as the latter was worried
that the Sukarno’s government was leaning towards the eastern bloc. However, Sukarno
determined to crushed the movements and by the end of 1958 the rebellions were lost. In
the aftermath, Sukarno had effectively led the Soviet Union to have an increasing influence
in Indonesia’s domestic affairs.
As a response to the ’free democracy’ which led to a number of insurgencies, Sukarno
proposed the ’Nasakom’ (an acronym for nationalism, religion [agama] and communism)
political system in 1957. The new system was greeted with violence between the different
groups, most prominently between the communists and the Islamic groups. Political
conflicts also spread outside Indonesia, with the country provoking a confrontation with
Malaysia and Singapore between 1963 and 1966.3
The end of the Sukarno era was marked by the event on 30 September 1965, where
six army generals were assassinated, followed by the takeover of Jakarta, allegedly con-
ducted by army troops infiltrated by communist elements. However, it is possible that the
communists were not the only masterminds of the event (Ricklefs, 2001). The takeover
3The confrontation was not held in full force, and, combined, the number of casualties was fewer than
1,000 people from both sides (Carver, 1986). One possible explanation for the lack of military interest
was the disagreement among Indonesian military generals, as some saw a much greater threat from the
Indonesian communist party (Vickers, 2005).
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was short-lived and Suharto, the commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve, managed
to control the situation. Sukarno’s public role was greatly diminished following the event
and, in 1966, he signed a letter of transfer of authority to Suharto. A year later, Sukarno
was impeached by the legislative body, and the transition to the ’New Order’ was com-
pleted when Suharto took his first presidential oath in 1968.
2.3 The New Order
Suharto’s New Order era was characterised by economic and political stability. The econ-
omy grew at around seven per cent annually from 1968 to 1996, while income inequality
was at relatively low levels, with Gini coefficients hovering around 0.33 between 1976
and 1998. The political system was also manipulated so that only Golongan Karya, the
government-owned political body, could win the elections (Ricklefs, 2001). Nevertheless,
the country experienced a number of violent conflicts that can be categorised into state
terrorism and separatist movements. The following sub-sections examine these types of
conflict separately.
2.3.1 State Terrorism
Suharto’s 32 years of authoritarian rule were marked by a number of violent events per-
petrated by the state (state terrorism). The occurrence of such violence found its justifi-
cation in the 1965 to 1966 anti-communist purge, which strengthened Suharto’s grip over
the nation (Heryanto, 2006). The purge was the worst violence experienced by modern
Indonesia, with the number of victims greater than that during the pre-independence
period combined (A. W. Adam, 2008). There is still no formal report on the number
of people killed, but the generally accepted figure is somewhere between 500,000 and
one million people (Cribb, 2001). Civilians, supported by the military, were actively en-
gaged in the killings, including those organised through religious organisations (Wertheim,
1966).4 Also, some Chinese Indonesians were killed during the purge, mostly because of
4In Bali, the killings were supported by the youth wing of the nationalist party and fuelled by the
communist party’s rejections of Bali’s traditional system. It was estimated that the proportion of people
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their association with the communist and not because of their ethnicity (Cribb & Coppel,
2009).
State-sponsored terrorism in Indonesia encompassed a wide variety of incidents, from
extrajudicial killings to unlawful arrests. State terrorism was institutionalised through
the Law No. 11/PNPS/1963 on Subversion, and mostly targeted suspected communists.
However, these people were not the only victims of the violence (see Table 2.2).
Military elites and the associated paramilitary groups played important roles in
the state terrorism (Collins, 2002). Despite some military reforms following the fall of
Suharto, those elites were never held accountable for their alleged crimes. In fact, they
reorganised themselves into new political power (Hadiz & Robison, 2013), such as the
current defence minister, Prabowo Subianto, who was suspected of kidnapping activists
in 1998. A ’culture of violence’ is often used as a justification for the military’s use of
violence.
Table 2.2: Examples of state terrorism during the New Order
Period Victims Casualties Modus operandi
’Petrus’
(mysterious
shooter)
1983 to 1985 Suspected
thugs and
criminals
>5,000 died Extrajudicial killing by
the military; dead bodies
placed in public areas.
Tanjung Priok
massacre
1984 Muslim
protesters
24 died, 55 injured Open fire towards
protesters; imprison-
ment without warrants.
Talangsari in-
cident
1989 Islamist
group
45 died, 5 kidnapped,
88 forced disappear-
ance, 36 tortured
Military attacked the vil-
lage hiding the group.
Activists kid-
nappings
1996 to 1998 Activists One died, 13 missing Unlawful arrests, killing
and kidnappings of ac-
tivists suspected as being
communists.
Source: Bourchier (1990), Komnas HAM (2000, 2016) and Kontras (2008, 2017).
During a 2001 event, Prabowo Subianto claimed that:
Indonesian culture is very violent and the military is a mirror of society ... this
whole culture in Indonesia is a culture of violence between tribes and ethnic
groups. Indonesians can very quickly turn to violence ... The word ’amok’
comes from the lingua franca of this archipelago. (Collins, 2002, p. 582).
killed in Bali was higher than that in other provinces in Indonesia.
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Although such a deterministic view of culture is generally rejected by most scholars
(e.g., Collins, 2002), the concept of violence as a sub-culture is more accepted, as most
scholars agree that culture is malleable and not rigid (Cribb, 2002).5 In addition, violent
sub-cultures are often present in local gangsters or thugs, which overlap with paramilitary
groups associated with political or youth organisations.
2.3.2 Separatist Movements
This sub-section explores three ethnonationalist separatist movements in Aceh, East
Timor and Papua, where three common themes emerge from the literature. First, there
is an argument that Suharto’s vision of the ’national model’ contributed to unresolved
violence in these regions. The model ’focused on unity through the formation of homo-
geneous political, social, developmental, and even some cultural characteristics for all of
Indonesia’s diverse ethnic groups’ (Bertrand, 2003, p. 28).6 A narrow view of ’unity’
translated into military operations in Papua and Aceh, where the two separatist move-
ments were and still are judged to be incompatible with the model and, therefore, need
to be eliminated through any means possible.
Second, it has been argued that factions within the military during Suharto’s era
contributed much to the occurrence of violence, not only the killings in East Timor, but
also the anti-communist purge and state terrorism:
The most definitive finding ... is that the main sponsors of mass political
violence in the country during the past four decades have been elite factions
connected to the state and the army. (Zinoman & Peluso, 2002, p. 546).
Such factions were allowed to occur because of Suharto’s dwifungsi ABRI (security
force’s dual function). In this doctrine, the security force, which consisted of the military
and police, actively participated in a public role, affecting economic and sociocultural
policies. Many of the elites benefited from these arrangements; however, because they
5Also, as will be seen in Chapter 3, economists have tried to incorporate the malleability of ethnic
identities in an economic model that attempts to explain exploitation by a dominant group.
6One of the slogans for this model is NKRI harga mati (’the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
is undisputed’), which is still a popular phrase among military officers, politicians and supporters of
nationalist movements.
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were often used by Suharto as a tool for personal purposes, they were eventually divided
along controversial issues, such as religion (Honna, 2003).
Third, economic grievances also drove the conflict, as evident in the case of Aceh
and Papua, where the insurgents demanded more equitable revenue sharing, among other
things. The revenue boom following the 1970s oil price shock was redistributed to other
regions and, while this helped reduce regional disparity, it nonetheless created grievances
in Aceh and other resource-rich regions, including Papua. The regional economic conver-
gence (and the grievance that followed) is argued to have led to secessionist movements, as
the redistribution process was centralised and viewed as unfair (Tadjoeddin, 2010, 2011).
The following segments discuss the conflict in Aceh, East Timor and Papua.
The Aceh Conflict
GAM started its campaign in 1976—the same year Indonesia occupied East Timor—and
only ended in 2005, seven years after Suharto’s downfall. Many of GAM’s commanders
and sympathisers were ex-DI rebels, who were quashed by the government’s force in 1962.
In the 1980s, GAM’s military strength was still relatively small, but the Indonesian gov-
ernment responded heavily by designating the area as being under a military emergency
from 1989 to 1998.
The Aceh conflict involved ethnic issues and economic grievances (Aspinall, 2007).
Following the DI rebellion in the 1950s, the region was declared a ’Special Region’, which
strengthened the Acehnese identity and was followed by a sense of entitlement. Together
with the increased authoritarian rule of Suharto and the 1970s resources boom, where
Aceh was one of the main producers of natural gas, the feeling of entitlement gave birth to
the GAM, which portrayed Acehnese as victims of the national government. Further, the
presence of a foreign oil and gas company in Aceh was not only seen as a manifestation of
resource theft, but also as the entry point for goods and activities deemed immoral—such
as alcohol, gambling and prostitution—in the deeply religious region (Ricklefs, 2001).
Although GAM’s combatants were mainly men, there were also women who actively
participated in the insurgency. Inong bale (’widow’) was a group of female combatants
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with membership in the thousands. These women joined the insurgency because they had
witnessed or experienced violence against themselves or their families (Schulze, 2004). In
addition, similar to wars in other countries, women participated in the labour force and
took over the social roles of men in their communities during the long course of the
insurgency.
The targeting of ethnic Javanese was an unpopular and controversial aspect of the
Aceh civil war. GAM perceived the central government, and especially ethnic Javanese,
to be the usurpers of Aceh’s resource. With 40 per cent of the population, the Javanese
are the dominant ethnic group in Indonesia, yet a minority in Aceh. The persecution
of ethnic Javanese was also grounded in the fear that they would assist the military in
providing intelligence.7 There is evidence that GAM’s intimidation of ethnic Javanese led
to ethnic tension and outmigration.8 The outmigration was even more pronounced when
the region was placed under the 1989 to 1998 military operation and during the 2003
offensive military operations (Amnesty International, 2004; Czaika & Kis-Katos, 2009;
Schulze, 2004; C. Smith, 2015).
After more than two decades of war and the demise of Suharto in 1998, Law No.
25/1999 on Fiscal Balance was introduced to tackle the economic grievances of Aceh
and other natural resource-producing regions.9 However, the law was still amended once
again through Law No. 18/2001. Nevertheless, the Acehnese viewed the new law with
scepticism, and it did not help much with the peace negotiation.
The peak of the conflict occurred a couple of years after the New Order collapsed
through the launch of offensive military operations in 2003, where around 15,000 people
7This seems to fit with the theory of statistical discrimination, where rational, non-prejudiced people
discriminate against other people with certain demographic characteristics (Altonji & Pierret, 2001;
Dahlby, 1983). Also, it should be noted that, despite very few in numbers, there is evidence that some
insurgents were ethnic Javanese (Aspinall, 2009).
8Note also that inter-ethnic tensions were not exclusively against Javanese. Indigenous ethnic minori-
ties, who mostly live in central highland districts, were generally against the insurgency (Barter, 2015). In
fact, they formed the Aceh Leuser Antara around the year 2000, with the aim of forming a new province.
In addition, the outmigration had a direct effect on the region’s cultural diversity: Aceh ranked in the
bottom quartile of the Greenberg-Gini index (which measures diversity) in 2010—a 29 percentage point
drop compared with the value of the index in 1990.
9The law stipulated that the regional government would only keep 30 per cent of natural gas revenue
(minus tax); the share was even lower (15 per cent) for oil revenue. This was hardly fair for Aceh, where
98 per cent of the region’s exports value was from liquefied natural gas and condensate in the 2000s.
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were killed on both sides. However, in 2004, the largest earthquake ever recorded in
Indonesian history hit the western coast of Sumatra, and the subsequent tsunami killed
around 160,000 people, mostly in Aceh. The tragedy, alongside other factors, placed
tremendous pressure on both sides, and a peace agreement was signed in 2005.10
The insurgency displaced more than half a million people during the intense period
between 1999 and 2004, and took around 30,000 lives between 1976 and 2005 (MSR,
2009). There are also many accounts of gendered violence in Aceh. For example, In-
donesian security forces were accused of torture, rape and public stripping of women,
including underage girls. Such incidents were repeated in patterns that indicate the sys-
temic use of violence against women as a war tactic. Women in Aceh also suffered from
having their family members killed, and an estimate by the Indonesian human rights
committee suggests that 3,000 women were widowed from 1989 to 1998. The Indonesian
military responded by holding military tribunals that tried hundreds of soldiers in more
than 500 cases, from the beginning of the 2003 Offensive Military Operation (Amnesty
International, 2004, 2013).
The conflict affected the economy, with the financial loss corresponding to Indonesian
Rupiah (IDR) 107.4 trillion (equivalent to United States Dollar [USD] 10.7 billion at that
time) or 7.4 per cent of provincial gross domestic product (GDP) from 1999 to 2004. The
national government also bore a financial burden, mainly from expenditure for military
campaigns. Inflation in Aceh was always higher than average in Indonesia during the
height of the conflict (2000 to 2004), except in 2003, when a cease-fire lasted for several
months.11 Local governments were barely functioning during the last phase of the conflict,
as only one-sixth of the provincial budget was spent in 2001, which rendered public service
delivery ineffective.
10Other factors contributing to the successful peace negotiation included the active roles of political
leaders, pressure from international communities and weakened military powers (Harris, 2010; Schulze,
2007; Tunc¸er-Kılavuz, 2017).
11Aceh’s inflation in 2000 was almost twice that of Indonesia’s. This trend faded after 2005 and, from
2010 onwards, the rate of inflation in the province has been consistently lower than that of Indonesia.
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East Timor and Papua
The country also dealt with separatist movements in East Timor and Papua, where their
problematic integration with Indonesia fuelled the conflict. East Timor was annexed in
1976 after the former Portuguese colony declared its independence one year earlier. Papua
only became part of Indonesia in 1969 after the Act of Free Choice, which was criticised
for failing to fairly represent the voice of Papuans.12 A report from the Commission
for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor estimated that close to 20,000
people disappeared or were violently killed during the occupation. However, an estimate
by UCDP/PRIO suggests that the number was much higher, with up to 101,250 deaths.
Meanwhile, UCDP/PRIO estimates that up to 18,500 battle-related deaths occurred in
Papua from 1965 to 1978 (Lacina, 2009; Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005).
The two movements had different fates. The 1999 referendum guaranteed East
Timorese a future as a state, as 78.5 per cent of people voted for independence, whereas
the conflict in Papua continues today. The ongoing conflict in Papua is partly because of
the region’s mountainous and rough terrains, which render military operations ineffective.
In addition, rapid modernisation and significant changes in demographic composition are
important factors that have prolonged the conflict in Papua (McGibbon, 2004). Papua’s
vast natural resources have brought government-sponsored development projects aimed
at modernising the region, followed by the incoming of migrants to meet the demand for
skilled labour. However, the local population viewed the projects as meagre compensation
for the resource extraction, and the entry of migrants created ethnic divisions, worsened
by competition for land and resources. In East Timor, these factors were non-existent, as
the region was not resource rich and was not a major transmigration site.
2.4 The Transition Era
The previous section examined events during Suharto’s era. The dethroning of Suharto
marked the beginning of the Reformasi era, which continues today. The pattern of vi-
12The Free Papua Movement began in 1965, one year before Sukarno handed his power to Suharto.
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olence during Reformasi is best observed by splitting the period into the transition era
(1998 to 2004; this section) and the contemporary or post-conflict Indonesia (2005 to
today; next section), as the two periods have different characteristics, with the former as-
sociated with large communal violence, whereas violent incidents during the latter period
have been relatively small yet frequent.13
The country suffered from significant ethno-communal violence during the transition
era, including anti-Chinese violence in Jakarta and Muslim-Christian violence in Maluku.
The former occurred in May 1998 and, in Jakarta only, claimed the lives of 1,188 people
and damaged 1,026 houses.14 The latter occurred in practically all districts in Maluku
from January 1999 to June 2000. The large number of casualties (more than 5,000 people
killed) makes it the worst of all ethno-communal violence incidents. The United Nations
Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) data estimates the number of ethno-
communal violence events during the transition era jumped to 546 from just 57 during the
1990 to 1998 period.15 The number of collective violence events—incidents with at least
10 perpetrators—was also higher during the five years of the transition era than during
the last 18 years of the New Order.
Ethno-communal violence also emerged between local indigenous people and trans-
migrants, some of which was episodic. Between December 1996 and January 1997, conflict
between the indigenous Dayak communities against the Madurese transmigrants in Kali-
mantan resulted in 600 deaths (Human Rights Watch, 2001). The violence re-emerged
in 2001, with hundreds of casualties. Similar events occurred in Sumbawa, with the 1980
riots between Balinese transmigrants and the local communities resurfacing again in 2013.
The transmigration program is another example of the implementation of the aforemen-
tioned ’national model’ that is considered as one of the causes of violence. It was the
largest resettlement scheme in the world, driven by the national government’s efforts to
unite the country’s diverse ethnic groups and to relieve population pressure from Java to
13The year 2004/2005 was chosen as the cut-off period between the two eras, as it coincides with the
peace agreement between the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia and the introduction
of the first direct presidential election.
14It should be noted that the anti-Chinese violence also occurred in other parts of Indonesia, such as
in the city of Medan in Sumatra and Surakarta in Central Java.
15Note that the data only record group violence and do not count general crimes, terrorism or homicides.
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the outer islands.16 The program had been conducted since 1905, yet gained momentum
when, between 1969 and 1989, 919,000 families were permanently resettled. It was also
partially funded by loans from the World Bank, totalling USD 820 million for projects
approved from 1976 to 1992 (Fearnside, 1997). In addition to the government-sponsored
migration, the number of voluntary or spontaneous migrants were also large and they
were part of the estimated five million transmigrants relocated during the Suharto’s era.
Tadjoeddin (2010) argued that population migration, mostly from Java to outer
islands, contributed to the convergence across ethnic groups, which led to conflict. Eth-
nic grievances surfaced as the arrival of migrants generated grudges among local groups,
who felt that they were either being cheated (for having their economic resources taken
away) or looked down on (as the migrants tended to be more successful in trade). These
grudges could lead to violent conflict if supported by elites and weakened central authority,
as was the case during the transition era. Nevertheless, other studies have presented more
nuanced views on the transmigration program. For example, it was often spontaneous,
rather than the government-led transmigrants that were involved in some inter-ethnic
violent incidents. In addition, there were peaceful relationships between Javanese trans-
migrants and their local counterparts, even during the conflict (Barter & Coˆte´, 2015). For
example, during the Madurese-Dayak and Maluku conflict, Javanese transmigrants were
spared.
Finally, there is also an indication that events following the anti-communist purge
had a long-term effect on conflict during the transition era (Farid, 2005). For example,
the curtailment of labour unions and direct appropriation of wealth were considered part
of Suharto’s economic strategy to provide productive assets to military-backed business-
people. Consequently, the absence of rule of law during the transition era was claimed to
have instigated land and other conflict in some of these locations.
16There was also local transmigration, where people were reallocated to other areas within the same
province or district. This was usually conducted to move people from areas designated for development
projects, such as dams or plantations.
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2.5 Post-conflict Period
This section examines the characteristics of violence in the years following the end of
the Aceh insurgency. Unlike during the transition era, which was associated with large
incidents of ethno-communal violence, this period was characterised by low-intensity, high-
frequency violent incidents, as shown in Figure 2.1. According to data from the NVMS, the
number of people killed between 2005 and 2014 (21,166) was roughly the same as that in
the shorter period of 1998 and 2004 (21,274). While the number of casualties diminished,
the frequency of smaller incidents increased significantly. In addition, separatist violence
was greatly diminished following the Aceh peace agreement, and the Papua insurgency is
the only threat faced by the government today. See also Figures B.3 to B.9 in Appendix
B for the distribution of intensity of violence by region in 2005 and 2014.
Violence sometimes re-emerges in post-conflict regions. For example, on August
2019, a number of large cities in Papua experienced turmoil in which riots—allegedly
prompted by racist comments against Papuans—killed at least 23 people and caused a
massive flight of the population (BBC, 2019; Detik, 2019).17 Prior to this event, a number
of ethno-communal violent incidents erupted, particularly between the local population
and migrants from the Buginese ethnic group (Barter & Coˆte´, 2015).
Inequality is also a major factor that has been argued to ignite violence. The
literature generally divides inequality into two types: vertical and horizontal. The former
is typically measured using the Gini coefficient of income inequality, whereas the latter is
sometimes calculated by comparing group (e.g., ethnic) differences in income. Its historical
traces can be found even during the colonial era, as briefly mentioned in the introduction.
The country witnessed relative stability, both politically and economically, during
the 30 years of the New Order, which arguably mitigated the risk of conflict. However,
during the Reformasi era, Indonesia’s Gini index increased significantly from 0.285 in
2000 to 0.382 in March 2019, which has raised the question of how it may affect social
conflict. In one estimate, relative to regions with low income inequality, 28 more violent
17Note that since the access to the Papuan provinces is limited, especially for foreign media correspon-
dents, it is difficult to make a transparent assessment of the situation in the region (Kine, 2017).
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Figure 2.1: Frequency of violent incident and intensity, 1998-2014
Source: Calculated from NVMS.
Notes: The geographical coverage for NVMS between 1998 to 2004 is significantly smaller (nine
provinces) than that between 2005 to 2014 (16 to 34 provinces).
incidents are expected to occur in regions with a high Gini index (World Bank, 2016).
Additionally, the gap between rural and urban inequality is also large: 0.317 (rural)
versus 0.392 (urban) as of March 2019. In terms of geographic distribution, three of the
five provinces with the highest levels of income inequality are in Java.
Institutional changes have bred a new and growing type of violence related to local
elections. Heads of sub-national governments (districts and municipalities) were elected
by their respective local parliamentary prior to 2005, but the enactment of Law No.
32/2004 on Regional Governance and Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance provided the
legal foundations for greater regional autonomy. Consequently, heads of districts and
municipalities are now directly elected by the citizens as part of this decentralisation
wave. This change resulted in local election-related violence that increased from 187
incidents in 2005 to 477 in 2014. Although these violent incidents rarely resulted in
deaths, many people were injured, with approximately 81 people injured for every 100
local election-related violent incidents from 2005 to 2014.
Table 2.3 summarises the number of violent acts by type during the three periods
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following Indonesia’s independence. While the 1965 anti-communist purge was the worst
in terms of the number of casualties, the Reformasi era witnessed the largest number of
violent events. Importantly, everyday violence stands out during the Reformasi era in
terms of the number of people killed, and has prompted a number of quantitative studies.
Nevertheless, decentralisation provides the opportunity for local groups to push the
national government to create new districts, which reduces grievances at the local level and
eventually relieves inter-group tensions (Diprose, 2009). Decentralisation creates incen-
tives for locals to participate in local governments, both in the legislative and executive,
given the greater financial and political opportunities. For example, fiscal transfer to
regions increased by almost twofold from just 18 per cent of the national budget in 2000
to 33 per cent in 2010.
Signs of the politicisation of ethno-communal identities were visible in recent local
elections. In the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, the incumbent—a Christian Chinese
person—was controversially sent to prison for blasphemy charges. Amid growing identity
politics, ethnicity does not seem to play a significant role in formal Indonesian politics,
as indicated by the absence of ethnic political parties (Aspinall, 2016) and by the 2014
National Survey on Social Resilience, which ranked party affiliation the least important
factor for selecting the head of district (BPS, 2014). However, religious identity was twice
as important as ethnicity, with almost 70 per cent of the respondents agreeing that it
influenced their decision.
One of the latest studies identified three issues that contribute to post-conflict vio-
lence in Indonesia (Barron, 2019): (i) failed bargains among elites, (ii) the effect of past
conflict on community relationships (ethnic grievances) and (iii) weak institutions (partic-
ularly the state).18 Nonetheless, violence does not necessarily occur every time these issues
emerge. In particular, significantly large incentives for all three actors—elites, society and
the state (including the military)—are required to make violence profitable.
18The definition of post-conflict violence as ’the episodic violence that occurs in areas emerging from
extended violence where extended violence has not restarted’ (Barron, 2019, p. 19) is rather restricting, as
it excludes areas that have never experienced extended violence (i.e., civil wars and extended communal
violence). Therefore, Barron’s case studies were limited to six districts that experienced this type of
violence.
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Table 2.3: Numbers and types of violent acts in the history of modern Indonesia
Types Sukarno era New Order era Reformasi era
Open confrontation with foreign entity 1 0 0
(<1,000)1
Civil war/insurgency 4 3 2
(45,000)2 (35,000)3 (8,825)3
State oppression N/A 106 2,855
(500,000-1,000,000) (1,434)
- Large scale N/A 1 0
(500,000-1,000,000)4
- Small scale N/A 105 2,855
(>5,000)5,6 (1,434)7
Ethno-communal N/A 57 1,840
(2,256)5 (8,708)7
Routine, everyday violence N/A 685 19,137
(189)5 (23,473)7
Notes: The numbers in brackets refer to the estimated number of deaths. The proxy for state oppression
is violence in the law-enforcement category in the NVMS. 1 Carver (1986). 2UCDP/PRIO database.
3Vickers (2005). 4Cribb (2001). 5UNSFIR (1990 to 20 May 1998). 6Including victims of ’Petrus’ shooter
(see Table 2.2). 7NVMS (June 1998 to 2014). The numbers are skewed towards violence in the Reformasi
era because of data availability.
The two non-state actors are important because, in Indonesia, violence is not the
monopoly of the state (Colombijn, 2002). Social factions outside the state contribute to
violence, as reflected in paramilitary groups, which are usually affiliated with political par-
ties and youth and religious organisations. Non-state factions are sometimes supported
by the military for political purposes, as in the case of Pamswakarsa, which was born in
1998 and, in later years, became the umbrella organisation for extreme Islamist groups
(Mudhoffir, 2017; Hadiz, 2018). Violence by these groups is not simply an expression of
self-administered justice, but also a means to seize power (Collins, 2002). In contrast,
Cribb (2002) presented a different view and suggested that Indonesia is predisposed to-
wards such groups, as the country witnessed the recurrence of paramilitary groups during
turbulent times (e.g., during the 1965 to 1966 anti-communist purge).
Figure 2.2 displays how different support for violence by the three actors predicts
the type of violence that will occur. According to this framework, episodic and infrequent
violent incidents are usually supported by actors outside the central state. Meanwhile,
small, infrequent acts of violence do not seem to require any support from the three
actors above, thereby implying that such violence may occur without coordination from
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Figure 2.2: Violence actors and types
Source: Barron (2019, p. 42).
the perpetrators.
2.6 Summary
Three broad themes emerged in this chapter: (i) (ethnic and economic) grievances, (ii)
institutions and (iii) economic opportunities. These themes are dependent on each other
and, together, explain the occurrence of conflict in modern Indonesia. For example,
grievance is one of the factors that explain secessionist movements during the New Order,
as well as violent incidents during the Reformasi era. However, grievance alone would
not prolong the conflict in Aceh, unless supported by Suharto’s militaristic approach (an
institutional factor). Additionally, the large quantity of natural resources in Aceh and
Papua (an economic factor) increased the stake of the conflict.
Despite the common themes, the findings in this chapter raise a number of issues
regarding how they explain violence in post-conflict Indonesia. For example, several
institutional changes only occurred or took effect during this period (e.g., decentralisation)
and it would be natural to control for such factors in the empirical model. However,
some factors were present before this era and are argued to may have had a long-term
effect on recent conflicts. The height of the transmigration program was in the 1980s,
but its purported effect on violence (through the mechanism of ethnic grievances) may
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reverberated until at least the transition era. In addition, some factors have unclear effects
on conflict occurrence. Increased local government revenue following decentralisation
may ignite competition among political parties, leading to local election-related violence.
However, it also creates space for bargaining among local elites, as the ruling party may
share the revenue with the opposition to stymie tension.
These issues can be resolved by reviewing the economics of conflict literature (Chap-
ter 3) as this provides the theoretical foundation for the occurrence of conflict or violence.
In addition, Chapter 3 also examines empirical cross-country and Indonesian studies that
provide a direct guide for Chapter 4’s empirical model.
Beyond Indonesia, the rest of the world could learn from the historical trajectory
of post-colonial Indonesia in at least two respects. First, an authoritarian model of
government—as in the case of Sukarno and Suharto—would create infighting among the
elites, aimed at being the close confidant of the dictator, which resulted in population-
wide violence. Such situation would less likely happen in a functional liberal democracy
as there will be check and balance from other branches of the government. Second, in-
surgencies were usually starting with a small support from the population, but when the
source of grievances were left unaddressed (or responded with a strong militaristic ap-
proach), the movement would quickly escalates to became a large-scale rebellion. This is
apparent in the case of the Aceh conflict where the 1989-1998 counterinsurgency opera-
tions backlashed and more Acehnese joined the movement. Overall, these lessons show
the importance of not only a functional democracy, but also a government that listens
to the people and solves the underlying grievances, than the one that only cares with
relieving the symptoms by putting more troops on the ground.
Part II
The Antecedents of Violence
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Chapter 3
The Economics of Conflict
The second part of this thesis provides a review of the studies examining the antecedents
of conflict or violence (this chapter) and an empirical investigation using Indonesian data
(Chapter 4). This chapter begins with a review of the theories and empirical findings
from cross-country studies examining the occurrence of conflict or violence. It discusses
quantitative studies examining conflict in Indonesia, complementing the historical, quali-
tative explanations of the roots of violence. In sum, this chapter provides the framework
that guides the specifications of the empirical model in Chapter 4.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter expands the discussion of the causes of conflict provided in Chapter 2. The
literature can be divided, although not exclusively, into three categories that emphasise
the importance of: (i) greed, (ii) group grievances and (iii) institutions. Most studies are
based on the analysis of cross-country data to understand the occurrence of large-scale
conflict, such as civil wars. While these studies provide insights regarding the factors
associated with such conflict, these factors may not be important in explaining the routine,
everyday violence that occurs in post-conflict Indonesia.
This chapter does not extensively review the literature on terrorism, despite Indone-
sia’s experience of terrorist attacks during the past decade. The number of incidents and
casualties caused by terrorist attacks are usually significantly lower than those from other
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types of violence. However, some studies have found that terrorism is positively associated
with some ethno-cultural variables, such as ethnic polarisation (Krieger & Meierrieks,
2010), religious fractionalisation (Freytag, Kru¨ger, Meierrieks, & Schneider, 2011) and
ethnic tension (Basuchoudhary & Shughart, 2010). Therefore, this literature does sup-
port a role of cultural diversity in explaining violence (for a compilation of studies on the
determinants of terror, see the appendix of Kis-Katos, Liebert, & Schulze, 2011). Finally,
studies on non-fatal violence in sports (Cuesta & Boho´rquez, 2012; Miguel, Saiegh, &
Satyanath, 2008) are also omitted. While it is true that some sports have a high potential
for fatality, such as boxing, they generally have prevention mechanisms that can minimise
such risk.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents explana-
tions and theories on the causes and effects of conflict. Section 3.3 presents a summary of
the studies using cross-country data to examine conflict, while Section 3.4 discusses the
quantitative studies that focus on conflict in Indonesia specifically. Finally, Section 3.5
summarises the chapter.
3.2 What Explains Conflict?
This section examines potential conflict determinants from three theoretical perspec-
tives: (i) rational economic models, (ii) cultural diversity/grievances and (iii) institutions.
Economists and political scientists often use formal mathematical models to posit theories
of conflict. However, such an approach is criticised for reducing conflict to a simple market
problem (Keen, 2000; Vahabi, 2009) and ignoring the role of grievances and institutions
that regulate human interactions, including the use of violence. Also, it is necessary to
note that the grievance hypothesis was developed alongside with the ’greed’ or rational
model of conflict (i.e., in Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).
In political science, theories on grievances and conflict can be divided into three
groups: relative deprivation, polarisation (or fractionalisation) and horizontal inequality
(Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2009). Theories on relative deprivation, for example, argue that
conflict may arise because of the gap between their aspirations and what they actually
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achieved. Meanwhile, a polarised or fractionalised societies with salient group identities
may lead to conflict for public goods. Lastly, horizontal inequality refers to gaps (e.g.,
in public spending) between groups, which, again, may resulted in conflict. This section
focuses on ethnic grievances as ethnicity is a salient feature that strengthened group
identities. Moreover, as will be seen in the empirical findings, ethnic polarisation or
fractionalisation prominently featured in the regression analysis.
3.2.1 Rationalist Explanations of Conflict
Conflict as a Bargaining Problem
There are five categories of rationalist economic theories, whereby conflict is believed to
arise from a bargaining problem between competing parties. The first three categories
relate to ’opportunities’ (to obtain material gains), ’preferences’ (or attitude for hatred)
and ’perceptions’ (information asymmetries). They are credited to Hirshleifer (1989)—one
of the leading authorities in the field of conflict economics. The other two categories—
’incomplete contracting’ and ’issue indivisibility’—were proposed by Fearon (1995). In
these theories, representative agents in the form of elites are important in determining
the conflict outcome.
The opportunistic (materialistic/greed) model is where agents are engaged in com-
petition for resources, including by using violent force. In one of the basic versions of the
models, agents contest for a prize that can only be obtained through conflict (Garfinkel
& Skaperdas, 2007). By producing ’guns’ with resources that can be used for positive
economic use, agents have a greater probability of winning the contest. Under certain
assumptions, a larger prize will induce greater conflict, even after considering the cost of
producing guns. These theoretical analyses of conflict relate to representative agent mod-
els with Contest Success Functions (CSFs), where the probability of winning is dependent
on agents’ valuation of winning the prize and exerted efforts (Hirshleifer, 1991). In recent
studies, CSF was used to study alliance formation (Konrad, 2014), inter-group conflict
(Abbink et al., 2010; Konrad & Morath, 2012) and political stability (Jia & Liang, 2014).
Conflict may also arise from preference incompatibility. Hirshleifer (1995) used an
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example from evolutionary biology, where genetic relatedness is thought to be an impor-
tant factor that explains individuals’ willingness to sacrifice for others. Bowles and Gintis
(2011) noted that the survival of one group depends on the share of prosocial individuals,
leading to in-group generosity and out-group selfishness (parochialism). However, pref-
erences may change following conflict experience. While the research on antisocial pref-
erences indicates spite as a motivation for destructive behaviour (Abbink & Herrmann,
2011; Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009).
Asymmetric information can also lead to conflict. In the simplest case, war occurs
when one state miscalculates another state’s willingness to enter conflict, as in the case of
Japan’s miscalculation of the United States’ willingness to go to war in 1941. Communi-
cation may bridge the information gap, but there are situations where not revealing the
truth is preferred. Fearon (1995) elaborated this by arguing that states have incentives
to misrepresent (private) information (e.g., to look tough), which reduces the bargaining
range. Critics of this approach argue that true fighting capability is quickly observed
in the field and, therefore, this theory is unable to explain prolonged wars (Blattman &
Miguel, 2010; Fearon, 2004). Another theory based on CSFs predicted the sustainability
of peace that was conditional on the material incentive of going to war and the fear of be-
ing attacked (Chassang & Miquel, 2010). This model also predicted that, under complete
information, stocking guns facilitates peace, which in turns explains the arms race.
Incomplete contracting models do not rely on informational asymmetry to explain
conflict. In this approach, a short-term peace contract brokered by elites can be made,
yet will not hold in the long term. Backwards induction of a dynamic, two-period game
shows that long-term peace is not feasible, since the prize of winning a war in the first
period can be carried over to the second period (Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007). This result
would be stronger when the discount rate is high, and the conflict technology is better.
Finally, issue indivisibility is related to the way issues and disputes are perceived
by the conflicting agents. Originally proposed by Fearon (1995), the approach argues
that some issues are simply non-negotiable. The prolonged Israel-Palestine conflict is an
example of the way in which the unwillingness of both parties to share major religious
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sites has brought ongoing violence to the region. To date, there are few economic studies
with this theory as the core of its contentions.
Explaining Group Grievances
The theories above focus on models where elites play a large role in the bargaining among
adversaries. These theories largely ignore the role of group relations within a society in
instigating conflict. The following theories try to explain how variations in groups, such
as ethnic groups, can cause conflict. These theories explicitly incorporate similarities
between ethnic groups in their models.
The first model links conflict with inequality across groups, proxied by three distri-
butional measures (polarisation, fractionalisation and the Greenberg-Gini index divided
by total population, G/N) (Esteban & Ray, 1999, 2011).1 Note that inequality is not re-
stricted to income groups, but can also be between ethnic or political groups. The payoff
of an individual in group m exerting efforts r in a conflict with k number of groups is
given by:
piumm + pm
µ
sm
−
k∑
n=1
pnpidmn − c(r),
where pi is the benefit for all groups (public payoff), µ is the private payoff and pm(n)
is the probability of success for group m(n). sm is group m’s population share. Lastly, dmn
is the ’distance’ or difference in utility between m’s ideal policy when n’s policy is chosen
(dmn ≡ umm − umn). This inter-group distance captures preferences over public goods.2
Measuring inter-group distance is important. In a conflict where the groups are similar,
the losing side may still receive benefits from the winning group. When the groups are
very different, the losers may not receive any benefit. Such situations cannot be captured
by the model if inter-group distance is absent.
The equilibrium conflict intensity of this model is determined by individual pref-
1The Greenberg-Gini index is the fractionalisation index weighted by inter-group distance. The dis-
tinction between various distributional measures is discussed in Chapter 4 section 4.2
2When income group is the focus, the distance is the income gap between each group. When ethno-
linguistic group is the focus, the distance can be in the form of similarities in language.
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erences and group size, aggregated into the three aforementioned distributional indices.
The nature and size of the prize, as well as the level of group cohesion, are important in
determining the equilibrium level of conflict intensity, where high levels of polarisation
and fractionalisation increase the probability of conflict over public and private goods,
respectively, whereas group cohesion increases the effect of both indices.
The second theory emphasises the possibility of individuals changing their identity
(Caselli & Coleman, 2013).3 The cost of changing identity can be in the form of the cost
to a person of changing their name and, perhaps more importantly, the feeling of losing
their ’real’ identity. The cost can be prohibitively high, and changing one’s identity is not
always possible, such as changing from dark to fair skin.
The utility of an individual from a minority group that ’switches’ to the dominant
group in a conflict situation is given by:
US = (1− ρ)
[
(1− ϕ)y + z
n′
]
,
where ρ is the fraction of resource lost from conflict, ϕ is the cost parameter for
switching identity, y is the individual’s endowment, and the last term is the (equally-
divided) winning prize, z, received by individuals in the (final) dominant group n′ that
accounts for those who switched.
The model predicts three possible solutions—war, peace or exploitation—that de-
pend on the financial incentives of appropriation by the dominant group. Exploitation
occurs when the number of switching is expected to be low. The model also predicts
a non-linear relationship between prize size and exploitation. A low prize discourages
exploitation, while a large prize motivates those in the minority group to move to the
dominant group.
3The authors originally used ’ethnic distance’ for the cost of changing one’s ethnic identity. However,
to avoid confusion with the previous model, a more generic term (’cost’) was used in this review instead.
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3.2.2 Ethnic Grievances and Cultural Diversity
This sub-section discusses the use of cultural diversity as a proxy for ethnic grievances,
which are often used in empirical models, including those used to test the aforementioned
theory by Esteban and Ray on inequality and conflict. Cultural diversity is a salient
feature that can be easily manipulated to mobilise groups. In studies on ethnonation-
alist movements, three alternative views regarding the nature of group identities have
emerged (Burr & Pitsch, 2003): primordial, instrumental and constructivist. The pri-
mordial argument views ethnonationalism as a manifestation of a group of people sharing
a similar common ancestor and culture. The instrumental argument views ethnic iden-
tity as a means by political elites to obtain power, where they may condone the use of
violence. The constructivist approach views ethnicity as, to some extent, a construction
by individuals trying to revive traditions or other national identities.4
There are three broad theories that seek to explain the relationship between cultural
diversity and conflict or civil war. The dominant one, often referred to as ’threat’—
or group grievances—theory, asserts that violence and conflict are more likely to arise
in diverse environments because of cultural or ethnic groups being threatened by other
groups (Blalock, 1967). Threats might stem from access to resources, jobs and income,
but also to a group’s cultural values and identity. Such threats and grievances grow as
the size of out-groups increases. Further, such threats are exacerbated by some groups
having greater power than others, and when discrimination occurs (Easterly & Levine,
1997).
An alternative theory, often called ’contact’ theory, asserts that a high level of
ethnic diversity minimises the chances of conflict because of interactions between groups
that overcome stereotypes and biases (Allport, Clark, & Pettigrew, 1954). The potential
implication of the theory is that, as out-groups grow in size, the likelihood of inter-group
contact and interaction increases, and, as negative stereotypes are dispelled, the chance
of conflict between groups falls. Moreover, democracy might be promoted in ethnically
4These views need not be mutually exclusive, as the primordial argument may be true in the short
term, but groups’ identities may change in the long term, which brings the constructivist argument into
play.
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diverse countries, since it will be very unlikely that one ethnic group will dominate political
power (Reilly, 2001).
An intermediate theory suggests that the relationship between diversity and conflict
is non-monotonic. Specifically, the relationship between ethnic diversity and the risk of
conflict takes the form of an inverted-U shape. As argued by Horowitz (1985), very low
and very high levels of diversity are associated with a low probability of conflict, but
mid-levels of fractionalisation engender conflict. Horowitz seminal work was followed by
Collier and Hoeffler (1998), who modelled conflict as a collective decision and introduced
coordination costs that accrue from changing individual decisions into collective ones. The
higher these coordination costs, the lower the probability of conflict. They argued that
an ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index (ELF) (which measures the probability that any
two citizens will be drawn from a different ethnolinguistic group) provides a good proxy
for these costs. At low levels of fractionalisation, coordination costs would be high, since
virtually everyone is from the same group and there would be little distinction between
them; thus, provoking conflict would be difficult. Coordination costs would also be high
(and the risk of conflict low) when levels of fractionalisation are high, since potential rebels
would need to coordinate across multiple ethnic groups. Therefore, the risk of conflict is
highest in the middle range of the fractionalisation index.
Theories that relate cultural diversity or group grievances to conflict can be criticised
on several grounds. First, the mobilisation of people to conduct violence might not be
relevant when the prize of conflicts is small. Individual person could just engage in a
violent act without waiting for other people to join. Second, following Barron (2019),
it is unclear how much influence elites hold over society in a post-conflict period. A
diverse society may remain in peace when elites agree to cease conflict; alternatively, elites
manipulating existing grievances can lead to conflict recurrence (as in the instrumental
argument discussed in the early part of this sub-section). Third, group grievances may not
necessarily lead to violence when individuals are unwilling to participate. For example,
Caselli and Coleman (2013) theory discussed above tries to capture this issue by assuming
that people can migrate to another identity group. Finally, societies are not living in a
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vacuum, as there is a set of rules that govern the way people live and behave. Building
on this point, the next sub-section discusses the importance of institutions in containing
conflict.
3.2.3 The Role of Institutions
Institutions are defined as ’the rules of the game in a society or, more formally ... the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990, p. 3). There-
fore, institutions are mutable: when a set of rules is deemed irrelevant to existing social
interactions, an alternative may be proposed. Consequently, social orders—the patterns
of social organisation—change following adjustments in institutions. Different social or-
ders dictate how violence is contained in a society; where most of the world today is still
in the form of a ’natural state’ as political systems are actively used to control violence
and regulate social and economic activities (North et al., 2009). However, some countries
or states have developed an open access order, where legitimate use of violence is consol-
idated under political systems and further constrained by a set of rules. In addition, the
transition from natural states to an open access order requires a set of rules of law for the
elites, as well as perpetually lived private and public elite organisations (e.g., the state
itself).
Organisations such as the state are thought to have emerged to consolidate the power
to enforce norms that are needed to prevent widespread conflict. Given that states are
expected to have a monopoly over the use of violence, a research agenda has been devoted
to understanding the ways states could achieve such a goal. In one of the theories, weak or
absent state intervention permits the use of decentralised punishment mechanisms, such
as vigilantism, to enforce order (Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Taylor, 1982). When the means
of violence is centralised, at the hand of the state, its interaction with existing (formal
and informal) institutions might alter the incentives for handling order. Following the
works of Fearon and Laitin (1996), Tajima (2013) proposed a game-theoretic model,
where two local communities face different incentives to either restrain their in-groups or
punish out-groups. The game has multiple equilibria that depend on the degree of state
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security intervention in dealing with communal violence. Specifically, the vigilantism
equilibrium—where both communities are better off punishing out-groups—exists when
there is heavy state intervention in the area. According to this view, the breakdown of
state institutions may result in a higher likelihood of communal violence.
Many of the rules are codified into formal institutions, but some persist as relation-
based informal institutions that tend to be stronger in developing countries (Boesen,
2007). Informal, relation-based institutions are useful, as they have low establishment
costs and are effective in small societies. Nonetheless, because they do not have a written
set of rules, they may lead to indefinite enforcement of norms, some of which could lead
to violence. Therefore, it is necessary to consider how institutions, whether formal or
informal, may affect social order—particularly the incidence of violence.
The limitation of an institutional approach to violence is that it may not be wholly
sufficient to explain within-country variations in violence. This is particularly evident
when the state is the focus. Rules and structures are generally established at a national
level and implemented equally across different sub-national governments (Barron, 2019).
Alternatively, one could exploit a specific facet of institutional arrangements that may
explain violence.
3.3 Cross-country Empirical Findings
This section summarises the results from cross-country empirical studies to provide an
empirical picture of the correlates of conflict. These studies typically used longitudinal
data with a binary dependent variable taking the value of one for the onset or incidence
of civil war (e.g., defined as internal conflict with at least 1,000 people killed) and zero
otherwise. Early works on this topic (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) used and updated the
Correlates of War data (Singer & Small, 1994), but other researchers either developed
their own measure of civil conflict (such as Fearon & Laitin, 2003) or used data from
UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002).
The past decade has witnessed strong growth in the number of empirical studies
examining the source and role of cultural diversity in shaping macro and socioeconomic
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processes. The operational variables for cultural diversity are usually distributional in-
dices, such as the ethnolinguistic fractionalisation or polarisation indices calculated from
the Atlas Narodov Mira (ANM) dataset (Bruk & Apenchenko, 1964).
Posner (2004) criticised distributional indices because they cannot capture the dif-
ferent depths of ethnic division, particularly when the indices are based on ANM data
that were collected in the 1960s, given that geographical distribution and composition of
ethnic groups may be different today. To overcome this, he constructed a list of ethnic
groups that were relevant for African countries to calculate the fractionalisation index.
His approach is similar to the ’Fearon groups’, which use various data sources to construct
a list of relevant ethnic groups that is also used to measure ethnic fractionalisation by
country (Fearon, 2003). ’Fearon groups’ have been used in empirical studies to assess
whether cultural diversity may have a role in increasing the risk of conflict (Cederman &
Girardin, 2007; Esteban, Mayoral, & Ray, 2012; Fearon, Kasara, & Laitin, 2007; Fearon
& Laitin, 2003).
Further, researchers have incorporated cultural or linguistic distance in the con-
struction of the indices (e.g., Esteban & Ray, 2011; Fearon, 2003) or created alternative
measures (e.g., the N* index that captures peripheral groups’ interactions with the eth-
nic group currently in power) (Cederman & Girardin, 2007). The N* index is uniquely
designed to analyse ethnonationalist wars and, therefore, may not be relevant to other
types of conflict.
Ethnic oppositions can also be elicited using group-level analysis. Researchers as-
sociated with the ’Uppsala group’ disaggregated ethnic group data into spatial maps and
estimated the likelihood of a dyadic conflict between the dominant and periphery ethnic
group (Buhaug, Cederman, & Rød, 2008; Cederman & Girardin, 2007). Consequently,
the usual metrics of ethnic heterogeneity became irrelevant, since dyads (pairs) of ethnic
groups were used as the level of analysis. Using geo-referenced data has the advantage
of enabling a large sample size (8,969 geo-referenced polygons for 929 ethnic groups), yet
lacks other information, especially economic information, that could explain conflict at
that level. Consequently, GDP data, for example, must be aggregated at the country/state
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level or proxied with other variables (e.g., road density) (Buhaug & Rød, 2006).
The quality of institutions, especially regarding democracy, in cross-country analyses
is often taken from the Polity project (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2002). However, m
ost of the measures are the outcomes of existing institutional arrangements, which do
not necessarily reflect their predisposition to the rule of law (Easterly, 2001). In addition,
measures of quality are usually based on general outcomes of institutional arrangements—
bureaucratic quality, democracy and political rights—that do not account for other aspects
of institutions, such as the presence of community organisations that provide the means
for social bonding, the quality of the business environment or country-specific institutional
arrangements.
Table A.1 in the appendix summarises the literature on the way that economic fac-
tors, cultural diversity and institutions are correlated with conflict.5 Countries’ economic
characteristics are argued to better predict the probability of civil war than grievance fac-
tors (e.g., ethnic diversity) (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Nonetheless,
many studies have found a detrimental effect of cultural diversity on violence (Cederman &
Girardin, 2007; Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, & Wacziarg, 2012; Esteban et al., 2012; Montalvo
& Reynal-Querol, 2005). Interestingly, the effect of cultural diversity can be non-linear, as
in the context of post-war periods, where the variable has an inverted-U relationship with
peace breakdown (Mason, Gurses, Brandt, & Michael Quinn, 2011).6 However, such a
non-linear effect was not observed in the context of civil war onset or prevalence (Elbadawi
& Sambanis, 2002).
There is mixed evidence regarding the way institutions affect conflict. Some cross-
country empirical investigations indicate that better institutional quality is associated
with a lower probability of conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), and high institutional
quality cancels out the effect of ethnic diversity in explaining war casualties (Easterly,
5Cultural and institutional variables (column 4) are specifically included in the table, since the focus
of this thesis is on the way cultural diversity affects violence. The importance of economic factors is
examined in the last column on main findings.
6The authors use hazard models with the length of peace duration after any civil war as the de-
pendent variable and a quadratic function of ethnic fractionalisation index as one of the independent
variables. They find consistent results where peace is expected to be longer in very homogeneous or
highly fragmented countries.
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2001). Interestingly, when various measures of cultural heterogeneity are included, the
importance of institutional variables diminishes (Esteban et al., 2012). There is also an
apparent puzzle whereby democracy is positively associated with civil wars (Cederman &
Girardin, 2007).
Given that the focus of this thesis is violence in post-conflict Indonesia, a country-
specific review of the literature provides deeper insight. Country studies outside In-
donesia have identified the factors associated with local violence, including economic and
geographical conditions in Nepal (Do & Iyer, 2007), cultural diversity in Liberia (Blair,
Blattman, & Hartman, 2017) and population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (Witmer,
Linke, O’Loughlin, Gettelman, & Laing, 2017). After reviewing 60 primary studies,
Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013) found a consistent association between environmental
shocks and various types of human conflict, including personal violence, such as aggressive
behaviour, violent crime and domestic violence.
Specifically, on the effect of cultural diversity, a country level analysis can capture
within-country spatial distributions of ethnic groups—something that is not feasible in
cross-country studies. This is particularly important in countries with a considerable
number of ethnic groups and vast geographical areas, such as India and Indonesia. For
example, Urdal (2008) found that linguistic fractionalisation was associated with a higher
incidence of armed conflict in India, while religious heterogeneity was positively correlated
with Hindu-Muslim riots. The next section discusses the findings from quantitative studies
on Indonesia specifically, and explores how cultural diversity is captured empirically.
3.4 Quantitative Studies of Conflict and Violence in
Indonesia
This section expands the discussion in Chapter 2 by reviewing the quantitative studies
that examined the factors contributing to violence in Indonesia. The results from these
studies can once again be categorised into those finding that violence is associated with: (i)
economic development, (ii) group grievance and (iii) institutions. The findings from this
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section inform the next chapter’s empirical investigation, which uses sub-national-level
data. The sub-national analysis provides insights that complement the lab-in-the-field
experiment, particularly regarding the role of cultural diversity in violent behaviour.
Indonesia is ranked 23rd (out of 151 countries) in terms of cultural diversity (as
measured by the ELF taken from the original 1961 ANM dataset), and, among other Asian
countries, sits only beneath India and the Philippines. Indonesia is still ranked moderately
highly (31st out of 179 countries) in the updated 1985 ELF (Roeder, 2001). The latest
population census indicates that the country has 964 ethnic groups, while Ethnologue
documents more than 700 living languages (Simons & Fennig, 2017). Using the ANM as
the basis for estimating cultural diversity in Indonesia is inappropriate because it only
covers 10 languages in its original dataset.
Most of the studies in this section were based on data from the last two decades (the
oldest year covered is 1990)—a period that witnessed two significant attempts of secession
(the Aceh and Papua insurgency). Some of the data also excluded regions experiencing
insurgencies. Consequently, these studies were generally concerned with local violent
conflict, rather than extended conflict, such as civil wars. Many of the studies in Indonesia
used the UNSFIR data, where the first wave covered the period from 1990 to 2001 and
used national newspapers articles for its source. The second wave used both national and
provincial newspaper articles and had a slightly broader time span (1990 to 2003), but
at the cost of only covering 14 provinces (compared with 26 provinces in the first wave)
(Tadjoeddin, 2002; Varshney, Tadjoeddin, & Panggabean, 2008). In practice, researchers
combine both waves for conflict analysis. The use of newspaper articles to collect data
on violence in Indonesia is not limited to local news outlet, as data can also be obtained
from overseas sources (e.g., Australia’s Sydney Morning Herald in Rohner & Saia, 2019).
Another source of data on violence is the village census (Potensi Desa, Podes),
available every three years from 2003. However, the Podes data have been criticised for a
lack of consistency and their particularly strong reliance on village heads’ reports (Barron
et al., 2016). UCDP/PRIO’s grid-level data have also been used to understand maritime
piracy—a form of criminal violence—as 25 per cent of global incidents occur in or around
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the Indonesian territory (Daxecker & Prins, 2016).
Many of the latest studies used data from the National Violence Monitoring Sur-
vey (NVMS) that are publicly available from mid-2016 from the World Bank’s website
(World Bank, 2018). The data collection was a collaboration between the Indonesia’s
Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare, the Habibie Center and the World Bank. It
is considered the most comprehensive survey on violence in the country (Barron et al.,
2016). The NVMS also uses newspaper articles, and this practice is widely regarded the
best way to collect violence data in Indonesia (Varshney, 2008). The NVMS data are
available from 1997 to 2014, but their coverage varies among 34 provinces (see Table A.2
in the appendix). The number of districts/municipalities in the NVMS increased from
256 in 2005 to 279 in 2013 because of district proliferation.7
The NVMS not only records incidence of violence and the number of people involved,
but also the number of casualties (people killed or injured). The survey categorises an
event as violent if it is intentional and causes physical harm to humans or property. The
data can also be broken down into violence in conflict and non-conflict situations. The
former includes conflict over natural resources, governance, executive/legislative elections,
identities, vigilantism and separatism, while the latter includes general crime, violent
incidents from law enforcement and domestic (household) violence.
Table 3.1 summarises the quantitative studies on conflict and violence on Indone-
sia. Unlike most cross-country studies, where the dependent variable is a binary dummy
for civil war, many quantitative conflict studies in Indonesia use the number of violent
incidents instead. In addition, while some studies focus on the factors that explain ethno-
communal violence, many are interested with general everyday violence.
7Divided by regions, the provinces covered in 2005 to 2013 are: (i) Eastern Indonesia (Maluku, Maluku
Utara, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Papua, Papua Barat); (ii) Java-Bali (DKI Jakarta,
Jawa Timur); (iii) Kalimantan (Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Tengah); (iv) Sulawesi (Sulawesi Selatan,
Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Utara), and; (v) Sumatra (Aceh, Lampung, and Sumatra Utara).
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Table 3.1: Quantitative conflict studies on Indonesia
Source Coverage and source Dependent variable Cultural diversity regressor Main findings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Chen (2007) 100 villages (excluding
Aceh and Papua), 1997-
1999; UNSFIR
Social violence Religious intensity (household
level), per capita religious institu-
tion (village level)
The positive association between religious inten-
sity and social violence was stronger after the
1997 crisis.
Tadjoeddin and
Murshed (2007)
Javanese district, 1990-
2003; UNSFIR
Number of routine vio-
lent incidents
None Non-linear (inverted-U curve) relationship of ed-
ucation and income with number of routine vi-
olent incidents. Population size was positively
associated with routine violence.
Mancini (2008) 193 districts, 1997-2003;
UNSFIR
Dummy ethnic violence ELF, ethnolinguistic polarisation,
religious polarisation
In ethnically diverse districts, religious polarisa-
tion positively increased the likelihood of ethnic
conflict. Horizontal inequality (in health and
political) increased the likelihood of ethnic con-
flict.
Barron, Kaiser,
and Pradhan
(2009)
50,530 villages (exclud-
ing those in high conflict
provinces), 2003; Podes
Dummy violent con-
flict (cases with mate-
rial damage)
Ethnic diversity index, ethnic clus-
tering, share of Javanese outside
Java
Ethnic clustering and low enactment of property
rights were associated with a higher likelihood of
violent conflict. Horizontal inequality in educa-
tion decreased the likelihood of violent conflict.
Murshed, Tadjoed-
din, and Chowd-
hury (2009)
Javanese district, 1990-
2003; UNSFIR
Number of routine vio-
lent incidents
None Fiscal spending after decentralisation and share
of government budget to GDP was associated
with lower occurrence of routine violence.
Østby, Urdal, Tad-
joeddin, Murshed,
and Strand (2011)
25 provinces, 1990-2003;
UNSFIR
Dummy routine and
episodic violence
Religious polarisation Religious polarisation and horizontal inequal-
ity could not explain the likelihood of violence.
GDP per capita and population size were im-
portant in predicting violent outbursts.
Tadjoeddin,
Chowdhury, and
Murshed (2012)
980 Javanese district-
year, 1994-2003; UNSFIR
Number of routine vio-
lent incidents
None Districts with both high population density and
growth experienced more violence. Income in-
equality positively predicted violence.
Tadjoeddin (2013) 255 district-year, 1997-
2002; UNSFIR
Categorical variable for
ethnic violence
None Income-welfare gap (as a proxy for relative
deprivation-related grievance) was positively as-
sociated with ethnic violence.
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Source Coverage and source Dependent variable Cultural diversity regressor Main findings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tajima (2013) 51,913 villages, 2003 and
2005; Podes
Dummy communal vio-
lence
Ethnic and religious fractionalisa-
tion, ethnic and religious cluster-
ing, dummy for Muslim majority
village, dummy for majority Ja-
vanese villages outside Java
Greater military presence lowered the risk of
communal violence. Ethnic fractionalisation
and clustering were associated with higher com-
munal violence. Javanese villages outside Java
tended to be peaceful, but the size effect was
comparably small among other covariates.
De Juan, Pier-
skalla, and Vu¨llers
(2015)
60,000 villages, 2003;
Podes
Dummy mass fighting Ethnic inequality, fractionalisa-
tion, and polarisation; religious
inequality, fractionalisation, and
polarisation; religious institutional
polarisation and fractionalisation;
local religious institutions density
Negative association between the probability of
mass fighting and the density of local religious
institutions.
Caruso, Petrarca,
and Ricciuti (2016)
108 province-year, 1993-
2003; UNSFIR
Number of violent inci-
dents
None Lower paddy production because of increased
minimum temperature led to a higher number
of violent incidents.
Daxecker and
Prins (2016)
2,367 grids (2,340 in In-
donesia, 27 in Malacca
Straits), 1998-2000 and
2003-2005; UCDP/PRIO
Number of piracy inci-
dents
None Small winning margins from local elections asso-
ciated with more piracy, indicating that pirates
increased their criminal activity to signal their
strength to the potentially new government.
Gubler, Selway,
and Varshney
(2016)*
175 district-year, 1997-
2014; NVMS
Number of Muslim-
Christian violent
incidents and fatalities
Religious-income cross-cuttingness
and religious-geographic cross-
cuttingness
Positive association between cross-cuttingness
(the degree that groups on one cleavage, such as
ethnicity, are distributed among groups on other
cleavages, such as social class) with inter-group
communal violence.
Tadjoeddin et al.
(2016)*
664 district-year, 2005-
2012; NVMS
Number of routine vio-
lent, violent crime and
ethnic violent incidents
Ethnic and religious fractionalisa-
tion
Income inequality associated with violence in
provinces that previously experienced extended
conflict. Ethnic fractionalisation negatively pre-
dicted routine and ethnic violence.
Pierskalla and
Sacks (2017)
915 district-year, 2001-
2010; NVMS
Number of violent inci-
dents
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation
and ethnic majority
Positive association between service delivery
and violence. Negative association between dis-
trict head election and district split on violence.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bazzi and Gud-
geon (2018)*
133 districts, 2000-2014;
NVMS
Dummy social conflict Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation
and polarisation with linguistic
distance, and change in diversity
District splitting increased conflict if the new
region became more (ethnically) polarised. In
contrast, conflict reduced when district prolifer-
ation created a more homogeneous population.
Bazzi, Gaduh,
Rothenberg, and
Wong (2019)
244 villages, 2000-2014;
NVMS; 817 villages,
2002-2014; Podes
Dummy ethnic conflict Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation
and polarisation
Fractionalisation (polarisation) was negatively
(positively) associated with the occurrence of
ethnic conflict.
Indra, Nazara,
Hartono, and
Sumarto (2019)
120 provinces, 1990-2012;
Podes
Number of social con-
flict
Ethnic fractionalisation Ethnic fractionalisation, income polarisation
and income inequality were positively correlated
with social conflict.
Rohner and Saia
(2019)*
289 districts, 1955-
1994; newspaper arti-
cles (NVMS, GDELT,
ICEWS in robustness
checks)
Dummy violent conflict Religious polarisation Using a quasi-natural experiment of 1974-1978
school construction programs, education was
found to reduce conflict. This effect was larger
in polarised districts.
Notes: Sorted by year of publication. *Working papers.
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3.4.1 Economic Development and Grievance
Income, as measured by GDP per capita, has at least some degree of positive associa-
tion with routine violence, suggesting that violent incidents tend to occur in rich regions
(Barron et al., 2009; Østby et al., 2011; Pierskalla & Sacks, 2017; Tadjoeddin & Murshed,
2007). However, poverty, another measure of economic wellbeing, is also positively as-
sociated with violence. Together, these results suggest that regions with high per capita
income yet a large number of poor people tend to have a high level of violence.8 Relat-
edly, vertical inequality, as measured using a Gini coefficient, is positively associated with
violent incidents (Tadjoeddin et al., 2012, 2016). Using the school construction program
as a quasi-natural experiment, education was found to have a positive effect on peace,
particularly in religiously divided districts (Rohner & Saia, 2019).9
As shown in column 4 of Table 3.1, studies typically control for cultural diversity
but only one study (Bazzi & Gudgeon, 2018) that take into account linguistic distance.
The effect of cultural diversity on the incidence of violence is mixed. Several studies
suggest a negative effect of cultural diversity. For example, ethnic fractionalisation was
found to be positively correlated with social conflict, although the data were at province
level (Indra et al., 2019). In another study, increased cultural diversity in newly created
districts tended to be followed by a rising likelihood of social conflict (Bazzi & Gudgeon,
2018). Ethnic clustering was also found to be associated with a higher likelihood of violent
conflict (Barron et al., 2009). Meanwhile, in ethnically diverse districts, religious polari-
sation increased the likelihood of ethnic conflict (Mancini, 2008). In contrast, two studies
indicated the potentially pacifying effect of cultural diversity on violence, although there
was clearly no consensus on how it operates. One study found ethnic fractionalisation to
be negatively associated with violence at district level (Tadjoeddin et al., 2016). Similarly,
a recent study on the long-term effect of transmigration found that, among transmigra-
8Thirty districts/municipalities in 2014 had higher than average for both income and poverty (includ-
ing major cities, such as Surabaya, Makassar, Semarang, Medan, Palembang and all four municipalities
in Jakarta), and most were located in Java. This suggests that the country capital, along with major
cities (particularly in Java), are potential hot spots for violence in Indonesia.
9INPRES programs were made possible from the massive oil revenue that the government enjoyed
during the 1970s, where the funds were allocated to a large number of school and road construction
projects (B. Smith, 2007). It is considered one of the largest and fastest school construction programs in
the world.
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tion villages, fractionalisation tended to decrease the likelihood of ethnic conflict, yet the
effect of polarisation was in the opposite direction (Bazzi, Gaduh, et al., 2019). Finally,
two studies could not find a direct effect of ethnic diversity on the incidence of violence
(De Juan et al., 2015; Pierskalla & Sacks, 2017).
All studies treat cultural diversity as purely exogenous, yet this assumption may
not hold if studies neglect some unobserved variables that could explain both cultural
diversity and socioeconomic processes. This is exactly the case of Indonesia, where there
have been indications of a changing demographic composition resulting from a transmi-
gration program that permanently displaced people from Java to the outer islands. The
scale of the program was significant, with 3.5 million people relocated between 1979 and
1989 (Fearnside, 1997).10 Some studies used the presence of Javanese outside Java as
a proxy for the effect of the population resettlement program. One study (Barron et
al., 2009) considered the share of Javanese outside Java (zero for villages in Java), while
another study used a dummy of Javanese-majority villages outside Java (Tajima, 2013).
However, it can be argued that this variable might not be a good proxy for the program
and could not fully capture its effect on societal relations. For example, as explained in
the previous chapter, Javanese transmigrants were spared during the conflict in Maluku
and Kalimantan. In addition, the intimidation of the Javanese in Aceh was mainly under-
taken by GAM combatants, rather than by fellow (Acehnese) neighbours (Barter & Coˆte´,
2015). Nevertheless, in both studies, the sign of the coefficient was negative (although
insignificant in the former), indicating that, relative to Java, areas with a large Javanese
population outside Java tend to experience lower levels of violence. These findings can
be interpreted as evidence against the argument that the transmigration program ignited
social conflict with the local population.
Finally, while cultural diversity is often used as a proxy for group grievances, re-
searchers have also used different proxies. For example, measuring horizontal inequality
between cultural groups using a coefficient of variance (Mancini, 2008; Østby et al., 2011;
10The transmigration program began even before the country’s independence, but the program was
up-scaled significantly during Suharto’s era, especially between 1974 and 1989. In addition, there were
also independent migrants who resettled to the outer islands without direct help from the government.
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Stewart, 2008; Tadjoeddin et al., 2016). However, this approach has limited operational
application, since the relevant data are only available in certain years. For example, the
annual Socioeconomic Survey—whose data are used to construct inequality—did not ask
about ethnic identity. Consequently, researchers must resort to cross-section data from
the Demographic and Health Survey (province level; conducted every five years) or Inter-
censal Survey (district level; conducted every ten years). Another approach is to estimate
relative deprivation, which measures inter-regional gaps, such as between income and hu-
man development or between education and poverty (Tadjoeddin, 2013). This approach
has greater practicability, since the data are widely available, yet it does not directly
capture ethnic grievance that motivates violence.
3.4.2 Institutions
Institutions are also associated with conflict and violence. A low enactment of property
rights—as proxied by reported land ownership, land titling and communal land—is asso-
ciated with a higher likelihood of violent conflict, based on the 2003 village census (Barron
et al., 2009). Specifically, unclear land ownership allows conflicting land claims, which
instigates conflict.11
A higher density of religious institutions is negatively correlated with the probability
of mass fighting (De Juan et al., 2015), similar to other countries, such as Ghana and
Nigeria (MacLean, 2004; Scacco & Warren, 2018). In particular, conflict resolution was
more likely via village-level institutions than through formal security apparatus. The
religious institution variable was proxied by the number of worship places per capita at
village level. Place of worship was selected because it is the centre of religious activities,
where elites meet with members of the community and spread their teaching.
Decentralisation, through the creation of new districts and transfer of power, ap-
pears to cause a reduction in the incidence of violence, although better public service
11In Java, land issues are important because there are three uses of tanah bengkok (lands owned by
the village): (i) use by village leaders as compensation for their office duty, (ii) use by village leaders for
village infrastructure development and (iii) use by retired village leaders as ’retirement plans’ (which will
be returned to the villages once they pass away). This unique arrangement provides the opportunity for
conflict when candidates compete in village head elections.
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delivery is, surprisingly, positively associated with violence (Pierskalla & Sacks, 2017).12
However, social conflict is more likely when the new district becomes more polarised
(Bazzi & Gudgeon, 2018). A competitive local election brings unintended consequences,
as it is associated with increased maritime piracy (Daxecker & Prins, 2016). However, a
general measure of institutional quality is not associated with social conflict in Indonesian
provinces (Indra et al., 2019).13
A change in social orders—when the police were separated from the military in
2000—contributed to rising violence (Tajima, 2013). During the New Order era, villages
closer to police posts tended to depend on the latter for security, which eventually impaired
the role of informal institutions for local security. These villages tended to have a higher
incidence of communal violence following the military reorganisation during the transition
era. Tajima used distance to community health clinics to instrument the distance to police
posts and confirmed the latter to be negatively associated with communal violence. This
finding highlights the need for alignment between formal and informal institutions at the
village level.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the current theoretical and empirical literature on the economics
of conflict. Most economic theories on conflict are based on rational agents maximising
their utility, but there are other channels through which conflict may occur, such as
through a change in parochial norms and preferences. Another channel is the way in
which group grievances impede the provision of public goods when society is divided
along different groups (e.g., ethnic groups). Changes in social orders can also contribute
to violence, as each order has different ways of containing violence.
Cross-country studies have yielded several findings that can be categorised into three
factors that contribute to conflict: level of economic development, group grievance and
12The authors attribute the high expectation and inequality in developed regions as factors that explain
the surprising association between violence and service provision (an index of public service delivery that
comprises education, health and sanitation outcomes).
13The variable is an index that comprises legal certainty, apparatus and service, local regulation and
local finance.
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institutions. In particular, the role of grievances, which are usually proxied by distribu-
tional indices, such as polarisation and fractionalisation, is explicable when the outcome of
interest is large-scale conflict. This is because most of the literature focuses on the cause
of civil wars, where rebel groups are trying to recruit combatants, which is presumed to be
a difficult task when the society is homogeneous. However, in the context of small-scale
violence, fragmentation might not be directly associated with group grievance and its re-
lationship can be non-linear. Therefore, while empirical investigations generally support
theoretical predictions in civil war settings, it remains unclear whether the theories have
strong explanatory power in the context of within-country everyday violence.
Similar to the findings in cross-country studies, the three main factors that con-
tribute to violence are also present for the case of Indonesia. However, most of the studies
on Indonesia have tended to focus on violence during the turbulent era (1998 to 2005).
To date, only a few studies have examined the violent events during the post-conflict
period. All except one study failed to consider ethnic groups’ similarities, and therefore
potentially overestimate the degree of cultural diversity in regions where the ethnic groups
were similar (e.g., speaking similar language). If left unaddressed, this would resulted in
a measurement bias of the cultural diversity variable. Furthermore, its association with
violence might not reflect its true relationship in the population.
The review of literature in this chapter provides a framework for the empirical inves-
tigations of Chapter 4. First, the incorporation of economic, grievance and institutional
factors in the estimation models is essential, given their importance in predicting violence.
However, this approach assumes the variables to be exogenous. Cultural diversity is al-
ways treated as exogenous, yet this assumption may not hold if there are unobservable
factors that may affect both the variable and violence (e.g., the transmigration program).
Consequently, the empirical model must be able to account for this issue.
Second, recent studies have treated cultural diversity more carefully by address-
ing ethnic groups’ similarities. This approach is crucial given Indonesia’s numerous, yet
similar, ethnic groups, where ignoring group similarities could overestimate the levels of
cultural diversity in districts.
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Third, the relationship between cultural diversity and violence might not be linear
as indicated in previous studies (e.g., Mason et al., 2011). This can be empirically tested
by using a quadratic function in the regressions. Lastly, a theoretical model based on
the rationalist approach that links ethnic diversity with violent conflict (Esteban & Ray,
2011) can also be tested. The theory is important because it provides the mechanism of
how the various measures of ethnic diversity affect conflict differently (i.e., high levels of
polarisation and fractionalisation increase the likelihood of conflict over public and private
goods, respectively). However, it is unclear whether the model has the same explanatory
power when it is used to analyse small-scale violence. In addition, as described in Chapter
2, an argument has been made regarding violence in post-conflict Indonesia, where small,
non-episodic and infrequent violence does not necessarily require coordination among the
three actors (violence specialists, local elites and the central state) (Barron, 2019). Hence,
a representative agent model, for example, may be unable to fully explain such violence.
Chapter 4
The Antecedents of Violence in
Post-conflict Indonesia: An
Empirical Investigation
This chapter uses secondary data to examine the antecedents of violence (economic,
grievances and institutional factors) in Indonesia. Every year, tens of thousands of violent
incidents across Indonesia result in personal injury, loss of life and property damage. This
study uses district-level data to examine the determinants of non-domestic, small-scale
violence in Indonesia, with a focus on the role played by cultural diversity. Consistent
with theoretical models of conflict, the findings strongly suggest a non-linear relationship
between cultural diversity and violence. The relationship between the two is initially
positive, but turns negative after a diversity threshold is reached. This finding is robust
to the use of instrumental variables as a way to mitigate endogeneity problem, to alter-
native measures of cultural diversity and to different measures of violence. The chapter
concludes with some implications for policy.
4.1 Introduction
Around 1.36 million people were killed in armed conflicts globally from 1989 to 2017,
with the peak in 2014 witnessing 104,769 deaths (Allansson & Croicu, 2018; Gleditsch
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et al., 2002). Three regions—Africa, Middle East and Asia—contributed to more than
90 per cent of these deaths. Nonetheless, the number of violent incidents and deaths
in non-conflict situations was comparatively much higher. For example, in 2016 alone,
more than 460,000 people were violently killed (Mc Evoy & Hideg, 2017). An analysis
of non-conflict violence is usually focused on one country, using data at regional or state
level. For example, studies have examined the effect of gun ownership on homicide in
the United States (Gius, 2009), the effect of inequality on homicide in Brazil (Menezes,
Silveira-Neto, Monteiro, & Ratton, 2013) and the role of economic development in routine
violence in Indonesia (Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007).
Qualitative studies on the history of conflict (discussed in Chapter 2) suggest that
ethnic grievances and economic motives are two important factors that precede violence.
Institutional arrangements with respect to a country’s security forces can also be associ-
ated with conflict, although this is more related to large-scale, rather than small-scale,
violence with low fatality rates, which is prevalent in post-conflict Indonesia (Barron et
al., 2016). Moreover, unlike large-scale and episodic violence, the eruptions of small-scale
violence do not necessarily require coordination among violent actors (Barron, 2019).
Similarly, the quantitative studies summarised in Chapter 3 confirm these factors as an-
tecedents of violent conflict, in addition to a number of institutional aspects such as
decentralisation and informal institutions.
The availability of the sub-national level data from the NVMS enables a thorough
examination of violence in Indonesia. Therefore, in this chapter, two research questions
are posed: 1) Do economic motives, ethnic grievances and institutional factors precede
violence? 2) How does cultural diversity that proxied ethnic grievances explain violence,
if any?
The regression results using district-level data suggest that the intensity of violence
in Indonesia—defined as the log of non-domestic violence per million people—has an
inverted-U shape association with cultural diversity, taking into account linguistic dis-
tance and mitigating the potential issue of endogeneity. Nevertheless, most districts have
levels of diversity below the threshold that suggests that violence intensity is generally
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expected to be higher in culturally diverse districts. In addition, GDP per capita is uncor-
related with the intensity of violence, while income inequality is found to have a positive
association with violence when regional fixed effects are accounted for.
The structure of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the
data and the methodology, while Section 4.3 presents the patterns of violence and cultural
diversity. Section 4.4 displays the regression results, followed by robustness checks in
Section 4.5 and alternative specifications in Section 4.6. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes
this chapter.
4.2 Data and Methodology
4.2.1 Data
The main dependent variable used in the empirical models of this chapter is the log
non-domestic violence per million people, with data taken from the NVMS. This include
all types of violence, including crime, but not domestic violence (e.g., spousal abuse
in a household). Other measures of violence are used in robustness checks, including the
number of violent incidents. This study used the latest available year (2014) of the NVMS
for two reasons: (i) the latest data for the main independent variable in this analysis—
cultural diversity—was only available in 2010 and (ii) until this year, not all provinces
were covered by NVMS (see Table A.2 in the appendix). It is important to note that
there were no local government elections in 2014, which may have affected violence at the
district level.
Several economic and development variables found to be important in past studies
were included in the models such as district GDP per capita, income inequality, unem-
ployment rate and whether a district was classified as urban. A number of institutional
variables were also included in robustness checks. The definition and sources of these
variables can be found in Table A.3 in the appendix.
The main independent variable of interest (cultural diversity) that proxied ethnic
grievances was the Greenberg-Gini index (ethnolinguistic fractionalisation weighted by
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inter-group distance dmn) (Esteban & Ray, 2011):
Gi =
N∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
smisnidmn.
where smi and sni are the share of ethnolinguistic group m and n, respectively, in
region i. N number of ethnolinguistic groups were included in the construction of Gi that
corresponds to all existing ethnolinguistic groups captured in the 2010 population census.
Gi takes a positive value equal to or smaller than 1, where a higher score of Gi means a
more divided society along different ethnolinguistic groups.
Accounting for linguistic distance is important, given Indonesia’s rich cultural di-
versity, although this might be overestimated, as most of the population are speaking
similar Austronesian languages (204.6 million people or 96 per cent of the population).1
In particular, three major subgroups account for 83 per cent of Austronesian languages
family in Indonesia (Minnesota Population Center, 2015; Simons & Fennig, 2017): Ja-
vanese (71.3 million), Malayo-Chamic (65.6 million) and Sundanese (32.3 million). Most
Javanese and Sundanese speakers live in Java, while most Malayo-Chamic speakers live
in Sumatra.
To control for similarities between the ethnic groups, the Greenberg-Gini index,
Gi, is weighted by linguistic distance. To achieve this, it is necessary to determine the
linguistic similarity, κ (defined as the ratio between the number of common branches and
its maximum possible number) and then construct dmn = 1− κδ, where δ > 0. Linguistic
distance is measured as dmn = 1 − (common/13)0.05, where common is the number of
shared linguistic classification branches between ethnolinguistic group m and n, while 13
is the maximum number of branches from Ethnologue Indonesia.
In this study, the choice of δ = 0.05 was motivated by previous research. Desmet,
Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, and Weber (2009) used this value in the main analysis and found similar
results when δ was varied between 0.04 and 0.10; similarly with Esteban et al. (2012) that
found the relatively flat pseudo-likelihoods for δ between 0.05 and 0.70.
1The Austronesian languages family is not exclusive to Indonesia. The total number of its speakers is
around 20 per cent of the world population (approximately 1.5 billion people).
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Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation was preferred over measures of ethnicity, since lan-
guage is considered an appropriate proxy for ethnicity in Indonesia (Mancini, 2008) and
because it is possible to estimate linguistic distance from the Ethnologue data (Simons &
Fennig, 2017). Ethnolinguistic groupings were based on language spoken at home from
the 2010 census, which was matched with linguistic distance calculated from Ethnologue.
Therefore, the value of G was assumed to be time invariant (or close to time invariant)
and unchanged in 2014.2
It should be noted that there are different ways of incorporating linguistic similari-
ties other than the one explained above. For example, Gershman and Rivera (2018) esti-
mated the ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index at different aggregation levels, ELF (k),
in Africa. So ELF (1) refers to the level of diversity at the most aggregated level, which
only used six major language families in its construction. At the most disaggregated
level, where each language is distinct, ELF (13) is effectively the same as the standard
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index (F ) that measured the probability of two individ-
uals coming from different ethnolinguistic groups. Most importantly, their study’s main
finding supports the inclusion of ethnolinguistic similarities in the calculation of the dis-
tribution indices when estimating cultural diversity at subnational level.
As noted in the previous chapter, different distributional measures may explain
group conflicts differently. Therefore, various measures of cultural diversity were employed
in robustness checks. The Greenberg-Gini index, G, becomes the standard ethnolinguistic
fractionalisation index F , when dmn is dropped.
3 An alternative measure, the ethnic
fractionalisation index (EFI), was based on the F formula, except that it used ethnicity
instead of ethnolinguistic group. These proxies for cultural identities were different, as
the former captured an individual’s preference of ethnic group, while the latter was based
on language. Although F was similar to G—both used ethnolinguistic groups—the latter
also accounted for linguistic differences. Therefore, EFI had two degrees of separation
with G.
2Unless necessary, subscript i is dropped from this point onwards.
3This abbreviation for ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index, F , was preferred to ELF as the latter
was often associated with the index constructed based on the ANM dataset.
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Another important measure of cultural diversity is the ethnolinguistic polarisation
index (Esteban & Ray, 2011):
Pi =
N∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
s2misnidmn.
Unlike fractionalisation that measures the probability of two individuals coming from
different groups, polarisation measures how polarised a society is. Group size matters in P
in determining the probability of two individuals coming from different groups. Without
dmn, this variable (Po) becomes the equivalent of the ethnic polarisation index (EPOI),
where groups are defined based on their preferred (stated) ethnicity. Since the difference
between Po and F is in the squared smi, there will be an inverted-U relationship between
these variables. This is the same for EFI and EPOI. Table 4.1 displays the various
measures of cultural diversity, along with their characteristics.
There are a huge number of possible language pairs for the case of Indonesia (266,815
pairs from 731 languages) and the number was still very large (48,704 pairs) after the
data were merged with the 2010 population census data.4 For comparison, the number of
language pairs was just 2,678 for 160 countries in Fearon (2003). Recall also that Fearon
groups are constructed out of the necessity for cross-country comparisons, which was not
the case in this study. The census data were taken from IPUMS-International, which
collects census and survey data from around the world (Minnesota Population Center,
2015). Their version of the 2010 population census was sampled (geographically stratified
and systematic) from the original data with an expansion factor of 10.
Distributional indices (i.e., fractionalisation and polarisation) were utilised in place
of other proxies for grievances because there has been an established economic theory on
how they are associated with conflict (Esteban & Ray, 2011). They are also commonly
used in the literature, although these studies were mostly lacking in controlling for lin-
guistic similarities in the construction of the indices (which is overcame in this study by
the use of linguistic distance). However, to complement the analysis, another proxy for
4The reduction in the number of pairs is due to the sampling of the census data that is likely to
exclude minority groups.
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Table 4.1: Measures of cultural diversity
Name Acronym Grouping Types of
distribution
Account for
linguistic
distance?
Greenberg-Gini index G Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation Yes
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation F Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation No
Ethnolinguistic polarisation (with dmn) P Ethnolinguistic Polarisation Yes
Ethnolinguistic polarisation (without dmn) Po Ethnolinguistic Polarisation No
Ethnic fractionalisation index EFI Ethnic Fractionalisation No
Ethnic polarisation index EPOI Ethnic Polarisation No
ethnic grievances (relative deprivation) is included in the robustness checks.
Lastly, trust can be lower in heterogeneous societies (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002)
and it might be that higher levels of trust are associated with lower violence in Indonesia.
Trust was measured using the 2014 Statistics of Social Capital, which asked 75,000 house-
holds about their levels of trust and tolerance. Specifically, the respondents were asked
whether they trusted (on a scale of four, from 1 = not trustful to 4 = very trustful) their
neighbours, village figures, religious figures and village apparatus. The trust index used
in the regressions was constructed based on the mean response to these questions. Figure
B.1 in the appendix provides a scatter plot of the trust index with violence intensity.
There was a negative correlation (r = −0.19), indicating that lower trust is associated
with a higher intensity of violence on average. It is understood that trust might be af-
fected by violence, hence the endogeneity issue. Nevertheless, its inclusion was simply as
a control and it is not the main variable of interest in this study.
4.2.2 Methodology
The models were first estimated using ordinary least squares. However, instrumental vari-
able regressions were also used because of the potential endogeneity of cultural diversity,
as discussed further below. The general specification was:
ln(non-domestic violence intensity) = β1G+ β2G
2 + β3X + α + u. (4.1)
G was used as the preferred measure of cultural diversity, while other measures were
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Table 4.2: Pairwise correlation matrix
G F P Po EFI EPOI
G 1.0000
F 0.3918 1.0000
P 0.9473 0.2570 1.0000
Po 0.3850 0.8363 0.3604 1.0000
EFI 0.4305 0.7360 0.3300 0.6136 1.0000
EPOI 0.2042 0.6650 0.1746 0.7520 0.6959 1.0000
Source: Calculated from population census and Ethnologue.
used in robustness checks. This contrasts the approach of Esteban and Ray (2011), who
included all measures of cultural diversity in the same model, on the assumption that
they simultaneously capture an individual’s propensity for violent conflict. However, the
various measures of cultural diversity were highly correlated—particularly between the G
and P with the coefficient of correlation, r = 0.9473—which would introduce a collinearity
problem into the empirical estimations (see Table 4.2 for pairwise correlations of these
variables). Their model also focused on factors explaining conflict, particularly civil wars,
rather than general violence that might not necessarily be driven by conflict. Nonetheless,
another specification based on the Esteban-Ray conflict model was also tested in Section
4.6.2. In addition, the literature has shown that the effect of cultural diversity might not
be monotonic; therefore, the squared value of G was included in Equation 4.1.
G, the preferred measure of cultural diversity, was used as a proxy for ethnic
grievances, yet there were reasons to believe that the variable was endogenous—for exam-
ple, the effect of the transmigration program on regions’ ethnic composition and violence.
Therefore, this study also aimed to carefully test the role of cultural diversity in explaining
violence by mitigating, not removing, the potential issue of endogeneity.
This study used the out-of-Taiwan theory to construct an instrument for G. The the-
ory is the mainstream hypothesis on the origin of Austronesian-speaking people, who are
thought to have come from Taiwan and arrived in the Philippines around 2500 BC, before
spreading to Sulawesi (1600 BC) and Borneo-Maluku-Timor-Papua (1500 BC) (Bellwood
& Dizon, 2008; Bellwood, Fox, & Tryon, 1995). Luzon in the north of the Philippines
was the intermediate point for the journey. The migration to Java and Sumatra was
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presumably around 1500 to 1000 BC, as the expansion to mainland Southeast Asia only
began from 500 BC (Spriggs, 2010). However, the dispersal did not stop in Indonesia,
and settlers arrived in New Zealand around 1200 AD (see Appendix B, Figure B.2). The
theory is not only supported by archaeological findings—such as radiocarbon dating—but
also by comparative linguistics and biological anthropology. For example, linguists note
innovations in terms of phonological mergers and pronoun forms among languages spoken
outside Taiwan (extra-Formosan or Malayo-Polynesian languages, such as Javanese and
Malay) (Bellwood, Chambers, Ross, & Hung, 2011; Blust, 1993).
Such dispersal from Taiwan might be correlated with ethnic diversity in regions
inhibited by Austronesian-speaking people. This conjecture is motivated by the out-
of-Africa hypothesis (Ramachandran et al., 2005), which indicates that the migratory
distance from Addis Ababa in Ethiopia—thought to be the origin of the human species—
is negatively correlated with genetic diversity. Unsurprisingly, the distance from Addis
Ababa also negatively predicts ethnic diversity (Michalopoulos, 2012). Such negative as-
sociation between the distance from East Africa and genetic/ethnic diversity is attributed
to the limited genetic variation brought by early human migrants. Therefore, this study
hypothesised that distance from Taiwan is also negatively correlated with cultural diver-
sity in Indonesian districts.
Between endpoints (Taiwan and each district in Indonesia), the distance was mea-
sured as the sum of the distance from Taiwan to the central Philippines (intermediate
waypoint) and from the central Philippines to the centroid of the respective district.
Distance was measured using QGIS software, while country maps and administrative
boundaries were taken from GADM (2018). Additionally, the distance from Addis Ababa
in East Africa was calculated using Cairo (Egypt) and Phnom Penh (Cambodia) as the
intermediate waypoints before reaching each district in Indonesia. In addition to the
distance from Taiwan and distance from Addis Ababa, geographic variabilities—mean
elevation, absolute latitude (distance from equator) and area—could also explain cultural
diversity (Michalopoulos, 2012). Theoretically, such variables should have no direct effect
on violence, thus meeting the exclusion restriction requirement.
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Therefore, the reduced form (first stage regression in two-stage least squares [2SLS]
estimations) is given by:
G = γ0 + γ1Z + γ2X + v, (4.2)
where Z is a set of instruments that include distance from Taiwan, absolute latitude,
an interaction between absolute latitude and distance from Taiwan, mean elevation and
area. Given that the structural model (Equation 4.1) included a quadratic form for G, the
squared form of these variables (except for the interaction term) was added as additional
instruments for G2 in Equation 4.2. Finally, X is a vector of other explanatory variables.
All regressions used heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors to ensure valid inference,
yet clustering (at provincial level) and bootstrapping were used as additional checks.
4.3 Patterns of Violence and Cultural Diversity
This section summarises the two main variables under consideration—violence and cul-
tural diversity—as well as descriptive statistics for the other variables used in the analysis
(Table 4.3).
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
Log non-domestic violence intensity 495 4.29 1.11 0.00 7.84
Log non-domestic collective violence intensity 495 1.49 1.23 0.00 4.47
Log non-domestic violence (with casualties) intensity 495 1.10 2.70 -4.61 5.34
Number of non-domestic violent incidents 495 52 106 0 1,211
Number of people killed in violent conflict 495 1 3 0 37
Greenberg-Gini index (δ = 0.05) 495 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.66
Greenberg-Gini index (δ = 0.5) 495 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.70
Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index 495 0.39 0.26 0.00 0.88
Ethnolinguistic polarisation index (δ = 0.05) 495 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.24
Ethnolinguistic polarisation index 495 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.25
Religious fractionalisation 495 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.70
Ethnic fractionalisation index 495 0.45 0.31 0.01 0.94
Ethnic polarisation index 495 0.44 0.25 0.01 0.94
Greenberg-Gini index (δ = 0.05)/population 495 0.81 2.39 0.00 28.73
Trust index 495 2.82 0.12 2.17 3.16
Gini ratio for income inequality 495 0.32 0.05 0.21 0.52
Human Development Index (HDI) 495 66.67 6.89 25.38 83.78
Unemployment rate 495 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.19
Log district real GDP per capita 495 1.95 0.70 0.28 4.98
Urban district 495 0.31 0.46 0 1
Share of Javanese outside Java 495 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.85
Relative deprivation in income-welfare gap 495 -64.94 12.33 -91.27 22.74
Number of worship places 495 1,792 2,666 36 19,253
Dummy for new district 495 0.41 0.49 0 1
Total government revenue (billion IDR) 489 1,216 815 373 6,459
Poverty rate 495 0.13 0.78 0.17 0.44
Distance from Taiwan (km) 495 3,498 440 2,202 4,546
Distance from Africa (Addis Ababa; km) 495 12,415 740 11,205 14,678
Mean elevation 495 0.34 0.38 0.00 3.07
Variation in elevation 495 0.25 0.21 0.00 1.26
Absolute latitude 495 0.47 0.30 0.00 1.19
Area (’000 km2) 495 3.73 5.65 0.01 44.07
4.3.1 Patterns of Violence
Figure 4.1 displays the large geographical variations of different measures of violence. In
all cases, the districts in Sumatra seem to stand out as experiencing greater intensities
of violence. It is clear from the two top panels of the figure that, while the number of
violent incidents in Java is larger than the rest of the country, the large population makes
the intensity less prominent.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of violence by district in 2014
Source: Calculated from NVMS and population census.
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Barron et al. (2016) noted the increase in collective violence in post-conflict regions,
which is consistent with findings from other countries. The third panel in Figure 4.1
displays the distribution of collective violence—defined as violent incidents that involved
at least 10 people–and the intensity of such violence in Javanese districts became more
prominent than in the previous panel. Finally, districts in the south of Kalimantan and
Sumatra stand out when casualties were accounted for (bottom panel).
4.3.2 Distribution and Variations of Cultural Diversity
Controlling for dmn reduces the concentration of cultural diversity to certain regions (com-
pare the first two panels of Figure 4.2). This visual observation is confirmed by examining
mean dmn for pairs of languages within a region (see Table A.4 in the appendix). Papua
has the largest number of relatively distinct languages, as indicated by the mean dmn =
0.815 (out of a maximum of 1). At another extreme, Kalimantan only has about one-
third of the number of local languages compared to Papua, but its average dmn (0.078) is
10 times smaller than Papua. This indicates the relative similarity of languages spoken
by people in Kalimantan. Consequently, the Greenberg-Gini index G for Papua is much
larger than for Kalimantan.
In another example, there are only eight local languages in Java-Bali, but their dmn,
on average, is roughly the same as the local languages in Maluku. Given that the mean
of the G in Java-Bali is very small relative to Maluku, it can be inferred that there must
be a few local languages that are highly dominant in Java-Bali relative to the dominant
local languages in Maluku.
In Figure 4.3, the inclusion of linguistic distance dmn reduces the degree and dis-
tribution of cultural diversity by comparing measures that account (G and P ) or do not
account (F and Po) for dmn. Measures that do not account for dmn have fat tails, which
suggest the presence of very heterogeneous districts.
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Figure 4.2: Various measures of cultural diversity in 2010
Source: Calculated from population census and Ethnologue.
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Figure 4.3: Kernel density of cultural diversity variables
Source: Calculated from census 2010 and Ethnologue.
4.4 Regression Results
Cultural diversity, as measured by G, displayed no strong linear association with the
intensity of violence (Table 4.4 Model 1). However, it did have a non-linear association—
a finding that remained after controlling for various covariates (Models 2 and 3). At low
levels of fractionalisation, a higher degree of cultural diversity tended to be associated
with higher intensity of violence. However, once its level reached a turning point, violence
intensity decreased with cultural diversity. Taking the coefficients from Model 3 suggested
that higher levels of cultural diversity were associated with more violent incidents, up to a
point where the diversity index had a score of 0.26. Beyond this threshold, the relationship
between the two variables became negative. Most districts (447 districts, 90 per cent of
all districts) had a level of diversity below this threshold, where higher levels of diversity
were associated with higher levels of violence (top panel of Figure 4.4).
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Table 4.4: Main regression results (dependent variable: log nondomestic violence per
million people)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
G 0.241 4.754*** 4.614*** 12.75 33.40 23.75** 17.67***
(0.547) (1.597) (1.511) (14.61) (26.17) (10.30) (4.931)
G2 -9.596*** -7.847** -18.82 -59.50 -44.29* -31.75***
(3.373) (3.097) (32.96) (67.15) (25.35) (11.01)
Trust index -0.836* -0.189 0.673 0.0389 -0.180
(0.468) (0.572) (0.805) (0.626) (0.556)
Gini ratio income ineq. 1.605 0.0142 -3.163 -1.422 -0.525
(1.020) (2.047) (3.243) (1.749) (1.251)
HDI 0.0638*** 0.0893*** 0.126*** 0.100*** 0.0907***
(0.0121) (0.0227) (0.0266) (0.0187) (0.0158)
Unemployment rate -0.941 -3.157 -4.599 -2.684 -2.445
(1.996) (2.520) (4.189) (2.461) (1.941)
Log GDP p.c. 0.0314 -0.0338 -0.290 -0.197 -0.118
(0.0906) (0.235) (0.444) (0.192) (0.131)
Urban district -0.00565 -0.00227 -0.0817 -0.0706 -0.0434
(0.133) (0.159) (0.256) (0.160) (0.157)
Constant 4.267*** 4.101*** 1.649 -1.564 -5.619* -2.507 -1.496
(0.0577) (0.0741) (1.497) (2.211) (2.917) (2.060) (1.784)
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 495 495
Instruments DT,DT 2 Lat, Lat2 DT,DT 2,
Lat, Lat2,
DT ×Lat
DT,DT 2,
Lat, Lat2,
DT×Lat,
DA,DA2
Endogeneity test p-value 0.200 0.0000322 0.000109 0.0000887
Weak identification test 2.031 0.649 2.808 5.104
Hansen J stat. p-value 0.302 0.264
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Instruments: DT =
distance from Taiwan (km); DT 2 = squared distance from Taiwan; Lat = absolute latitude (’000 km);
Lat2 = squared absolute latitude; DA = distance from Africa (km); DA2 = squared distance from Africa.
Weak identification test was based on the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic. The endogeneity test
was a variation of the Wu-Hausman test (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003).
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Figure 4.4: Scatterplots of violence and measures of cultural diversity
Notes: Vertical lines cross at the turning points estimated from Model 3 in Table 4.4 (G) and Models 3
(P ) and 7 (EPOI) in Table 4.6.
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Neither clustering the standard errors at provincial level nor bootstrapping with
1,000 repetitions changed this key result. The finding also held when using 2010 violence
data to match the year of the census used in the construction of the cultural diversity
variable (results not shown).5 Nevertheless, the non-monotonic correlation between G and
violence intensity was absent once regional fixed effects were included. This is discussed
further in the next section.
The estimated parameter for per capita real GDP was insignificant, while the non-
linear result remained unchanged. When levels of GDP was used instead of per capita
GDP, districts with lower GDP tended to experience higher levels of violence intensity
(results not shown). Trust was statistically significantly and negatively associated with
the intensity of violence in Model 3, yet lost its significance in subsequent models. How-
ever, the use of standardised beta coefficients showed stronger effects of G than GDP or
trust (results not shown). Interestingly, districts with higher HDI scores tended to experi-
ence greater intensity of violence. As shown later in the chapter using robustness checks,
the relationship between the HDI and violence was more complex than what these coeffi-
cients suggested in these regressions. Other control variables—including the Gini ratio for
income inequality, the unemployment rate and whether a district was urban—generally
appeared unimportant to the intensity of violence in Indonesia.
Before proceeding to instrumental variable regression models, a statistical test was
conducted to estimate the severity of omitting variables in the regression (Oster, 2019).
In Model 3, the estimated degree of selection for G was -0.87, which means that the
unobservables need to be 0.87 times as important as the observables to produce zero
treatment effects (the negative sign denotes the unobservables have to be negatively as-
sociated with G). This estimate suggests the relatively less severe bias from omitting
important variables in the regression.
Instrumenting G and G2 generally did not affect the non-linearity findings. Distance
from Taiwan (DT ) negatively predicted G in the first-stage regression of Model 4, but
the estimated parameter was not significant (results from the first-stage regressions can
5However, the 2010 regression was limited by the absence of the trust index, since it was only available
in 2014.
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be found in Appendix A, Table A.5). However, the model did not pass the endogeneity
test, implying that we could reject the null of an exogenous G.6 By itself, this implied the
sufficiency of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations. When absolute latitude (Lat)
was used to replace DT in Model 5, the variable negatively and significantly predicted
cultural diversity, similar to the findings in Michalopoulos (2012). Model 6 combined DT
and Lat, and the interaction strongly predicted G.
Finally, Model 7 augmented Model 6 with distance from Africa DA and DA2, which
resulted in an increase in the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic that signalled stronger
instruments overall.7 Relative to Model 3, the estimated coefficients for G and G2 jumped
significantly.
4.5 Robustness Checks
This section assesses whether the results presented above were robust to regional vari-
ations, alternative measures of cultural diversity, additional covariates and alternative
measures of violence. In addition, since the 2SLS models yielded similar results to OLS,
robustness tests were based on changes to Model 3.
4.5.1 Regional Variations
Column 1 in Table 4.5 indicates that, on average, the intensity of violence was higher
outside Java and Bali. Another important observation was the absence of statistical
significance of cultural diversity across regions, except for Sumatra. Overall, income
inequality seemed to be an important factor (Column 2), particularly in regions outside
Java-Bali and Sulawesi (Columns 3 to 7).
The effect of cultural diversity was no longer prominent once regional fixed effects
were accounted for. Different shapes of non-linear association were observed in different
regions, which rendered the estimated parameters for G and G2 insignificant in the most
6The test was a variation of the Wu-Hausman test (Baum et al., 2003).
7Other instruments, such as mean elevation and area, were not a good predictor of G, as shown by the
insignificant parameters of these variables and the drops in the weak identification test statistic (results
not shown).
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comprehensive model (Column 2). The parameters for G and G2 varied across regions
where the inverted-U association seemed to be driven by districts and municipalities
in Sumatra (Column 7). This correlation was also observed in Java-Bali and Sulawesi,
although it was not statistically significant.
Table 4.5: Regional variations (dependent variable: log nondomestic violence per million
people)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All All Eastern Kalimantan Java-Bali Sulawesi Sumatra
G 3.042* 0.624 -1.916 -1.833 0.797 4.129 12.95***
(1.582) (1.347) (2.171) (2.939) (5.317) (3.744) (3.680)
G2 -6.178* -1.718 3.338 0.378 -10.81 -8.125 -49.25***
(3.215) (2.655) (3.694) (5.598) (11.73) (7.875) (17.01)
Trust index -0.127 -0.569 0.243 -2.194 0.250 0.272
(0.442) (0.758) (1.210) (1.658) (1.694) (0.686)
Gini ratio income ineq. 2.385** 5.819** 5.041* -0.993 -3.092 6.871***
(1.098) (2.923) (3.000) (2.242) (2.141) (1.616)
HDI 0.0790*** 0.0903*** 0.101** 0.0576*** 0.0481 0.0694**
(0.0114) (0.0217) (0.0383) (0.0201) (0.0396) (0.0310)
Unemployment rate -0.838 -1.502 -1.811 -6.620** 13.68** 1.913
(1.923) (5.198) (4.922) (3.110) (6.645) (2.077)
Log GDP p.c. 0.0832 0.0885 -0.108 0.160 0.0683 -0.0971
(0.0818) (0.168) (0.217) (0.184) (0.243) (0.145)
Urban district 0.160 0.682** 0.418 0.00538 0.585 -0.113
(0.119) (0.270) (0.390) (0.220) (0.568) (0.185)
Sumatra 0.870*** 1.156***
(0.116) (0.115)
Sulawesi 0.622*** 0.877***
(0.154) (0.143)
Kalimantan 0.559*** 0.855***
(0.157) (0.143)
Eastern 0.455** 1.432***
(0.201) (0.191)
Constant 3.669*** -2.417 -1.525 -4.284 6.357 0.626 -3.200
(0.0820) (1.486) (2.314) (4.496) (4.533) (5.438) (3.441)
Observations 495 495 90 55 127 73 150
R2 0.110 0.386 0.467 0.536 0.350 0.416 0.360
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Eastern region
comprises Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and Papua islands. Region was relative to Java-Bali in (1) and (2).
OLS was used in the regressions. Using province rather than island fixed effects in (1) and (2) yielded
similar results.
4.5.2 Alternative Measures of Cultural Diversity
Using various measures of cultural diversity did not alter the main results. The choice of
δ = 0.05 could exacerbate the problem of overcounting language in Ethnologue (Hammarstro¨m,
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2015), as smaller δ would place more emphasis on small differences in languages. How-
ever, Model 1 in Table 4.6 used δ = 0.5 in the calculation of G, which resulted in similar
estimated coefficients for G and G2.
Ignoring linguistic distance altogether in F (Model 2), as well as using ethnicity
as ethnic grouping (Model 6), also did not change the non-linear relationship. When
religious fractionalisation (Model 5) was used, the variable was positively associated with
the intensity of violence.
All polarisation indices (Models 3, 4 and 7) yielded qualitatively similar results,
where the relationship with the intensity of violence was non-linear. Similar to previous
results, the majority of districts (92 per cent) were in the increasing region of the inverted-
U shape (with P < 0.10 as the turning point; see second panel of Figure 4.4 above). When
EPOI was used, the share became significantly lower (58 per cent of districts with EPOI
less than the value of the turning point of 0.57; bottom panel).
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Table 4.6: Alternative measures of cultural diversity (dependent variable: log nondomestic
violence per million people)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
G (δ = 0.5) 5.332***
(0.898)
G2 (δ = 0.5) -7.905***
(1.867)
F 3.822***
(0.615)
F 2 -3.836***
(0.776)
P 12.11**
(4.748)
P 2 -52.06*
(27.24)
Po 12.38***
(2.339)
Po2 -38.46***
(10.34)
Relig. fractionalisation 2.205***
(0.847)
Squared relig. fract. -2.274
(1.607)
EFI 2.283***
(0.528)
EFI2 -1.195*
(0.630)
EPOI 4.092***
(0.635)
EPOI2 -3.655***
(0.786)
Trust index -0.894** -0.780* -0.824* -0.789* -0.798* -0.539 -0.575
(0.436) (0.429) (0.477) (0.438) (0.436) (0.465) (0.467)
Gini ratio income ineq. 1.553 1.634* 1.781* 1.595* 1.990** 1.416 1.578*
(0.970) (0.961) (1.032) (0.952) (0.926) (0.934) (0.921)
HDI 0.0569*** 0.0585*** 0.0627*** 0.0596*** 0.0548*** 0.0641*** 0.0607***
(0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0114)
Unemployment rate 0.133 -0.459 -1.421 -0.292 0.173 -1.708 -1.039
(1.853) (2.032) (2.076) (2.051) (1.938) (1.975) (2.031)
Log GDP p.c. -0.00744 0.0155 0.0527 -0.00884 0.0377 -0.0979 -0.0421
(0.0899) (0.0886) (0.0901) (0.0881) (0.0876) (0.0905) (0.0907)
Urban district 0.0520 0.0246 -0.0238 0.0582 0.000779 0.110 0.0549
(0.130) (0.134) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130) (0.134) (0.133)
Constant 1.901 1.399 1.633 1.270 1.911 0.656 0.612
(1.329) (1.343) (1.521) (1.387) (1.433) (1.457) (1.475)
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 495 495
R-squared 0.271 0.271 0.224 0.271 0.229 0.310 0.288
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. OLS was used in the
regressions.
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4.5.3 Additional Covariates
It can be argued that the control variables were insufficient to capture economic motives
or grievances. Table 4.7 indicates that the non-monotonic result remained when more
covariates were added to the regressions. By itself, G could be unable to fully capture
group grievance and, to overcome this, relative deprivation (RD) was included in the
regression. The variable measured a district’s relative deprivation in income and welfare,
as proxied by per capita GDP and HDI, respectively.8 The regression yielded a negative
and significant coefficient of RD, while keeping the non-linearity result of G unchanged
(Model 1). This implies that relatively poor districts with high human development tend
to experience more violence.
Two sets of institutional variables were also included as additional covariates. In
Model 2, a set of institutional variables related to the decentralisation that began in early
2000 (regarding district proliferation) and 2005 (regarding district head elections) were
included in the regression. Pierskalla and Sacks (2017) found that violence was negatively
associated with these two aspects of decentralisation, thereby suggesting that institutional
change is important in abating violence. They also found that service provision positively
affected violence.9 However, Model 2 indicated that becoming a new district and the level
of service provision had no effect on violence, while the parameter signs for G and G2 were
unchanged and still significant.10 The estimated parameter for total government revenue
was negative and significant, which suggests that larger fiscal capacity abates violence.
It is likely that the limited number of observations in this regression could explain the
difference in results, as Pierskalla and Sacks used NVMS data from 2001 to 2010, which
included the period of extended communal violence during the transition era.
8See Tadjoeddin (2013) for the construction of the variable.
9Service provision was calculated as a sum of standardised variables of net enrolment rates (primary
and junior), access to safe water, access to safe sanitation and birth attended by a skilled health worker.
10The absence of district head elections in 2014 meant that the data could not be used to test this in
the regression.
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Table 4.7: Additional covariates (dependent variable: log nondomestic violence per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
G 4.359*** 4.291*** 2.468* 4.605*** -0.852 3.461**
(1.569) (1.420) (1.453) (1.513) (1.300) (1.499)
G2 -8.129** -7.988*** -4.721 -7.830** 1.365 -6.033**
(3.281) (2.952) (2.937) (3.111) (2.579) (3.011)
Relative deprivation -0.0227***
(0.00600)
Service provision index -0.0138
(0.0258)
New district 0.0190
(0.0941)
Log total government revenue -0.527***
(0.0944)
Number of worship place -0.000124***
(1.72e-05)
Poverty rate 0.175
(0.953)
Lagged dep. var. 0.604***
(0.0723)
Share of Javanese -0.651***
(0.118)
Trust index -1.183** -0.542 -0.592 -0.822* 0.0283 -0.739
(0.472) (0.407) (0.471) (0.493) (0.516) (0.474)
Gini ratio income ineq. 3.029*** 1.385 1.365 1.593 0.726 1.012
(1.016) (0.984) (0.999) (1.035) (0.819) (1.028)
HDI 0.0697*** 0.0619*** 0.0651*** 0.0171 0.0734***
(0.0134) (0.0112) (0.0138) (0.0122) (0.0122)
Unemployment rate 1.849 0.104 1.119 -0.962 2.677 -1.610
(2.056) (2.040) (2.062) (1.971) (1.710) (1.990)
Log GDP p.c. 0.241*** 0.0125 0.0345 0.00944 0.0347
(0.0831) (0.0877) (0.0940) (0.0668) (0.0895)
Urban district 0.121 0.0843 -0.0226 -0.00835 0.128 0.0343
(0.130) (0.116) (0.126) (0.133) (0.153) (0.132)
Constant 3.272** 3.749** 1.432 1.496 0.173 1.168
(1.360) (1.590) (1.472) (1.833) (1.563) (1.513)
Observations 495 489 495 495 304 495
R2 0.172 0.298 0.300 0.223 0.583 0.254
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. HDI and per capita
GDP were dropped, as they were used to construct relative deprivation in (1). OLS was used in the
regressions.
While formal institutions are important at the macro level, it is argued that informal
institutions at the micro, grassroots level are also essential. In particular, studies have
found a pacifying effect of religious institutions on violence (Barron et al., 2009; De Juan
et al., 2015). The number of places of worship was included as a proxy for religious
informal institutions and, consistent with previous studies, the effect was negative and
significant (Model 3). In addition, the estimated parameters of G and G2 still exhibited
4.5. Robustness Checks 81
the same signs, although at lower levels of significance.
Previous studies have found a positive correlation between poverty and violence
(Barron et al., 2009; Pierskalla & Sacks, 2017; Tadjoeddin & Murshed, 2007). However,
the inclusion of this variable seemed to have no effect on violence intensity (Model 4). The
non-linear effect of G remained. Lagged violence intensity had a strong predictive power in
Model 5, but at the cost of a smaller number of observations (see results in Section 4.6.2 as
well). More importantly, its inclusion biased down the estimated coefficients of the other
explanatory variables, particularly G. Models that took care of serial correlation—such
as an OLS with Newey-West standard errors—could not be used because the data for G
is only available for one year.
Finally, the non-monotonicity of G remained even after adding the share of ethnic
Javanese—the proxy for the omitted variable that affects district’s demographic compo-
sition and violence (Model 6). This finding is consistent with previous studies (Barron et
al., 2009; Tajima, 2013), although these studies used 2003 and 2005 data—a period where
the Aceh conflict was at its height and the country had just experienced large religious
and ethnic conflicts in Maluku and Kalimantan.
4.5.4 Alternative Dependent Variables
The results were also robust to different measures of violence. Model 1 in Table 4.8
used the number of non-domestic collective violent incidents per million people as the
dependent variable, and the non-linear effect of G remained. However, when violent
incidents with casualties was used as the dependent variable (Model 2), the significance
of both G and G2 disappeared but the signs remained.
The inverted-U relationship was still observed when a negative binomial estimation
method was used to estimate models with a number of different measures of violence, such
as the number of non-domestic violence (Model 3), number of violent incidents (Model
4), number of people killed (Model 5) and number of violent conflicts (Model 6).11 The
11Negative binomial regression was preferred, since the outcome was a non-negative count of violent
incident that was also over-dispersed. Re-estimating Models 1 to 3 of the main regressions with this
method yielded similar results (appendix Table A.6).
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Table 4.8: Alternative dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log non-
domestic
collective
violence per
million
people
Log
non-domestic
collective
violence with
casualties per
million people
Number
of non-
domestic
violence
Number
of
violence
Number
of people
killed
Number
of violent
conflict
G 4.934*** 4.483 4.227*** 4.164*** 4.921*** 3.974***
(1.679) (3.645) (1.319) (1.319) (1.310) (1.381)
G2 -8.928** -12.40 -7.346*** -7.312*** -8.535*** -5.675**
(3.489) (7.554) (2.385) (2.373) (2.527) (2.520)
Trust index -0.859* -2.027 -0.458 -0.398 -1.188*** -0.936**
(0.466) (1.325) (0.382) (0.381) (0.411) (0.409)
Gini ratio income ineq. 0.554 3.044 2.464** 2.555** 1.807** 1.673
(1.100) (2.390) (1.015) (1.013) (0.863) (1.096)
HDI 0.0499*** 0.0714*** 0.0692*** 0.0713*** -0.00536 0.0447***
(0.0112) (0.0257) (0.00986) (0.00981) (0.0113) (0.0112)
Unemployment rate 4.175** 6.164 0.856 0.792 1.187 3.352**
(1.814) (4.187) (1.629) (1.625) (1.475) (1.582)
Log GRDP p.c. -0.160 0.219 0.0540 0.0474 0.219*** -0.0648
(0.0972) (0.182) (0.0793) (0.0792) (0.0805) (0.0832)
Urban district 0.134 -0.714** 0.156 0.144 0.119 0.522***
(0.139) (0.318) (0.114) (0.113) (0.123) (0.125)
Log population 0.663*** 0.656*** 0.784*** 0.722***
(0.0539) (0.0537) (0.0466) (0.0576)
Ln(alpha) -0.469*** -0.478*** -0.738*** -0.323***
(0.0684) (0.0687) (0.101) (0.0766)
Constant 0.250 0.450 -9.408*** -9.547*** -6.104*** -8.243***
(1.510) (4.374) (1.329) (1.311) (1.528) (1.501)
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 495
R2 0.145 0.094
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. OLS was used in (1)
and (2), while negative binomial regression was used in (3) to (6).
last regression suggests that, at least in the 2014 data, the effect of cultural diversity was
not limited to general violence, but also extended to violent conflict.
4.6 Alternative Specifications
This section tests the robustness of the results to a few changes in the model specification.
First, under the assumption that cultural diversity does not change in the short term,
panel regression models were used to exploit the longitudinal nature of the NVMS. Second,
this study employed an empirical model based on the Esteban-Ray theory of conflict.
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4.6.1 Panel Data Regressions
The NVMS is known for its longitudinal data, which span for more than a decade. To
take advantage of this facet, the regressions in Table 4.9 employed a random-effects model
by assuming that the value of G was unchanged during 2005 to 2014. The year 2005 was
selected as the cut-off because it is considered the start of the era where large, episodic
violence were largely subsided.
The results indicated that the non-linear association between cultural diversity and
violence intensity held even after controlling for province fixed effects (Models 1 to 3).
Again, the exception was when a lagged dependent variable was included as an additional
control (Model 4). Even so, the signs of the coefficients remained the same. The last three
models employed a two-stage least-squares method, where the non-monotonic finding was
still observed in general.12
12These models used the same instruments as in Table 4.4, Model 7.
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Table 4.9: Panel regressions, 2005-2014 (dependent variable: log nondomestic violence
per million people)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RE RE RE RE RE-IV RE-IV RE-IV
G 5.170*** 4.821*** 3.850*** 0.650 12.08*** 25.83** 18.54***
(1.483) (1.285) (1.479) (0.610) (4.226) (10.06) (4.760)
G2 -9.900*** -8.175*** -7.963*** -1.031 -24.24** -42.53 -33.78***
(3.025) (2.667) (2.952) (1.218) (9.804) (26.91) (11.42)
HDI 0.0411*** 0.0653*** 0.0195*** 0.0390*** 0.0395*** 0.0471***
(0.0101) (0.0124) (0.00659) (0.00813) (0.0120) (0.00833)
Unemployment rate 2.685*** 3.726*** 1.866*** 2.452*** 2.557*** 2.782***
(0.652) (0.690) (0.467) (0.422) (0.495) (0.602)
Log GDP p.c. 0.105 0.173** 0.0394 0.0494 0.0528 0.0119
(0.0670) (0.0726) (0.0444) (0.0688) (0.0793) (0.0624)
Urban district 0.275*** 0.424*** 0.150** 0.220* 0.458*** 0.265***
(0.105) (0.103) (0.0623) (0.113) (0.167) (0.0817)
Lagged dep. var. 0.579*** 0.364***
(0.0331) (0.0254)
Constant 4.097*** 0.739 -2.225** 0.213 0.755 -1.475* -2.882***
(0.0721) (0.683) (0.950) (0.384) (0.570) (0.838) (0.566)
Observations 2,974 2,868 2,868 2,411 2,868 2,868 2,411
Number of district 495 495 495 304 495 495 304
Province fixed effects No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. RE = random-
effects estimator; IV = instrumental variable regression. Trust index was dropped because it was only
available for 2014. Gini ratio for income inequality was also dropped because there were no reliable
data for all districts from 2005 to 2014. Its coefficients were also insignificant in the main regressions.
The HDI for 2005 to 2013 was calculated using the old (pre-2014) method, while the value for 2014 was
calculated as
HDIold2013
HDInew2013
×HDInew2014, where new refers to the actual HDI calculated using the new method.
This technique was used because HDI data calculated using the new method were only available from
2010 onward. Province was preferred to island/regional fixed effects because, before 2014, there was a
disproportionate coverage of the NVMS. For example, all provinces in the eastern region were covered
from 2005 to 2014, while only three (out of 10) and two (out of seven) provinces in Sumatra and Java-Bali
were covered, respectively.
4.6.2 Esteban-Ray Conflict Model
One of the motivating theories in this study was the Esteban-Ray model of conflict. The
regressions in Table 4.10 were specified to closely mimic the empirical specifications of this
model, with the number of people killed from violent conflict as the dependent variable
and the simultaneous inclusion of all three distributional indices (Esteban et al., 2012).13
Also, following this model, G/N—where N is the number of population—was used instead
13The authors used a binary dependent variable in their empirical specification because of the lack of
reliable cross-country data on conflict intensity. Fortunately, the NVMS includes the number of people
killed from violent conflict and was used in these regressions.
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Table 4.10: Esteban-Ray model of conflict (dependent variable: number of people killed
from violent conflict)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NB NB NB XTNB XTNB XTNB
G/N -0.351 -0.167 -0.163 -0.0887* -0.0597 -0.0708
(0.246) (0.160) (0.160) (0.0454) (0.0447) (0.0456)
F 0.00789 -1.030** -1.014** -0.0226 -0.458** -0.460**
(0.412) (0.436) (0.423) (0.177) (0.205) (0.206)
P 17.18*** 7.562* 7.429* 5.341*** 3.803*** 4.150***
(6.210) (3.955) (3.894) (1.429) (1.462) (1.488)
Lagged dependent variable 0.162*** 0.165*** 0.0155** 0.0136*
(0.0273) (0.0274) (0.00710) (0.00704)
Log population 0.670*** 0.394*** 0.412*** 0.786*** 0.783*** 0.753***
(0.120) (0.103) (0.102) (0.0495) (0.0563) (0.0578)
Log GDP per capita -0.0677 0.173***
(0.132) (0.0601)
Constant -8.875*** -5.071*** -5.180*** -10.13*** -9.720*** -9.627***
(1.678) (1.430) (1.386) (0.657) (0.740) (0.749)
Observations 495 304 304 2,974 2,523 2,523
Number of id 495 304 304 495 304 304
Notes: Robust standard errors (Models 1 to 3) and standard errors (Models 4 to 6) in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. NB = negative binomial; XTNB = random effects panel negative
binomial.
of G.
Only the estimated parameters for P were always positive and significant, as in
Esteban-Ray’s empirical results, which suggests that polarisation increases the intensity
of conflict over public goods. Albeit insignificant, the estimated coefficient for G/N was
negative, similar to the results in Esteban et al. (2012), which signals the free-riding motive
might not be as strong as the prediction from the model. Unlike Esteban-Ray empirical
results, the coefficients for F in Models 2 and 3 were negative because of the inclusion
of the lagged dependent variable.14 Adding this variable also biased down the size of
P ’s coefficient. Models 4 to 6 used panel data, where the results were largely the same,
except now the estimated parameter for per capita GDP was positive and statistically
significant (Model 6). Together, the regressions do not seem to support the Esteban-Ray
conflict model. Nonetheless, they provide some evidence on the role of cultural diversity
in explaining the intensity of violence.
14WhenG andG2 were used instead ofG/N in Model 3, the non-linear term and P became insignificant.
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4.7 Conclusion
This study has revealed some interesting insights for the ongoing discourse on the eco-
nomics of conflict literature. First, income as measured by log of per capita GDP was
not associated with intensity of violence. Second, it appears that the relationship be-
tween cultural diversity and intensity of violence was non-linear. However, this finding
was subject to regional variations, except when panel data were used. Third, despite the
non-linearity, most districts were in the region where the correlation was positive, which
suggests a detrimental effect of cultural diversity in most of Indonesia. Fourth, the find-
ings were robust to alternative dependent variables and the addition of various covariates
(which included some institutional measures of decentralisation and religion). Fifth, in-
come inequality played an important role once regional fixed effects were included. Sixth,
only one institutional variable—the number of places of worship—was directly associated
with a lower intensity of violence. Finally, Esteban and Ray (2011) model of conflict could
not fully explain the intensity of violent conflict in Indonesia.
The findings from this study indicate the importance of the antecedents of violence
(economic, institutions and grievance factors), thus answering the first research question,
although there is evidence that the role of cultural diversity (a proxy for ethnic grievance)
is more pronounced. Specifically, the variable’s curvilinear association with intensity of
violence answered the second research question. The non-linear relationship was the first
to be observed at country level which complements a cross-country study (Mason et al.,
2011). This finding is also consistent with previous studies (Pierskalla & Sacks, 2017;
Tajima, 2013), although, in this study, the relationship was stronger and non-linear.
This study has the following policy implications. Law No. 5/2017 on Cultural Ad-
vancement, for example, considers cultural diversity as the ’nation’s wealth and identity’,
but also emphasises the principle of tolerance. The 2019 Government Work Plan also
acknowledged the importance of ethnic diversity on violence and devoted activities on
conflict management. The rising income inequality should be addressed given its effects
on violence, which can be achieved by promoting health and education services to the
poor.
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That being said, there is still much work to be done to understand the mechanism
behind the results. The main theory behind this study was aimed at understanding
civil wars, not everyday violence, in which the results were only partially consistent.
In addition, the representative data of Indonesia were only available as a cross-section
in 2014, which constrained further generalisation of the results, particularly regarding
the non-linearity result. Therefore, future research agendas should focus on finding the
mechanisms that can explain small, everyday violence and on generalising the results
using other data, including data obtained using experimental methods.
Part III
The Consequences of Conflict on
Antisocial Behaviour
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Chapter 5
Antisocial Behaviour Experiments:
A Review
The third part of this thesis discusses the experimental works on antisocial behaviour,
including a review of existing work (in this chapter) and an empirical investigation (Chap-
ters 6 and 7). As briefly mentioned in the introductory chapter, most post-conflict experi-
ments have observed prosocial behaviour. However, antisocial behaviour is also important
because it poses negative effects for inter- and intra-community relations. It also encap-
sulates behaviour in an actual conflict. Therefore, this chapter is aimed at exploring
antisocial behaviour—elicited through economic experiments—by focusing on games that
capture pure spite and identifying the factors that explain the behaviour.
5.1 Introduction
There is an increasing number of experiments aimed at understanding the long-term
effects of conflict on individual behaviour. A meta-review on post-conflict experiments
indicated strong evidence that experience of war or violence is positively correlated with
higher cooperation, with some theoretical explanations proposed for this finding (Bauer
et al., 2016). Experience of violent conflict has been considered to create psychological
changes and disorders in both adults and children, and the effects may continue long after
the wars end (Jakupcak et al., 2007; Palmieri, Canetti-Nisim, Galea, Johnson, & Hobfoll,
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2008; Slone & Mann, 2016). The psychology literature on post-traumatic growth also
indicates that war victims experience a change in general preference on life, including
other-regarding preferences (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2014; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). This
argument challenges common presumptions that mutual trust is destroyed in polarised
societies because of civil wars (Waldmann, 2003), or at least argues that the negative
psychological effect of war is not permanent.
Studies in post-conflict regions also indicate a temporary effect of parochialism. For
example, higher in-group parochialism was found among the victims of the Georgia-Russia
war and the Sierra Leone war (Bauer, Cassar, Chytilova´, & Henrich, 2014), but sustained
contact through an inter-group project helped reduce inter-group discrimination when
the participants were paired with religious out-group members (Scacco & Warren, 2018).
Meanwhile, a study in Ambon, Indonesia (a region that experienced Muslim-Christian
conflict in 1999 to 2000), only found moderate effects of the past conflict on out-group
discrimination (Werner & Lambsdorff, 2019). However, these studies mostly focused
on prosocial behaviour, yet antisocial behaviour is prevalent in conflict situations and
captures the dark side of human behaviour. It also signals weak community cohesion,
which endangers security and peace in the long term. Therefore, this chapter reviews
antisocial behaviour experiments in the literature and identifies the antecedents of such
behaviour.
This thesis follows the literature in the definition and use of the term ’antisocial be-
haviour’. Specifically, antisocial preferences are defined as ’pleasure derived from lowering
somebody else’s well-being, even if this comes at an own cost and in absence of negative
reciprocity (we also refer to this kind of attitude as nastiness)’ (Abbink, Masclet, & Vee-
len, 2011, p. 1). Further, the terms ’nasty’, ’spiteful’ and ’malevolent’ refer to the same
behaviour, and are used interchangeably in this thesis.
In this chapter’s literature review, three criteria were used for the inclusion of antiso-
cial behaviour games that capture spite: (i) the game must be strategic (where a player’s
payoff depends on other players’ actions); (ii) at least one of the strategies must be a spite-
ful one; and (iii) punishment games, such as the public goods game with punishment, were
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excluded. From the first criterion, experiments that could observe antisocial behaviour
yet did not involve strategic decision making, such as cheating and lying games (Cadsby,
Tapon, & Song, 2010; Fischbacher & Follmi-Heusi, 2013; Gravert, 2013), were excluded.
Although they are useful to understand bad behaviour, the observed behaviour might not
necessarily be out of spite. Games where participants only choose between some pairs of
allocations—which is not necessarily Pareto-damaging (e.g., E. Fehr, Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, &
Sutter, 2013; Kerschbamer, 2015)—were also excluded, even though they can be useful in
classifying participants’ preferences.
The second criterion was used to filter out actions that are rationally motivated
by material benefit, such as taking money from others in the fragile public goods game
(Hoyer, Bault, Loerakker, & van Winden, 2014), undervaluing competitors’ outcomes in
the sabotage game (Carpenter, Matthews, & Schirm, 2010; Habring & Irlenbusch, 2011)
and ’attacking’ other players in the anarchy game and destruction game (Powell & Wilson,
2008; Scacco & Warren, 2018).
The third criterion was selected because punishment games have been widely stud-
ied, such as ultimatum game (Oosterbeek, Sloof, & van de Kuilen, 2004) and public
goods game (Thoni, 2014), where some experiments were conducted in the field, such as
in India (E. Fehr, Hoff, & Kshetramade, 2008) and dozens of societies around the globe
(Herrmann, Thoni, & Ga¨chter, 2008). Punishments in these games are typically intro-
duced as a norm-enforcing mechanism, which is arguably a different motivation than pure
spite. Therefore, in the following part of this review, the focus is on antisocial behaviour
in non-punishment games.
With these criteria, antisocial behaviour economic games can be classified into
payoff-destruction games and spiteful auctions. Payoff-destruction games are commonly
implemented using the money-burning (MB) game (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001) or the joy-of-
destruction (JoD) game (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011; Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009). In these
games, players are given the opportunity to reduce (’burn’) other participants’ money
(always at some marginal price in the MB game, but sometimes for free in JoD games).
In the original MB game, each player may reduce his or her own money and any other
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participants’ money, but, in subsequent studies, the game can be played in pairs. In the
JoD game, because of its dyadic nature, payoff-destruction can only be aimed at each
participant’s partner.
While these games are used to elicit spite, the observed behaviour might not be
purely driven by spite. For example, some participants received a (randomly allocated)
advantage over others in the original MB game (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001). This feature was
introduced to create a sense of unfairness, which is argued to have driven spite. Therefore,
payoff-destruction experiments are often used to find antecedents of spite, such as emotions
and social environments.
There are several antisocial behaviour games that are part of market mechanisms
(auctions). Morgan, Steiglitz, and Reis (2003) developed a theoretical work based on four
standard types of auctions, where the theory predicts the existence of spite motive, with
people aggressively bidding in first-price auctions after knowing that their opponents are
not machines. They also predict that aggressive subjects in first-price auctions should
be more aggressive in second-price auctions. Empirically, the experiment is designed so
that bidders know their own private valuation of the item and, in the complete informa-
tion condition, know other bidders’ private valuations (and vice versa for the incomplete
information condition) (Nishimura, Cason, Saijo, & Ikeda, 2011). Around half of the
participants bid spitefully in the complete information condition, while the rate dropped
in the incomplete information condition.1 In another study, Kimbrough and Reiss (2012)
measured spite in a dynamic second-price auction, and found that people are either always
spiteful or not spiteful at all. This means that, when a person wants to be spiteful, he or
she will do it consistently and at the maximum level.2 Unlike payoff-destruction games,
spiteful auctions are almost exclusively conducted with university students.
While understanding spiteful auctions has its merits, the focus of this thesis is payoff-
destruction games that capture spite. Before delving into the details of payoff-destruction
1They also observed underbidding by high-value bidders, which explains that spiteful acts may backfire
on spiteful bidders. Such reciprocal spite occurred when a low-value bidder bid above their private
valuation to reduce the winner’s payoff, while, in contrast, a high-value bidder facing a spiteful low-
bidder would allow themselves to lose to force the spiteful bidder to receive a negative payoff.
2There is also a work in progress that combines a survey measure of spitefulness with spiteful auction
(Kirchkamp & Mill, 2019).
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games, Section 5.2 will first review several theories on social preferences and the way spite
is incorporated in them. Section 5.3 reviews the use of payoff-destruction games and the
general experimental results, while Section 5.4 elaborates the various factors that have
been found to explain spite. Finally, Section 5.5 summarises the main findings of this
chapter.
5.2 Behavioural Theories of Spite
Scientists have theorised spite from many aspects, from evolutionary biology (Hamilton,
1964a, 1964b) to game theory (Hamburger, 1979). For example, in the spite game
(Hamburger, 1979), the upper-left cell of the payoff matrix (Table 5.1) represents the
best strategy for both players. However, if A’s utility is negatively dependent on what
B is obtaining, he or she will choose (3, 1) so that the difference in payoff received is
maximised in favour of A. In other words, A is willing to receive a lower payoff as long as
the payoff gap is the largest. However, this scenario creates another motive for players to
deviate from the best strategy. That is, if B anticipates that A is a difference-maximiser,
then B’s best decision should be (3, 1).3 If that is the case, his or her action is essentially
the same as being a difference-maximiser him/herself—B would choose the right column
in the matrix.
This section focuses on relevant behavioural theories of spite that are under the
umbrella of other-regarding preferences. Other-regarding preference is a growing subject
in experimental and behavioural economics, where theoretical models are developed to
explain phenomenon such as fairness and altruism, which formalised the concept of spite.
For example, Levine (1998) defined an individual i in n-person games as being spiteful if
the utility of an individual j negatively affects i’s utility.4 This definition is also found
in studies that measure spite in public goods game literature (Cason, Saijo, Yamato, &
Yokotani, 2004; Saijo & Nakamura, 1995), which bear a close resemblance to the antisocial
3Unless if B is unwilling to be the subject of A’s malice, in which B would choose (0, 0).
4In experiments, a spiteful type must choose spiteful strategy that leads to action (or a set of actions)
that reduce the payoff of the player and the partner(s), in comparison with actions that maximise the
player’s own payoff.
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Table 5.1: The spite game
B
A
4, 4 1, 3
3, 1 0, 0
behaviour games reviewed in this chapter. Therefore, essentially, spite is observed when
there is no private material incentive for doing so.
Spite motive is embedded in some other-regarding models because it is often thought
to be the opposite side of, yet still on the same spectrum as, prosocial motive. However,
as will be seen in the experimental works, participants sometimes behaved both spitefully
and prosocially, which suggests that these motives may not necessarily be within the same
spectrum.
E. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) distinguished three ways to approach other-regarding
preferences in a non-axiomatic way (i.e., by starting with a specific utility function). The
first approach (social preferences) models an individual’s utility function to depend on
the division of the financial payoff among all individuals in the relevant reference group,
in addition to his/her own financial payoff. The second approach (interdependent pref-
erences) considers the type of co-participant that affects an individual’s own preference.
The third approach (intention-based reciprocity) is concerned with an individual’s belief
about his or her co-participant. The rest of this section uses this classification to group
behavioural theories that could explain spiteful behaviour.
5.2.1 Social Preferences
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) modelled an individual i’s utility ui = ui(yi, σi) to comprise
own (positive) payoff, yi, and relative payoff share, σi, where:
σi =
 yi/
∑n
j=1 yj if
∑n
j=1 yj > 0,
1/n if
∑n
j=1 yj = 0.
The utility function is assumed to be weakly increasing and concave in yi, strictly
concave in σi and, importantly, reach a maximum at σi = 1/n. The latter condition
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implies that an individual with such utility function will prefer an equitable payoff division.
This model is also qualitatively similar to E. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function:
ui = yi − αi
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max {yj − yi, 0} − βi
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max {yi − yj, 0} ,
where the second term captures the disutility from having other participants earn
more (in absolute terms) than the individual, while the third term reflects the individual’s
distaste of being ahead of other participants. It is also assumed that αi ≥ βi, which means
that, relative to being advantageous, the disutility from being disadvantageous is greater.
To summarise, in both models, an individual compares his or her relative payoff standings
with other participants and selects a strategy that aims to reduce the difference in payoff.
Social preference theories deal with spite indirectly in the models discussed earlier.
For example, in experiments where participants received unequal endowment, a partici-
pant that has a social preference may choose a strategy that minimises the inequity—such
as by reducing other participants’ payoffs—even though it does not directly bring addi-
tional payoffs to him/herself.
During the past decade, the emergence of spiteful behaviour games has created a
new type of social preference. Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) introduced the JoD game, where
pairs of individuals have the opportunity to reduce each other’s money in the absence of
unequal endowment in expectation. In a sense, this game is the direct opposite of the
dictator game. The behavioural prediction of this game is straightforward (i.e., no payoff-
destruction), but, when money is destroyed, the only plausible explanation is spite. That
is, the destroyer receives utility from seeing the other person lose money:
ui = xi − uj,
where xi is the direct utility for person i and uj is j’s utility (j 6= i). This simple
model can be extended to allow giving decision, such as in a double-dictator game, where
the individual has the chance to either reduce or add money, w, for the other individual
(Sadrieh & Schro¨der, 2016):
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ui = xi +
 0 for w ≥ 0,uj(w) for w < 0.
In this utility function, the individual has a purely spiteful or antisocial preference,
as he or she does not receive any enjoyment from giving money to others. Rather, the
person obtains additional utility from reducing other players’ money. Such antisocial
preference is the direct opposite of Andreoni and Miller (2008) model, where a social
maximiser in a dictator game would always try to choose allocations that result in the
greatest total amount of payoff for both parties.
It can also be contrasted with the warm glow preference, where an individual receives
utility simply from giving money to others, without actually caring about their utility
(Andreoni, 1989). This can be extended to antisocial behaviour experiments where an
individual might be receiving utility simply from the act of reducing other’s money.
5.2.2 Interdependent Preferences
As briefly mentioned before, Levine’s model considers a person’s utility to be affected by
another person’s utility. Specifically, in an n-player game,
ui = xi +
n∑
j 6=i
uj (ai + λaj) /(1 + λ),
where, again, xi is the direct utility for person i and uj is the utility of a person j
other than i. In addition, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and−1 < ai < 1. The parameter ai reflects individual
i’s regard towards j, where a negative (positive) value means that the individual is spiteful
(altruistic). When ai = 0, the individual is of a selfish type.
Levine calibrated the value for ai using multi-country ultimatum data from Roth,
Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991) and conjectured the distribution of the
’spiteful’ type to be 20 per cent. He defined the ’spiteful’ type as those who demanded
USD 7 (out of the maximum USD 10) in the ultimatum game.5 While the definition of
spite based on the ultimatum game results might not satisfy everyone, the theoretical
5The ’normal’ type would demand USD 6, while the ’altruistic’ type would demand USD 5.
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model is clear and provides a transparent mechanism to indicate how an individual’s
utility is affected by that person’s regard of the other participants.
5.2.3 Intention-based Reciprocity
Rabin’s (1993) theory can be understood by examining a two-player game with two levels
of beliefs. Upon choosing a strategy, Player 1 forms a belief of Player 2’s strategy and
then defines the kindness function: the ratio of the difference between the actual payoff
(which is conditional on the belief about Player 2’s strategy) and the fair payoff as the
numerator, and the range of all possible payoffs as the denominator. Player 1 will also
need to form a belief of the kindness of Player 2, which means that the person needs
to anticipate the belief that Player 2 has towards him or her, and then form his or her
kindness function. Together, Player 1’s utility function consists of own payoff yi, kindness
function fi and Player 2’s kindness function f
′
j :
ui = yi + f
′
j (1 + fi) .
Both fi and f
′
j must lie in the [−1, 0.5] interval. If Player 1 thinks that the other
player is going to be spiteful or unkind (f
′
j < 0), then it is of his or her best interest to
be unkind as well.
Rabin’s contribution to the other-regarding literature by introducing beliefs was
further developed to include beliefs about intentions in sequential games or was combined
with the social preference model (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006).
5.3 Payoff-destruction Games
The previous section discussed several behavioural theories of spite, some of which have
been explored through experiments. This section reviews experiments that are used to
test predictions from payoff-destruction games. Before discussing these games and experi-
ments, the first sub-section provides the conceptual basis for lab-in-the-field experiments,
which are sometimes used to study antisocial behaviour.
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5.3.1 Lab-in-the-field Experiments
Laboratory and field experiments methodologically complement each other, rather than
the latter being a special case of the former, because the loss of the field context when
an experiment is conducted in the laboratory (Harrison & List, 2004). Further, there
are six factors that can be used to determine the context of an experiment: subject
pool, information, commodity, task or rules applied, stakes and the environment. They
further broadly classified the different types of field experiments: artefactual, framed and
natural field experiment. An artefactual field experiment is the closest to a standard
laboratory experiment, with the exception that the subjects are not students. A framed
field experiment exploits one of three field contexts (information, commodity, task or rules
applied), while a natural field experiment is like a framed field experiment, except that
the subjects are unaware that they are being studied. Figure 5.1 indicates how, along
the spectrum of empirical methods, field experiments bridge laboratory and naturally-
occurring data.
Other researchers expanded this taxonomy by emphasising the role of the experi-
menter; that is, an experiment is not a field study if the action of the experimenter would
generate the observed activity (Charness et al., 2013; Gneezy & Imas, 2017). Therefore,
according to this classification, experiments conducted with nonstandard subject pools,
but using standard economic games—such as public goods games or dictator games—
should not be classified as a field experiment. Rather, they should be classified as an
’extra-lab’ or ’lab-in-the-field’ experiment (other researchers preferred different terms such
as ’lab-like field experiment’ in Viceisza, 2016). In this thesis, the term ’artefactual field
experiment’ and ’lab-in-the-field experiment’ refer to experiments with nonstandard sub-
ject pools conducted in natural environments.
In this thesis, the main experiment in Aceh was conducted outside the laboratory,
but using a variation of the JoD game. Such a lab-in-the-field experiment is preferred to
a standard laboratory experiment because war is not a normal experience for everyday
people—it affects people directly and is impossible to reproduce in the laboratory. Fur-
ther, in the districts where the experiment was conducted, universities or similar higher
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Figure 5.1: Laboratory, field and naturally-occurring data
Source: List (2007).
Notes: AFE = artefactual field experiments; FFE = framed field experiments; NFE = natural field
experiments; LAB = laboratory; NE: natural experiments; PSM = propensity score matching; IV =
instrumental variable; STR = structural modelling.
education institutions were only located in the city centre. Using these locations for the
experiment would not only bias the sample, but would also remove the conflict context,
as Aceh rebels were mostly fighting in rural areas.
5.3.2 A Summary of Results
Zizzo and Oswald (2001) introduced the MB game and hypothesised that destroying oth-
ers’ money was motivated by inequity aversion. They found that payoff-destruction was
consistent with Charness and Rabin (2002) model and the non-linear version of E. Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), but not with Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model of inequality aver-
sion. Subsequently, experimental works indicated that inequity aversion drives most of
the behaviour. For example, Kebede and Zizzo (2015) directly tested the behavioural pre-
diction of E. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in multivariate
regressions, and found that only the former’s prediction that was supported by the data.
They found the empirical data to be in the opposite direction of Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) prediction: the greater the ratio between one’s own income and the mean of the
other participant’s payoffs, the more likely the participants would burn the money.
MB experiments indicate that fairness regarding how the payoff is generated is an
important determinant of payoff-destruction, both in the laboratory (Dickinson, Masclet,
& Peterle, 2018; D. Fehr, 2018) and the field (Zeballos, 2018). In one of the treatments,
participants were given bonus payments that, according to most social preference models,
would increase burn rate (D. Fehr, 2018). However, because the bonus payments were
given fairly—they corresponded to their results in the real-effort task—the burn rate was
expected to be the same, which was confirmed by the experimental data. Similarly, the
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probability of participants’ money being burnt increased by 29 percentage points when
they were placed in an advantageous position to earn more money (Zeballos, 2018).
While the MB game has contributed much to the antisocial behaviour literature,
its focus on fairness means that it overlooks the pure spite motive. With the absence
of expected unequal payoff distributions, the JoD game was introduced to elicit pure
spite (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011; Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009). The game is not used
to test reciprocity models, but belief expectation has been included in the experimen-
tal design, where negative belief—the belief that the co-participant is willing to burn
money—strongly predicts money burning (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011; Prediger, Vollan,
& Herrmann, 2014). The findings from the JoD experiment indicate that a smaller amount
of endowment obtained—which is equal in expectation—is not associated with a higher
burn rate (Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009). This is in contrast to the models of Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000) and E. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which assume that people dislike inequity,
irrespective of whether the inequity is in favour of them or not.
Antisocial behaviour might be motivated by envy, but this seems to not be the case
as it could not predict money-burning among the sub-sample of unemployed subjects in
a study on labour market discrimination (Dickinson et al., 2018).6 However, this finding
should be interpreted with caution because the number of observations was relatively
small, with n = 48.
A variation of the JoD game was developed in which participants were asked to select
the payoff (in an integer between 0 to 10 euros) for their co-participant prior to the actual
matching (Bracht & Zylbersztejn, 2018). Afterwards, participants randomly chosen as
Player A would obtain 10 euros, while the rest (Player B) would receive whatever amount
their co-participant chose for them before the pairing (participants knew about the two
types of player when they made the allocation decision). The authors found a 22 per cent
burn rate, which is close to Levine (1998) conjecture of the distribution of spiteful type.
However, their finding contrasts with the results from a similar game, where the burn
rate was only one to two per cent (Razen, 2019). In this game, a distributor made an
6Envy was elicited through a social preference task (Blanco, Engelmann, & Normann, 2011).
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allocation 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 between him/herself with a recipient, knowing that, when x > x∗,
the discrepancy |x−x∗| would be forfeited for the recipient. In other words, choosing any
amount larger than x∗ offered no benefit to the distributor (he or she received money x∗
at the maximum), while hurting the recipient at the same time. Therefore, this game is
similar to (Bracht & Zylbersztejn, 2018), except, here, the exogenously-determined cut-off
point x∗ was absent.
At one extreme, two variations of JoD game—the first-strike game and pre-emptive
Strike game (Abbink & de Haan, 2014; Simunovic, Mifune, & Yamagishi, 2013)—allow
participants to burn a significant payoff of and ’deactivate’ their partner. These games
essentially reflect the defensive aggression strategy in real-life situations; for example, the
1967 Six-Day War is considered a pre-emptive attack by the Israeli against an imminent
threat from the Egyptian forces. The experiments indicated that up to 80 per cent
of participants are willing to destroy others’ money. Similarly, when participants have
the option to bind themselves from burning money, subjects burn more when both are
unbound (77 per cent) than when their partner is bound (60 per cent) (Jauernig & Uhl,
2019).
At the other extreme, participants could play both the dictator game and JoD game
(L. Zhang & Ortmann, 2016) or the double-dictator game (the decision to destroy payoffs
is given as another option besides giving) (Sadrieh & Schro¨der, 2016). In these studies,
a significant proportion of participants had a mixed preference, where they both gave
and destroyed others’ money (20 and 34 per cent, respectively). However, only six per
cent were purely antisocial (those who only destroy and never give) in the latter study.
Coincidentally, the proportion of pure antisocial participants was also six per cent in the
baseline condition of the former study.
Burn rates—the percentage of money-burning decisions—are lower when payoff-
destruction games are played repeatedly. For example, the rates dropped from around
25 per cent to almost zero in just three rounds when the money-burning decision was
observable after each round (Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009). Similarly, the rates were halved in
just three rounds of play in other experiments (Abbink et al., 2010; Karakostas & Zizzo,
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2016). The only exception was in the first-strike game, where the rate did not dropped,
and in fact increased in some of the treatments over the 18 rounds.
Antisocial behaviour games can also be used to observe conflict at a group level. In
the mobbing game (Abbink & Dog˘an, 2018)—which is similar to the collective money-
burning game (Abbink, Masclet, & Mirza, 2011)—each participant in a group of four may
choose one other participant who, if selected by all other three participants, will lose all
the payoff. The researchers found that, unsurprisingly, the mobbing formation rate was
lower when it did not entail personal benefit to the perpetrators (i.e., mobbing for pure
spite). Predictions made by social preference theory could not explain the occurrence of
mobbing: the predicted drop in the mobbing formation was not observed even when one
of the group’s participants was ’safe’.7 Given that there was no drop in the mobbing
formation, greed seemed to be the only predictor for the mobbing decision.
In the pointless vendetta game (Abbink & Herrmann, 2010), each member of a
four-people group may choose to destroy the payoff of the other group at some cost. The
researchers found that the destruction rate was lower when there was possible retaliation.
In a field setting, the effect of deciding in a group (for money burning of a random
counterpart) was more detrimental than in the situation where individuals made decisions
in isolation (Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Celik Katreniak, et al., 2018).
Table 5.2 summarises the results of the payoff-destruction experiments. The review
includes both journal publications and works in progress to minimise publication bias. An
accompanying table (Appendix A, Table A.7) shows that, while most (29 of 38) payoff-
destruction experiments were conducted in the laboratory with standard subject pools
(university students), the number of experiments with nonstandard subject pools—mostly
civilians in developing countries—is not negligible.
7In this treatment, the safe participant would not lose the payoff if selected as a victim; therefore,
mobbing only occurred when a safe participant participated.
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Table 5.2: List of payoff-destruction experiments
Source) Participants Game Gender Main findings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Zizzo and Oswald (2001) 116 of mostly United
Kingdom (UK) univer-
sity students
MB N/A Deservedness (rank egalitarianism) and expectation of money destroyed
explain money burning. The decision to destroy money is not sensitive
to the price of destruction.
Zizzo (2003) 87 UK university stu-
dents
MB N/A Burn rate remains large despite removing expectation of money burning.
Around 75 per cent appears to be rank egalitarian.
Zizzo and Fleming (2011) 216 UK university stu-
dents (native speakers)
MB N/A Participants destroyed and gave more (pure altruism or pure spite not
observed on average). This result was driven by social pressure—i.e.,
players who were sensitive to social pressure tended to give and destroy
more.
Kebede and Zizzo (2015) 240 rural Ethiopian
villagers; 120
Ethiopian univer-
sity students
MB No effect The decision to burn money was motivated by inequity aversion. Re-
venge (negative reciprocity) did not become statistically significant in
explaining money burning. Money burning was negatively associated
with agricultural innovations (data taken from a concurrent household
survey that contained questions such as whether participants grew new
crops).
Gangadharan, Islam,
Ouch, and Wang (2017)
492 Cambodian civil-
ians
MB No effect Participants who lived in districts with a high mortality rate and direct
exposure to genocide tended to burn more.
Islam et al. (2017) 762 Indian civilians MB Mixed
effect
Exposure to the Assam riots was positively associated with money-
burning behaviour.
Dickinson et al. (2018) 48 French university
students
MB N/A Payoff destructions recorded when participants were disadvantaged by
favouritism aimed at others.
D. Fehr (2018) 248 German universi-
ties students
MB N/A By itself, inequality did not lead to money-burning decisions, but was
mediated by the mechanism through which income was generated.
Gangadharan, Grossman,
and Vecci (2018)
370 Australian univer-
sity students
MB No effect Money-burning game played in a group of 10. Burn rate was higher
when participants could not change their income class.
Zeballos (2018) 285 Bolivian dairy
farmers
MB Women
burn more
Participants earned money through real-effort task. More than half of
the participants destroyed others’ money, particularly against those with
higher productivity.
Gangadharan, Grossman,
Molle, and Vecci (2019)
186 American univer-
sity students
MB N/A In a group of six, participants with low income tended to burn more
money towards people of different social or income identity. There was
no such effect among high-income participants.
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Source Participants Game Gender Main findings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Abbink and Sadrieh
(2009)
40 Dutch university
students
JoD N/A Money burning could not be explained by inequity aversion because the
largest amount of money burnt happened when both players had the
same level of endowment.
Abbink and Herrmann
(2011)
131 Ukrainian univer-
sities students
JoD No effect Hiding the decision to burn others’ money under nature increased burn-
ing rate.
Kessler, Ruiz-Martos, and
Skuse (2012)
606 Hungarian univer-
sities students
JoD No effect Destruction rate (the unilateral version of the burn rate in JoD game)
was lower when the decision was unilateral.
Baillon, Selim, and van
Dolder (2013)
153 Dutch university
students
JoD N/A Pictures of eyes negatively affected money-burning behaviour.
Prediger et al. (2014) 120 Namibian villagers JoD No effect Burning rate was more intensive in the community that faced higher
competition and scarcer resources.
Zeitzoff (2014) 98 Israeli civilians JoD N/A Exposure to violence reduced intragroup conflict. Some participants
primed with anger had mixed effects on the decision to destroy their
partner’s money. Participants with higher exposure to rocket attack
were more willing to take revenge.
Basurto, Blanco, Ne-
nadovic, and Vollan
(2016)
127 Mexican civilians JoD No effect Both antisocial behaviour and contribution to public goods were higher
in marine protected areas (MPAs) than in non-MPAs. Economic devel-
opment unique to MPAs and increased group identity may explain this
result.
Jauernig, Uhl, and Luetge
(2016)
218 German university
students
JoD Mixed Competition escalated money burning. Losers were punished more by
winners than losers, but winners were equally punished by both.
Karakostas and Zizzo
(2016)
390 UK university stu-
dents
JoD No effect Giving orders or cues to destroy money significantly increased spiteful
behaviour.
L. Zhang and Ortmann
(2016)
143 Australian univer-
sity students
JoD Mixed Context matters: actions made by participants were subject to which
decision game was played first. Players were less altruistic when JoD
game was played ahead of dictator game.
Diamond and Blackwell
(2017)
74 American university
students
JoD No effect Hugging was negatively associated with money burning.
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´,
Chytilova´, and Zelin-
sky (2018)
327 Slovakian adoles-
cents
JoD N/A Burning rate doubled when facing the Roma ethnic minority (who are
often the target of ethnic hostility).
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Source Participants Game Gender Main findings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Ce-
lik Katreniak, et al. (2018)
630 Slovakian adoles-
cents; 1679 Ugandan
adolescents
JoD N/A In both experimental locations, participants in groups made more
money-burning decisions (against other groups) than when participants
made the decisions individually. Group, rather than deliberation, effect
drove the result.
Dickinson and Masclet
(2019)
123 French university
students
JoD No effect Using trolley problems to elicit dubious ethical decisions predicted spite-
ful behaviour.
Alm˚as et al. (2019) 864 American uni-
versity students; 995
Kenyan university
students
JoD Men burn
more
Participants in Kenya who were exposed to relatively high laboratory
room temperature burnt more money than in the control group. Current
political situations and emotions may have driven the result. No effect
for the American sample or with regard to other behaviours.
Jauernig and Uhl (2019) 286 German university
students
JoD N/A Spite was the main motive for money burning, as indicated in the 60 per
cent burn rate of unbound participants when facing bound participants
in the self-binding treatment.
Vicente and Vilela (2019) 353 young (14-44 years
of age) Mozambique
males; 30 American
university students
JoD N/A In the main (Muslim) sample, the promotion against Islamic extremism
program reduced the burn rate relative to the control group. Relative to
the Muslim co-participants, foreigners had more of their money burnt.
In all samples, Christian and foreigner participants burnt more and less,
respectively, relative to their Muslim counterparts.
J. Zhang, Brown, and Xie
(2019)
124 participants,
mostly Canadian
universities students
JoD N/A Antisocial behaviour was not affected by religious priming, but positively
correlated with a multidimensional measure of religiosity.
Bracht and Zylbersztejn
(2018)
198 participants
(∼80% French univer-
sity students)
JoD equivalent No effect Differential moral judgement by gender occurred even after controlling
for spiteful behaviour.
Razen (2019) 288 Austrian univer-
sity students
Spite No effect Very few participants with spiteful preference (1 to 2 per cent) relative
to those with greed preference (10 to 23 per cent; elicited with the greed
game).
Abbink and Dog˘an (2018) 860 Dutch and Ger-
man university stu-
dents
Mobbing N/A Giving a larger monetary benefit for mobbing increased mobbing forma-
tion. Social preference theory could not explain mobbing decisions.
Abbink and Herrmann
(2010)
144 Turkish university
students
Pointless
vendetta
N/A When there was the possibility of continuing retaliation, the rate of
payoff-destruction decreased.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Abbink and de Haan
(2014)
160 Dutch university
students
First-strike No effect Fear of revenge fuelled spiteful behaviour. First-order fear created the
highest intensity of attack. The opposite occurred when there was no
reason to strike in the asymmetric treatment.
Simunovic et al. (2013) 58 Japan university
students (in the bilat-
eral version)
Preemptive
strike
N/A The majority of participants attacked the other player because of fear of
being attacked, rather than the desire to harm others.
Sadrieh and Schro¨der
(2016)
170 German university
students
Double-dictator Women
burn more
One-third of players had mixed preference (both giving and destroying
money), which was positively associated with payoff comparison. Ex-
perimenter demand affected giving, but not destruction.
Garc´ıa-Gallego, Geor-
gantzis, and Ruiz-Martos
(2019)
126 Spanish university
students
Heaven-dictator N/A Playing background music (classical or contemporary pop and rock) had
no effect on behaviour.
Abbink and Herrmann
(2011)
378 French university
students
Collective
money-burning
No effect Inequality aversion did not cause a riot. Disadvantaged groups tended
to submit to the advantaged group by performing fewer riots.
Grossman and Komai
(2013)
160 American univer-
sity students
Harm and
insurance
Men burn
more
Inequality aversion explained money burning and was directed towards
those within the same hierarchical group. Spending on insurance was
twice as high as spending on harming others.
Notes: MB = money-burning game; JoD = joy-of-destruction game. Given that the essence of the two main games, MB and JoD, is the same (i.e., the willingness
to destroy others’ payoff), the categorisation between these games was subjectively made based on what the authors stated in their papers. If the authors did
not specifically mention which game was used, the game was categorised as JoD if the participants played in pairs or the cost of burning money (if any) was
invariable. Otherwise, the game was categorised as MB.
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5.3.3 A Meta-analysis
The small yet increasing number of MB and JoD experiments made it possible to under-
take a simple meta-analysis of the experimental results.8 Around 72 per cent of the studies
required participants to pay for money burning (the data for this analysis can be found
in Appendix A, Table A.7). Figure 5.2a displays a histogram of burn, which measures
the average burn rate—defined as the percentage of players who chose to burn a portion
of their partner’s money—across all treatments of the studies. Although the density was
small for burn rates higher than 50 per cent, money burning was quite prevalent, with an
average of 32 out of 100 participants choosing such behaviour.
In addition, there is a clear pattern whereby burn was higher in the studies con-
ducted in European countries and the cost of burning money was associated with an-
tisocial behaviour (Figure 5.2b). The latter indicates that introducing cost increases,
rather than decreases, antisocial behaviour. This finding suggests that the participants
wanted to maximise every penny they spent by hurting other participants as much as
possible—similar to, although not necessarily comparable with, the findings from the
spiteful auctions discussed in the introduction of this chapter.
The previous findings were confirmed in the OLS regressions where, following best
practice in meta-analysis and a relevant past study (Hedges & Olkin, 2014; Johnson &
Mislin, 2011), the error term was weighted by w (the number of subjects in each treatment
divided by the total number of observations). Therefore, the specification for the main
regression (with burn as the burn rate and X as a vector of explanatory variables) is given
by:
burn = β1 + β2X +
ε
w
.
8The analysis was ’simple’ partially because a large proportion of the studies did not include standard
deviations of the observed burn rates. Also, the analysis was limited to results from these two games to
minimise variations in the designs of payoff-destruction experiments that could affect the outcome.
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(a) Histogram
(b) Box plots
Figure 5.2: Distribution and box plots of burn in the meta-analysis
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Table 5.3: Simple meta-analysis of MB and JoD experiments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Costly 18.05*** 13.93* 13.96** 5.418
(4.358) (7.007) (6.922) (6.815)
Students -4.888 -3.824 -18.50**
(8.468) (8.457) (7.100)
JoD game -5.447 -3.755 -9.727
(8.292) (8.197) (7.914)
One-shot 13.28 12.34* 9.300*
(8.093) (6.705) (4.887)
Working paper -12.77*** -6.782
(3.551) (4.110)
Region: Africa -24.46***
(7.833)
Region: America -14.85***
(5.112)
Region: Asia-Oceania -13.89***
(4.910)
Constant 20.42*** 19.13 20.39 50.15***
(2.287) (16.40) (16.24) (14.87)
Observations 62 62 62 62
R2 0.173 0.251 0.311 0.461
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Regions are
relative to Europe.
Model 1 in Table 5.3 displays the result of the parsimonious model, where costly
money burning strongly predicted average money burning across the 62 experimental
treatments of MB and JoD games. This finding was consistent when the student dummy,
one-shot game dummy and JoD game dummy were included in Model 2. In Model 3, the
working papers tended to have lower burn rates, which suggested publication bias, but
this effect could be caused by the papers still being developed or in the review process for
journal publications.9 Finally, region dummies absorbed the effect of cost and working
papers in Model 4, as burn was always lower in sessions conducted outside European
countries. Instead, the types of subjects participating in the experiment strongly explained
antisocial behaviour: the estimated parameter for experiments conducted with students
was negative and significant at five per cent level in this last model. Model 4 was used to
predict the burn rates of this thesis’s experiments, with the results presented in the next
two chapters.
9More than half of the observations (four of the seven working papers) were dated 2018 or 2019.
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5.4 The Antecedents of Spite
The previous section summarised the general findings from payoff-destruction experiments
and the results from a simple meta-analysis. This section elaborates the findings from
the experiments to gain a deeper understanding of the factors that could explain spite.
Inequity aversion and pure spite have been found to be the main motivating factors
that drive money burning in payoff-destruction games. However, researchers have also
identified other drivers of antisocial behaviour, such as emotions, competition, social
environments, personal attitudes and beliefs, past experiences, and income and social
identity. The following sub-sections examine these six factors in turn.
5.4.1 Emotions
Fear incites a higher intensity of antisocial behaviour when the level of harm is highly
devastating. The deactivation rate in the symmetric treatment of the first-strike game
(where both participants can deactivate) was 34 per cent (Abbink & de Haan, 2014).
This rate was three to four times higher than an equivalent experiment where the level
of harm was low (JoD game with open treatment) (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011; Abbink
& Sadrieh, 2009), but was still lower than the pre-recorded treatment (co-participant’s
decisions simulated from a prior experiment) where the burn rate could be as high as 78 per
cent. When the deactivation decision was only available to one participant (asymmetric
treatment) and fear had no part, no deactivation decision was observed. In stark contrast,
the burn rate among participants who did not choose the self-binding mechanism was
very high (60 per cent) when they encountered other participants that bound themselves
from burning money (Jauernig & Uhl, 2019).10 This last study, again, emphasises the
importance of spite motive in explaining money burning.
Anger was found to have mixed effects on antisocial behaviour and was conditional
on exposure to violence in Israel (Zeitzoff, 2014). Specifically, anger was positively (neg-
atively) associated with the decision to destroy one’s partner’s money in locations with
10This rate was almost double their previous study, where the participants had no option to self-bind
(Jauernig et al., 2016).
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low (high) exposure to rocket attack. This result could be explained by the formation of
beliefs, where experience of violence are conjectured to shape expectations of individuals
under certain social situations. In particular, as found in the psychology literature, in-
group anger could be positively associated with frustration in the failure of in-groups to
respond to an external threat (Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006).
5.4.2 Competitions
Competition drives antisocial behaviour, both in the field and laboratory, and this is
more pronounced than the pure spite motive. In two field studies (among rural Namibian
pastoralists and Mexican communities) with relatively homogeneous demographics and
no experience of group conflict, competition for resources was associated with antisocial
behaviour (Basurto et al., 2016; Prediger et al., 2014). Moreover, only seven per cent of
participants stated that they had made the payoff-destruction decision due to pleasure in
hurting others (Basurto et al., 2016).
Meanwhile, in a laboratory experiment, participants undertook a competition with
no financial payoff, where the losers were punished more by winners than by losers, yet
winners were equally punished by both (Jauernig et al., 2016). This result implies sym-
pathy among losers after the competition ends.
5.4.3 Social Environments
Antisocial decisions can also be driven by the social environment faced by the partici-
pants. For example, social pressure with no financial incentive increases payoff destruc-
tions (Karakostas & Zizzo, 2016), while in another study, a sharp increase in the burn
rate was observed when participants saw the actual burning behaviour of the preceding
participants, which indicates the effect of peers’ decisions in spreading such behaviour
(Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Chytilova´, & Zelinsky, 2018). Similarly, when participants made
money-burning decisions in groups, the burn rate was higher than when decisions were
made individually (Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Celik Katreniak, et al., 2018). Interestingly, retalia-
tion played no part, as indicated by the conditional money burning in the group treatment
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that was higher than in the individual treatment, even when co-participants chose not to
burn money.
Positive acts such as hugging can also be used to reduce money-burning behaviour,
as can displaying pictures of eyes, which suggests social exchange heuristic (Baillon et al.,
2013; Diamond & Blackwell, 2017). In contrast, playing music has no mediating effect on
antisocial behaviour (Garc´ıa-Gallego et al., 2019).
Meanwhile, external socioeconomic circumstances may have unintentional conse-
quences on antisocial behaviour, as witnessed in the results from a lab-in-the-field experi-
ment in Kenya (Alm˚as et al., 2019). The experiment was not aimed at directly examining
the experience of violence, yet political situations (presidential elections) during the study
sometimes involved violent demonstrations, which have been argued to affect behaviour.
Specifically, relative to participants from different ethnic groups, those sharing the same
ethnicity as the winning president seemed unaffected by the treatment (thermal) condi-
tion.11 In addition, participants with a below median score for the cognitive test tended
to behave more antisocially. Nonetheless, there was a question of why this result held
only with regard to antisocial behaviour and not to the other types of social preferences
being investigated (public goods contribution, trust, fairness and donation).
5.4.4 Personal Attitudes and Beliefs
Machiavellianistic behaviour, a measure of individuals’ tendency to be cynical and manip-
ulative, has been found to be associated with smaller giving in the dictator game and more
money burnt among those who choose to destroy payoffs in the JoD game (L. Zhang &
Ortmann, 2016). A low to average score for Machiavellianism (elicited using the Mach-IV
test) is also associated with greater trustworthiness in the trust game (Gunnthorsdottir,
McCabe, & Smith, 2002).
Religiosity—as measured using questions from Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975)—is
positively associated with antisocial behaviour, which might be because religious partici-
pants detest out-group (non-religious) members (J. Zhang et al., 2019). However, priming
11In the thermal condition, participants were seated in a laboratory with a 30°C target temperature,
while, in the control group, the target temperature was 22°C.
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participants with religious words has no effect on money-burning decisions. This mixed
finding supports Hoffmann (2012), who generally found weak or no associations between
religion and behaviour in experiments.
Finally, Dickinson and Masclet (2019) used a measure of moral judgement (the
trolley problems) to elicit dubious ethical decisions, and found that the willingness to
perform such an act predicted spiteful behaviour. However, in viewing the issue from the
opposite causal direction, moral judgments are different based on gender, with males more
likely to be utilitarian, even after controlling for spiteful behaviour (Bracht & Zylbersztejn,
2018).
5.4.5 Past Experiences of Conflict
Three lab-in-the-field antisocial behaviour experiments involved participants who had
experienced violent conflict. In two cases, in India (Islam et al., 2017) and Cambodia
(Gangadharan et al., 2017), a higher prior exposure to violence was positively associated
with payoff-destruction behaviour, while the opposite was observed in Israel (Zeitzoff,
2014). It is difficult to pinpoint the exact factor that can satisfactorily explain these
apparently mixed results, since the types of violence experienced were vastly different.
The late 1970s Cambodian genocide was one-sided, with almost no resistance from the
victimised groups. The Assam riots in the 1980s were sporadic and involved different
groups. The rocket attack against Israeli citizens was much more recent (in the 2000s)
and there is the prospect that the conflict will continue. The mixed results in these three
studies do not suggest a consensus on how violent conflict affects antisocial behaviour.
The above studies focused on within-community interactions, with no evidence of
similar behaviour if paired with people outside the community. A number of cross-cultural
studies found out-group bias when participants played a trust game (Chuah, Fahoum, &
Hoffmann, 2013; Chuah, Ga¨chter, Hoffmann, & Tan, 2016), and the bias tended to be
stronger when the interaction was situated in a competitive context (Sherif, 2015). The
following studies aimed to tackle this issue by examining intercommunity interactions. In
a study on inter-ethnic hostility, adolescents from the ethnic majority (Slavic) displayed
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higher burn rates against the Romani people than against fellow Slavics (Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´,
Chytilova´, & Zelinsky, 2018).12 As a background, those from ethnic minority Roma
mostly live in poverty and are often the subject of ethnic prejudice and discrimination.
This study is the only experiment undertaken to aim to understand how inter-ethnic
hostility is associated with spiteful behaviour. However, the study did not ask for actual
experiences of hostility, and the observed behaviour cannot be directly linked with this.
In the context of violence attributed to the discovery of a large natural gas reserve
and Islamic extremism in rural Mozambique, a religious sensitisation program among
young Muslim men has been found to be effective in reducing antisocial behaviour (Vicente
& Vilela, 2019). Interestingly, an economic intervention program through entrepreneur-
ship training had no effect on behaviour. There was no out-group discrimination when
participants were paired with fellow Mozambicans (Christians or public officials), but
the burn rate was higher when they played against a foreigner (American university stu-
dents). Thus far, only this study and Scacco and Warren (2018) study have systematically
investigated the effectiveness of conflict prevention programs for destructive behaviour.
5.4.6 Individual and Social Identity
Low-income individuals tend to behave more antisocially towards those of different in-
come and social groups when the social identity of the other participants is revealed
(Gangadharan et al., 2019). Moreover, when low-income participants have no chance of
becoming richer, the rate of money burning is increased and aimed at those with high
incomes (Gangadharan et al., 2018).
Experimenters have always been interested in understanding the relationship be-
tween gender and behaviour.13 Of the 38 studies in Table 5.2, 20 included a gender
12Ethnicity was signalled by the list of names of potential co-participants.
13There were no systematic differences in altruism levels by gender, but men were generally more
trusting than women (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Sent & van Staveren, 2018). Women were also more
sensitive to experimental context, design or social cues, while men were more likely to enter competitions
(Flory, Leibbrandt, & List, 2014; Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007).
There are also numerous studies that aimed to observe gender differences in risk-taking, cooperative and
punishment behaviour, to name a few. However, critics note that gender differences are usually overstated
and that most studies ignore gender beliefs, gender roles, stereotypes and gender identities (Nelson, 2015;
Sent & van Staveren, 2018).
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variable in the analysis, yet the majority (14) could find no differences by gender. These
results do not indicate that the rest of the studies did not collect data on gender; rather,
it might be that there was no effect of gender on the observed behaviour or there was
no clear mechanism regarding how gender affected behaviour. Either way, gender was
excluded from the final versions of the manuscripts.
When the authors found a gender difference, the evidence was mixed. In some cases,
women burnt more (Sadrieh & Schro¨der, 2016; Zeballos, 2018; L. Zhang & Ortmann,
2016), while, in other cases, men burnt more (Alm˚as et al., 2019; Grossman & Komai,
2013; Jauernig et al., 2016). In fact, in one study (Islam et al., 2017), men living in areas
that were moderately and heavily affected by past violence tended to be more spiteful;
however, in the full sample, women burnt more money. Sample size has also become a
problem. Both L. Zhang and Ortmann (2016) and Jauernig et al. (2016) found a gender
difference, but only in certain sub-samples: in the truncated data (n = 31) and among
’losers’ in the in-group condition (n = 40), respectively. There were no effects of gender
when the full sample was used.
To date, no antisocial behaviour experiment has been specifically designed to ob-
serve gender discrimination. However, experiments on social preferences suggest that
beliefs, expectations and knowledge of one’s co-participant’s gender are important fac-
tors in predicting discrimination.14 In addition, there have been some insights regarding
gender differences and negative behaviour from the psychology literature.15
14In the prosocial literature, Buchan, Croson, and Solnick (2008) used first name as a cue for gender,
and found that men were more trusting; however, the amount sent did not differ according to the gender
of the responder. In their study, expectation also played a role, where, relative to female participants,
the expected amount returned was higher for male participants. Similarly, knowing one’s co-participant’s
gender did not affect trusting behaviour (Bonein & Serra, 2009), but trustees that were paired with
trustors of the same gender appeared to be more trustworthy. Using an online trust game, the par-
ticipants trusted women more than men and, consequently, expected women to be more trustworthy
(Garbarino & Slonim, 2009). In contrast, using the standard trust game, subjects selected and sent more
to partners of the opposite gender (Slonim & Guillen, 2010). Among men, this discrimination could be
explained by the belief that women are more trustworthy, and could also be explained by men’s preference
for altruism. Among women, expected trustworthiness explained discrimination. In the dictator game
literature, Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) found different amounts of money given to men and women
(with women given more); however, the amount given did not differ based on the participant’s gender. In
contrast, Boschini, Dreber, von Essen, Muren, and Ranehill (2018) did not find differential giving based
on co-participant’s gender.
15In a meta-analysis of organisational studies, men reported more counterproductive or deviant be-
haviour, directed either at organisations or other people, than did women (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007).
Gender also mediated anger in predicting counterproductive work behaviour, thereby suggesting that
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5.5 Summary
Antisocial or spiteful behaviour can be elicited through spiteful auction or payoff-destruction
games, with the latter the focus of this thesis. In these games, participants may reduce
other participants’ money, but will receive nothing in return. In this chapter, spite has
been viewed from three dimensions: (i) behavioural theories, (ii) the way spite is mea-
sured and (iii) the antecedents of spite. Among the three categories of other-regarding
preferences theories, Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) JoD utility and E. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) utility seem to be the most relevant to the one being studied in this thesis. Over
the past two decades, two similar games were introduced, but with two different moti-
vations for money-burning decisions: to reduce inequity (Zizzo & Oswald, 2001) or pure
spite (Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009).
Nevertheless, other factors also contribute to antisocial behaviour, such as emotions
(e.g., fear), personal attitudes (e.g., Machiavellianism) and competition. Spite can also
be explained by experiences of conflict, although the results are mixed. In most cases,
previous experiments focused on within-community interactions.
When the studies were aggregated for a meta-analysis, the types of participants and
cost of burning money seem to have a strong correlation with average money burning.
In particular, the burn rate is higher when burning money is costly; however, when
region dummies are included (with burn rates generally lower in non-European countries),
experiments conducted in the field with nonstandard subjects strongly predict antisocial
behaviour. The findings from this simple analysis can also provide a rough idea of the
expected antisocial behaviour from the lab-in-the-field experiments.
Finally, there is a question of whether gender influences antisocial behaviour, whether
independently or mediated through another variable. Again, the results are mixed. Also,
while the results in the psychology literature show a consistent relationship between gen-
aggression is acceptable for males, but not for females (Spector & Zhou, 2013). Gender may also be an
important determinant of how anger is felt (Astin, Redston, & Campbell, 2003; Litvak, Lerner, Tiedens,
& Shonk, 2010), whereby, for men, anger is seen as seizing control, while, for women, anger means a loss
of control. Beliefs about gender roles are also argued to explain prosocial behaviour (Eagly, 2009), such
as women being thought to be ’communal’ (friendly, unselfish and emotionally expressive), while men are
thought to be ’agentic’ (assertive, competitive and dominant).
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der and negative behaviour, the studies are almost exclusively elicited through surveys,
rather than experiments. This raises the question of whether participants report the neg-
ative behaviour truthfully when there is no direct (monetary) benefit or cost from doing
so. This opens a new avenue of research on this topic.
Chapter 6
The Experiment with Indonesian
Migrants in Melbourne
This chapter presents the results from an experiment based on payoff-destruction games
with a strategy method. Although the experiment was designed in the context of the Aceh
conflict, it could also be used to elicit antisocial preferences among the general Indonesian
population. The Melbourne experiment was conducted in April 2018 with Indonesian
migrants, and served as a pre-test for the Aceh experiment. Given that the participants
were less likely to have experienced the Aceh conflict, the observed antisocial decisions
should reflect the antisocial behaviour of a more general population. Finally, this study
identified the antecedents to such behaviour.
6.1 Introduction
A number of experimental studies have highlighted the importance of conflict experience
in explaining prosocial behaviour years after the conflict ended (see the review in Bauer
et al., 2016). The Aceh conflict ended in 2005, yet has left a scar on intercommunity
relationships, and it remains unknown to what extent the experience of conflict still
affects people’s behaviour today.
The lab-in-the-field experiment was designed to elicit ethnic and gender discrimina-
tion, which has never previously been undertaken in antisocial behaviour studies. Specifi-
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cally, the experiment exploited honorific titles in a one-shot payoff-destruction game with
a strategy method, where participants made simultaneous decisions against different types
of co-participants.
The experiment in this chapter was conducted with Indonesian migrants in Mel-
bourne, where the population was expected to have very low experiences of conflict. The
experiment aimed to elicit antisocial preference and identify the factors that drive this
behaviour. It was also used as a pre-test for the Aceh field study. Addressing potential
implementation problems was expected to be more manageable in Melbourne, since the
city has a relatively more predictable environment than Aceh.1
Three research questions are asked in this chapter: (1) Do Indonesians generally
display spiteful behaviour? (2) If so, does this behaviour discriminate between ethnic-
ity and gender? (3) What are the antecedents of this behaviour? The first and sec-
ond questions could be answered by observing money-burning decisions against different
types of co-participants. The third research question could be answered by correlating
money-burning decisions with demographic and personal attitude variables. Moreover,
the conduct of the study had practical implications for the fieldwork in Aceh.
The remainder of this chapter examines the subject pool (Section 6.2), methodology
(Section 6.3), experimental results (Section 6.4) and robustness checks (Section 6.5), and
then presents the conclusion (Section 6.6).
6.2 Indonesian Migrants in Melbourne
According to the 2016 Australian Census, a significant 29 per cent of Indonesian-born
residents of Australia were full time students. The relatively good relationship between
the two countries, quality of education offered by Australian higher education institutes
and close geographical proximity between the two countries have attracted Indonesians to
migrate to Australia. This migration was further boosted by the signing of the Indonesia-
Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in 2019, which encourages
1In addition, the logistics of undertaking the experiment in Australia were less demanding: while
incentivising participants in Australia is significantly more expensive, other operational costs (e.g., return
flights to Indonesia) could exceed the savings obtained from incentivising participants in Aceh.
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Figure 6.1: Indonesian migrants distribution in the greater Melbourne region
Source: Victoria (2019).
the movement of goods and people across the two countries.
In the greater Melbourne region, migrants are relatively mature, with 45 per cent
aged between 30 and 49 years. They are also well educated, with more than half holding
higher education degrees. As a comparison, only 10 per cent of the Indonesian population
aged 15 and above who had completed higher degree education (BPS, 2019). Moreover,
43 per cent of these individuals arrived in Australia only in recent years (from 2006
onwards). Figure 6.1 displays the geographical distribution of Indonesian migrants in the
greater Melbourne region.
There have been no known extended violent conflicts among the Indonesian commu-
nities living in Melbourne. In addition, because most migrants were temporary (particu-
larly students), they were expected to integrate with the general population with relative
ease compared to migrants from vulnerable groups such as refugees (OECD & European
Union, 2018). Together, the subject pool reflected general Indonesians who had never
experienced conflict.
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6.3 Methodology
6.3.1 Experimental Design
This section describes the antisocial behaviour experiment with a strategy method based
on the JoD minigame (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011). In the experiment, participants could
pay to destroy a portion of their co-participant’s money. The strategy method (Selten,
1967) is commonly used to elicit rare responses, as it requires participants to reveal all of
their strategy.2 The experiment was using the strategy method where participants were
asked to make decisions against four different co-participant types, identified by their
preferred honorific titles. These titles signalled the participants’ gender and ethnicity
(Acehnese and Javanese males and females are addressed as Bang and Kak and Mas
and Mbak, respectively). These titles were expected to be effective in differentiating the
participants’ ethnicity and gender in a community where the compositions of either ethnic
groups (Acehnese or Javanese) were dominant.
The use of honorific titles was essential for a couple of reasons. First, it was necessary
to gauge possible in-group or out-group bias due to the past conflict in Aceh. Second, it
was necessary to reduce ethnic salience. Using the name of the ethnic groups could create
a demand effect and would bias the result through the vividness and salience of ethnic
identities (Chuah et al., 2013; Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001). Therefore, one would expect
in-group bias if the experiment directly used the names of the ethnic groups, given the
past ethnicity-related conflict. For this reason, participants were asked whether they were
willing to reduce their co-participant’s money if that person identified him/herself as Y —
where Y was one of the four titles mentioned above—rather than actually mentioning the
ethnic group.3 From the game-theoretic perspective, experiments with a strategy method
and direct elicitation approach should generate similar results (Brandts & Charness, 2011).
2This method is useful in the ultimatum game, where the standard direct elicitation approach only
enables experimenters to obtain information regarding the responder’s decision, given the proposer’s offer.
However, when the game is played with strategy method, the experimenters will obtain responses from
all possible offers.
3If Y was changed to, for example, ’Javanese male’, the information on gender and ethnic identity
would be too salient and could bias the result. In addition, these titles are commonly used to greet older
males/females, whereas younger people are addressed with Dik in both Acehnese and Javanese language.
This ’Dik ’ title was not used in this study.
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While behavioural differences occur empirically, the results are more or less consistent (see
e.g., Brandts & Charness, 2011; Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, & Quercia, 2012).4
In addition to the experiment, several questionnaires were used to shed light on the
antecedents of antisocial behaviour. The main survey in the experiment was a self-report
war victimisation questionnaire, based on a similar study in Tajikistan (Cassar, Grosjean,
& Whitt, 2013). The original questionnaire consisted of eight binary-choice questions
on various dimensions of war victimisation: whether the participants or their household
members were injured, killed, moved within the country, moved outside the country, lost
property, witnessed armed clashes, personally fought in the war, or personally fought in
the war after the peace agreement. There were also questions about the regions in which
the participants lived during the war. This study used the same set of questions after
adjusting for some Aceh-specific characteristics (e.g., moved outside of Aceh, rather than
outside of the country, during the conflict). Only those who lived in Aceh between 2000
and 2005 were required to answer questions on war victimisation.
The next question involved (negative) belief elicitation, with participants asked
whether they thought their co-participant was willing to reduce their money. Belief re-
garding one’s co-participant’s decision has been found to be an important predictor of
antisocial behaviour (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011; Prediger et al., 2014). Following proce-
dures in previous experiments, a correct guessing of belief was not incentivised to avoid
the potential correlation between behaviour and stated belief (Ga¨chter & Renner, 2010;
Prediger et al., 2014).
The social value orientation (SVO) questionnaire is a series of unincentivised al-
location tasks based on experimental game theory (van Lange, 2000). There are nine
allocation tasks whereby, based on the consistencies in choices that participants make,
the participants can be grouped into one of the four categories (prosocial, individualistic,
competitive and other/unknown). This survey has been used in many psychological ex-
periments and has appeared in some economic experiments (Boone, Declerck, & Kiyonari,
4Critics of the strategy method argue that decision makers face different information sets than when
playing with direct elicitation method (Chen & Schonger, 2017). However, because the use of the strategy
method in this experiment was simply for practical purposes and not to analyse very rare events or
compare the results from the two methods, it is argued that the benefits outweighed the costs.
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2010; Emonds, Declerck, Boone, Vandervliet, & Parizel, 2011; Polonio & Coricelli, 2019).
This study also employed four personal attitude questionnaires. In the following
paragraphs, each of the questionnaires is briefly described, and interested readers may re-
fer to Appendix D for the lists of questions. First, the Mach-IV test measures Machiavel-
lianism, such as being cynical and manipulative (Christie, Geis, Festinger, & Schachter,
1970). The 20-item test is very popular among psychologists and has been used in sev-
eral economic experiments (see e.g., Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002; L. Zhang & Ortmann,
2016). This test was employed partly because its results could be compared with a pre-
vious antisocial behaviour experiment that also used the same instrument (L. Zhang &
Ortmann, 2016).
Second, the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire is an established, self-reported ag-
gression survey that can be broken down into four sub-traits (physical aggression, verbal
aggression, anger and hostility). Of these sub-traits, anger is thought to be the ’psycho-
logical bridge between the instrumental components [physical and verbal aggression] and
the cognitive component [hostility]’ (Buss & Perry, 1992, p. 457). Thus, anger unites var-
ious aspects of aggressive behaviour. The questionnaire is influential in psychology and
has been used by economists in a number of experiments (Kugler, Neeman, & Vulkan,
2014; van Veldhuizen, 2013).
Third, the questionnaire on religiosity consists of eight questions that can be broken
down into four dimensions (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975): ritual, consequential, experiential
and ideological.5 This instrument has also been used in economic experiments (e.g., Chuah
et al., 2016; Chuah, Hoffmann, Ramasamy, & Tan, 2014) and it is expected that religiosity
has at least some degree of negative association with spite.6 The survey is reliable across
major religions in the world (Hill & Hood, 1999), including Islam. The Indonesian 2010
population census estimated that 98 per cent of the Aceh population are Muslim.
Finally, a set of questions on religious fundamentalism were asked. The 12-item
5The ritual dimension is related to the commitment to religious practices such as frequency of praying.
The consequential dimension is associated with the belief that a person’s behaviour is to some degree
correlated with religious teaching. The experiential dimension is linked with mystical experience. The
ideological dimension is associated with the fundamental belief of a religion.
6See Hoffmann (2012) for a review on the role of religion in economic experiments.
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instrument was a revision of the original 20-item scale that measures respondents’ belief
about whether there is a set of religious teachings that are true, are fundamental and must
be followed (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). Similar to Rohrbaugh and Jessor (1975),
this scale is applicable to major religions and has also been used in economic experiments.
6.3.2 Ethical Challenges in the Data Collection
This sub-section briefly discusses the ethical challenges of the data collection. The main
experiment was conducted in post-conflict Aceh and some risks were identified before
the fieldwork proceeded in 2017.7 First, animosity could arise from the decision-making
task. By design, the experiment was anonymous, and participants were only identified
by their participant number (which was destroyed at the end of each session). In the
field, social tension could arise because the game involved people reducing others’ money,
and the participants were most likely not strangers. Second, some participants could
feel upset by the differential payment. Third, answering items relating to the experience
of conflict could cause distress. Fourth, the war victimisation questionnaire specifically
asked whether the participants were personally involved in armed clashes, which could be
used to incriminate them. In response to the potential risks, five measures were imple-
mented in the experiments, in addition to the standard conduct of economic experiments
(e.g., anonymous response, right to withdraw and private payment). Almost all of these
measures were also implemented in the Melbourne experiment, as it was employed as a
pre-test of the Aceh study.
First, computerised co-participants were included to create a layer of uncertainty
regarding whether humans or computers made the money-burning decision, if any. Theo-
retically, the introduction of computerised co-participants should not make any difference,
as a rationally motivated participant should never make a money-reduction decision at
all. The computer was included in the Melbourne experiment and was programmed to
make the same decision as a human co-participant (i.e., to reduce their co-participant’s
money or not), except that the decisions were made randomly. Later, the computer was
7Risk is defined as ’a potential for harm, discomfort or inconvenience’ (The National Health and
Medical Research Council, The Australian Research Council, & Universities Australia, 2018, p. 12).
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removed from the Aceh experiment, as the fear of distressed participants was unfounded
following the completion of the Melbourne experiment.
Second, co-participants were positioned in a distant location. In the worst case that
participants become angry about having their money reduced, the cost of finding and
physically travelling to the other location was prohibitively high. In the Aceh experiment,
the distance was at least 50 km and in a different district. In the Melbourne experiment,
the distance varied from 4.5 to 37 km.
Third, the experiment was designed to minimise potential upset by: (i) limiting the
implementation of money-burning decisions (only one decision, rather than both decisions,
in a pair that was implemented) by tossing a coin, (ii) capping the amount of money that
could be reduced (only 40 per cent of the co-participant’s money could be destroyed),
and (iii) concealing the matching (participants never received any information about the
social identity of the co-participant with whom they were matched).
Fourth, the addresses of primary health clinics were provided in the consent form
in the Aceh experiment to provide psychological support. Participants who had a health
card (for the universal health coverage program that every Indonesian citizen must have)
were entitled to free health services.8
Fifth, a debriefing document was provided at the end of each experimental session,
which explained the objective of the experiment, as well as the general results from other
similar studies. Further, after six months, short reports written in layperson’s language
were sent to the heads of the villages where the experiments were conducted in Aceh.
Finally, while not a measure to specifically tackle the risks, incrimination was not an
issue because the Aceh Peace Treaty (Sections 3.1. and 3.2. of the Helsinki Memorandum)
contains a general amnesty for conflict participants that is honoured by the Indonesian
government.9 A research recommendation letter was also granted by the Aceh government,
which formally allowed this study to be conducted in the region.
8In the event that participants did not have a health card, the research assistants were expected to
provide the necessary support to obtain the card or help them access counselling services.
9In fact, many of the current district leaders were ex-rebels, as the national government provides the
opportunity for local parties to compete in Aceh elections.
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6.3.3 Implementation
There were three phases during each of the sessions.
Phase 1. After registration, the participants were seated alone to ensure privacy
and avoid collusion. After signing the consent form, the participants could start filling
in the demographic characteristics questionnaire, which included their preferred honorific
titles. Once all participants had completed the demographic survey, the experimenter
started reading the decision-making task instruction sheet. The forms for the Melbourne
experiment can be seen in Appendix C.
Phase 2. Each participant received an equal amount of endowment (AUD 25) and
was then asked to make decisions about whether they were willing (or not) to reduce their
co-participant’s money, based on their honorific title. The cost of burning AUD 10 of the
co-participant’s money was AUD 1. For example:
If my co-participant most identifies with the title of mas, my decision is (tick one):
 to leave their money as it is and not have to pay
 to reduce their money by AUD 10 and pay AUD 1
In addition to the four types of (human) co-participants, the participants were also
asked to make a decision against the computer co-participant that was programmed to
make random decisions. Therefore, in total, each participant made five money-burning
decisions: four against human co-participants identified by their chosen honorific titles
and one against the computer co-participant.
Before making any decisions, the participants were asked to answer some compre-
hension questions, and the experimenters were instructed to explain the answer for each
of them. The participants were also clearly informed that they must be able to answer
all questions before starting the decision tasks. After making their decisions, only the
decision made by one of the participants in each pair was implemented, based on a coin
toss in one of the experimental locations. Therefore, knowledge about whether they were
a decision maker or not did not affect the participants’ decisions in the experiment. This
procedure was similar to the one used in Zizzo (2003).
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Phase 3. After the decision task, the participants were asked to answer questions
on conflict experience, negative belief, SVO and personal attitudes. The participants
were paid a flat fee of AUD 15 for completing the questionnaire. After answering all the
questions, they were directed to the adjacent room for private payment and were allowed
to leave the experimental location. The applicable decision given the co-participant’s
actual title was used to determine earnings.
To avoid potentially resurfaced tensions between the two ethnic groups in Aceh, two
teams of experimenters/research assistants (RAs) were assigned to two (distant) locations
and sessions were held simultaneously. The two locations for each experimental session
were separated by as far as 37 km, which is equivalent to a one-hour drive. This was
made known to the participants. This approach was also implemented in the Melbourne
study to mimic the Aceh study. In each location, one of the RAs read the instructions,
while the other RA communicated (by telephone and in a separate room) with the first
RA to randomly match the participants.
This experimental design enabled elicitation of antisocial behaviour between the
two ethnic groups (Acehnese and Javanese). Therefore, it could be used to elicit ethnic
and gender discrimination, provided there was a large proportion of the population from
either ethnic group. Given that Javanese is the majority ethnic group (40 per cent of the
Indonesian population), it was safe to assume that the demographic composition of the
Indonesian migrant community in Melbourne would not be much different.
Recruitment posters were placed in public areas that are known to cater to the In-
donesian community (e.g., Indonesian restaurants) and distributed via social media and
messaging apps. There was no time limitation for the experiment, but the recruitment
poster specified that the whole session would last for approximately two hours. The
participants needed to be at least 25 years old to match with the recruitment require-
ments in Aceh. All sessions were conducted in either a community hall or lecture room.
Community halls—located in suburbs with large Indonesian communities—were chosen
to attract general (non-student) participants, while lecture rooms were used to entice
students to participate in the study. Therefore, the participants could attend whichever
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location suited their preference.
Six Indonesian graduate students helped as RAs. Four pilot sessions were conducted
in September 2017. The participants who attended the pilot sessions were not allowed to
participate in the real sessions, but some were recruited as RAs instead. All materials
(written in formal Indonesian language) were identical, except when describing the coin
toss. The whole sessions were held with pen and paper.
6.4 Results
The previous section elaborated the experimental design, implementation and ethical chal-
lenges and responses. This section presents the results from the experiment in Melbourne,
where a total of 127 Indonesian participants completed the sessions conducted on October
2017.
Table 6.1 displays the summary statistics. The average age of participants was 32
years, and female participation was lower than male participation, at 46 per cent. Impor-
tantly, half of the participants identified themselves as Javanese, which well complemented
the experimental design. There were three Acehnese participants in the sample, but their
decisions cannot possibly represent the larger Acehnese community.
Table 6.1: Summary statistics, Melbourne
Variable Obs. Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
Burn any types of co-participant money 127 0.26 0.44 0 1
Burn at least one human co-participant’s money 127 0.16 0.37 0 1
Burn only human co-participant’s money 127 0.06 0.24 0 1
Burn only computer co-participant’s money 127 0.09 0.29 0 1
Count any burning decision 127 0.54 1.10 0 5
Count any burning decision (except computer) 127 0.35 0.88 0 4
Negative belief 127 0.20 0.40 0 1
Female 127 0.46 0.50 0 1
Age 127 31.75 5.91 25 50
Javanese 127 0.50 0.50 0 1
Muslim 127 0.77 0.42 0 1
Married 127 0.63 0.48 0 1
Income >AUD 2,000 125 0.53 0.50 0 1
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6.4.1 Patterns of Antisocial Behaviour
This study sought to determine whether spiteful behaviour was observed among general
Indonesians and, if so, whether the participants discriminated between ethnicity and
gender. The results indicated that around one in four participants were willing to reduce
their co-participant’s money, despite the cost of doing so (first row in Table 6.1).10 This
rate is almost equal to the prediction from the meta-analysis regression in the previous
chapter (Model 4 in Table 5.3), where the model predicted an average of 26 per cent burn
rate, but with large intervals (12 to 40 per cent).11
There was no differential burning behaviour by gender or ethnicity, as indicated by
the Mann-Whitney tests, which could not reject the null of equal distributions (Table
6.2). When only money-burning decisions against a human co-participant were used, a
two-sample parametric test of proportions by gender yielded a p-value of 0.1071,12 mean-
ing that males were somewhat more likely to burn money than were females. Nonetheless,
calculating the index of similarity (Sent & van Staveren, 2018) when counting burning
decisions by gender, with and without the computer co-participant, resulted in the val-
ues of 0.93 and 0.91, respectively, which indicated an almost complete overlap in the
distributions of burning decisions.13
Result 1: No differential antisocial behaviour was found by ethnicity or gender.
When only considering decisions against human co-participants, the ratio dropped
to only 16 per cent (including burning both humans’ and the computer’s money). This
burn rate was higher than in Abbink and Herrmann (2011) open treatment (10 per cent),
yet lower than the prediction from the meta-analysis (26 per cent). When only antisocial
decisions against humans were considered (i.e., those who never burnt the computer’s
10Given the lack of specific ethnicity-gender combinations of interest (e.g., whether Javanese males tend
to be more spiteful against non-Javanese females), the following analyses used a simpler categorisation of
burning decisions with regard to (co-)participants’ gender or ethnicity. For example, the variable ’female
partner’ identified decisions against co-participants with (preferred) female honorifics (Mbak or Kak)—
similarly for ’Javanese partner’ (Mas or Mbak). In addition, as will be seen later, using honorifics (plus
the computer) as control variables did not change the results.
11To estimate the predicted value for the burn rate, averages were used for a working paper dummy
and student dummy, as it was expected that a significant proportion of the participants would be (post-
graduate) students.
12With the null hypothesis of no difference and alternative hypothesis of positive difference, where the
difference was defined as the proportion of burning by males minus the proportion of burning by females.
13An index equal to 1 meant that the two groups’ distributions were identical.
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Table 6.2: Mean burning decision by gender and ethnicity
Gender Ethnicity
Male Female p-value Javanese Non-Javanese p-value
Full sample 0.290 0.224 0.402 0.266 0.254 0.881
Excluding computer 0.203 0.121 0.216 0.141 0.190 0.451
Notes: The p-values are from the Mann-Whitney test for difference by gender or ethnicity.
money), the burn rate dropped even lower to six per cent. In contrast, the burn rate was
higher (nine per cent) when counting antisocial decisions only against the computer (i.e.,
the participants never reduced the human co-participant’s money).
Such a large proportion of antisocial decisions against the computer was unexpected,
as it was introduced simply as a means to avoid upset—that is, in instances in which people
had their money destroyed, there was the probability that it was caused by the computer
and not a human. It could be that the participants did not understand the instructions,
but there was a mandatory comprehension quiz before the decision-making task. It could
also be that the cost of burning was too low; however, money burning was costless in the
original JoD experiment and there were pilot sessions to calibrate the cost.
Nevertheless, when the participants chose to burn, most of them only burnt once, and
the proportion decreased with a larger number of burning decisions, except when the burn
count excluded decisions against the computer co-participant (Figure 6.2). Importantly,
there was also no differential antisocial behaviour against gender or ethnic out-group
members (Figure 6.3), although those from ethnic Javanese tended to burn non-Javanese
co-participants slightly more often (Wilcoxon’s two-sided p-value = 0.317). The indifferent
antisocial behaviour was as expected, as there are no indications of conflict along ethnic
lines among Indonesians in Melbourne. Similar results were found with regard to conflict
among different genders (there were none).
Result 2: No discrimination was found by ethnicity or gender.
Irrespective of the participant’s own gender, males were targeted more than females
and the differences were statistically significant, as shown in the left panel of Figure 6.3.
The Wilcoxon test for matched sample gave the p-value of 0.025 (0.096) for differential
antisocial decisions among females (males).
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Figure 6.2: Count burning decisions
Figure 6.3: Share of money-burning decisions by ethnicity and gender
Notes: Excluding the computer co-participant.
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Table 6.3: Antisocial behaviour, personal attitudes and beliefs; Melbourne
All Male Female
Religiosity 0.8676 0.4122 0.2375
Religiosity: ritual 0.7437 0.9658 0.6059
Religiosity: consequential 0.9543 0.3923 0.2507
Religiosity: ideological 0.4205 1.0000 0.1569
Religiosity: experiential 0.5509 0.1818 0.3401
Religious fundamentalism 0.6483 0.7989 0.4354
Mach-IV 0.7070 0.4386 0.2213
Aggression 0.6184 0.6657 0.8017
Aggression: anger 0.1463 0.5411 0.0836*
Aggression: hostility 0.8883 0.5915 0.4842
Aggression: physical 0.8198 0.8214 0.9883
Aggression: verbal 0.3973 0.7413 0.2771
Note: The numbers are p-values from the Mann-Whitney test for unmatched data (by money burning
decision; i.e., destroy the money of at least one human co-participant). ∗p < 0.10.
Result 3: Females were less likely to have their money destroyed when decisions
against the computer co-participant were excluded.
This study also employed various measures of personal attitudes and beliefs to
seek the antecedents of antisocial behaviour. The majority of participants had proso-
cial tendency (as elicited using SVO) and their burn rate (burn at least one human
co-participant’s money) was only 14 per cent—much lower than those in the individual-
istic (22 per cent) or other/unknown (57 per cent) categories. However, this finding was
limited by the small sample (16 observations) of those outside the prosocial category.
The statistical tests between money burning and personal attitudes and beliefs only
suggested anger as having the potential to explain antisocial behaviour (Table 6.3). More-
over, it seems that the effect of anger operated differently by gender. Figure 6.4 graphs
the mean score for anger and burning decisions to provide a better visualisation of this
finding. There was a significant difference by gender at 10 per cent level among those
who chose to burn (Mann-Whitney p-value = 0.08), with females tending to have higher
scores for anger. When the data were broken down by the number of burning decisions, it
was apparent that the difference was driven by those who burnt three to four times (see
Table A.8 in the appendix).
Result 4: Females that chose to burn tended to have higher scores of anger than did
males.
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Figure 6.4: Mean score of anger by antisocial decisions and gender
Finally, expectation (of having one’s money destroyed) was an important indicator
of money burning in the original design of this experiment (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011).
In this study, the burn rate for participants who thought they would be burnt (negative
belief) was 50 per cent—more than twice the rate of those who did not have such negative
expectations (20 per cent). This was confirmed by the Mann-Whitney test, which yielded
a p-value < 0.01.
Result 5: Negative belief strongly predicted spiteful behaviour.
Next, regressions were used to test the consistency of these results.
6.4.2 Regression Results
Panel probit regressions indicated that the five results held even after controlling for var-
ious covariates. Burning decisions were strongly correlated by the types of co-participant
(see Table 6.4). When facing the computer (Models 1 to 3), the probability of antisocial
decisions against such a co-participant was higher than when facing a human. When only
decisions against human co-participants were considered (Models 4 to 6), participants
tended to be less antisocial when facing female co-participants. In addition, in Models 2
to 6, negative belief was strongly associated with a higher and lower likelihood of antiso-
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cial behaviour, respectively. Also, in all cases, students tended to behave more rationally
and selfishly than did non-students by not burning money.
There was no observed ethnic or gender discrimination, as indicated by the in-
significant estimated parameter for the interaction terms (Models 5 and 6), although the
negative signs were pointing in the correct direction. This finding did not change when
preferred honorific titles were used instead of the partner’s gender or ethnicity (results
not shown).
Table 6.5 displays how anger was associated with antisocial behaviour. In the first
and second models, anger was slightly correlated with antisocial behaviour, but adding an
interaction between gender and anger (Model 3) resulted in the loss of significance of anger.
However, when decisions against the computer partner data were excluded, adding the
interaction term resulted in a highly significant correlation with burning decision (Models
4 and 5). This suggests that the finding was not driven by decisions against the computer
co-participant. Figure 6.5 displays the predicted probabilities of antisocial decisions from
Model 5. In the last two models, regressing Model 4 by the gender sub-samples confirmed
the positive association between anger and antisocial behaviour among females.
However, this result was sensitive to the choice of the method to calculate the
standard errors. When bootstrapping was used for Model 5 (with 1,000 repetitions), the
p-values for gender and the interaction term dropped from 0.006 and 0.016 to 0.137 and
0.164, respectively (results not shown). The estimated parameter for the female partner
variable was also weakly significant, with a p-value of 0.108. Only the effects of negative
belief and student variables were unchanged.
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Table 6.4: Main regressions, Melbourne (dependent variable: burning decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female partner -1.501*** -1.488*** -0.971** -0.773* -0.971**
(0.310) (0.307) (0.401) (0.453) (0.401)
Male partner -0.680** -0.666** (base) (base) (base)
(0.294) (0.280)
Javanese partner -1.009*** -0.135 -0.130 -0.108
(0.269) (0.178) (0.181) (0.185)
Non-Javanese partner -0.921*** (base) (base) (base)
(0.238)
Female -0.422 -0.395 -0.665 -0.522 -0.666
(0.382) (0.363) (0.542) (0.610) (0.542)
Javanese 0.0376 0.0264 -0.325 -0.317 -0.298
(0.398) (0.377) (0.546) (0.554) (0.579)
Negative belief 1.685*** 1.588*** 2.396*** 2.432*** 2.396***
(0.445) (0.420) (0.664) (0.671) (0.664)
Age 0.00817 0.00809 0.0313 0.0293 0.0313
(0.0379) (0.0357) (0.0504) (0.0510) (0.0503)
Muslim -0.355 -0.329 -0.0575 -0.0471 -0.0577
(0.426) (0.401) (0.523) (0.526) (0.523)
Married -0.580 -0.540 -1.061 -1.062 -1.062
(0.482) (0.456) (0.736) (0.751) (0.735)
Income >AUD 2,000 0.0776 0.0682 0.188 0.185 0.187
(0.383) (0.363) (0.558) (0.568) (0.557)
Student -1.148*** -1.084*** -1.761*** -1.796*** -1.760***
(0.427) (0.404) (0.646) (0.654) (0.646)
Female × female partner -0.615
(0.825)
Javanese × Javanese partner -0.0598
(0.376)
Constant -1.737*** -0.485 -0.494 -1.646 -1.679 -1.659
(0.366) (1.320) (1.241) (1.656) (1.664) (1.634)
ln(σˆv
2) 1.134*** 0.525 0.391 0.885* 0.934* 0.884*
(0.381) (0.374) (0.362) (0.505) (0.532) (0.506)
Sample All All All Exclude
computer
partner
Exclude
computer
partner
Exclude
computer
partner
Observations 635 625 625 500 500 500
Number of id 127 125 125 125 125 125
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. In (1) to (3) partner
was relative to computer co-participant.
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Table 6.5: Panel regression on the role of anger (dependent variable: burning decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female partner -1.448*** -1.440*** -1.434*** -0.972** -0.972** -0.675* -1.773
(0.300) (0.298) (0.295) (0.404) (0.405) (0.406) (1.086)
Male partner -0.626** -0.623** -0.622** (base) (base) (base) (base)
(0.283) (0.277) (0.272)
Javanese partner -0.103 -0.0995 -0.0983 -0.132 -0.131 -0.166 0.0481
(0.143) (0.143) (0.142) (0.180) (0.180) (0.212) (0.326)
Female -0.454 -0.581 -2.960* -0.904* -6.877***
(0.371) (0.362) (1.782) (0.523) (2.514)
Anger 0.0853* 0.0987** 0.0467 0.138** 0.0333 0.0135 0.578*
(0.0448) (0.0425) (0.0422) (0.0577) (0.0564) (0.0435) (0.304)
Female × anger 0.138 0.337**
(0.0979) (0.136)
Negative belief 1.823*** 1.772*** 1.846*** 2.575*** 2.855*** 2.323*** 3.719
(0.472) (0.435) (0.424) (0.667) (0.684) (0.601) (2.333)
Javanese 0.125 -0.0858 -0.106 -0.563 -0.391 -1.178
(0.390) (0.367) (0.556) (0.565) (0.560) (1.539)
Age -0.000640 0.0120 0.0183 0.0484 0.100** -0.0305
(0.0348) (0.0331) (0.0473) (0.0450) (0.0485) (0.125)
Muslim -0.443 -0.289 -0.226 0.125 -0.0526
(0.425) (0.383) (0.563) (0.494) (0.448)
Married -0.674 -0.730* -1.184* -1.278** -1.503*** -0.178
(0.447) (0.421) (0.680) (0.614) (0.574) (1.418)
Income >AUD 2,000 -0.0433 -0.0912 0.0435 -0.0332 0.122 -1.663
(0.348) (0.334) (0.527) (0.497) (0.420) (1.571)
Student -1.270*** -1.166*** -2.074*** -1.873*** -1.345** -1.057
(0.433) (0.392) (0.657) (0.607) (0.614) (1.710)
Constant -3.167*** -1.541 -1.087 -3.132 -2.429 -3.557* -11.82
(0.874) (1.428) (1.400) (1.947) (1.860) (1.880) (7.200)
ln(σˆv
2) 0.667* 0.406 0.288 0.794 0.600 -0.320 1.568*
(0.386) (0.394) (0.392) (0.525) (0.521) (0.806) (0.945)
Sample All All All Exclude
computer
partner
Exclude
computer
partner
Male &
Exclude
computer
partner
Female &
Exclude
computer
partner
Observations 635 625 625 500 500 276 180
Number of id 127 125 125 125 125 69 45
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Partner ethnic
was relative to non-Javanese. In (1) to (3), partner gender was relative to the computer co-participant.
Religion (Muslim) was dropped from (7) because of collinearity.
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Figure 6.5: Predicted probability of burning decision with 95 per cent confidence intervals
Notes: The prediction was based on Model 5 in Table 6.5.
The differential gender effect of anger on antisocial behaviour was more pronounced
when the dependent variable was the count of antisocial decisions. Using Poisson regres-
sion, Table 6.6 indicates that, even when the data included decisions against the computer,
the interaction between gender and anger yielded positive and statistically significant co-
efficients at least at five per cent level (Models 2 to 4). In these regressions, females burnt
less, yet females with a high score of anger burnt more. Bootstrapping the standard er-
rors (with 1,000 repetitions) in Model 3 did not change the results, with p-value = 0.075
for the interaction term and 0.050 for gender (results not shown). In addition, in the
regressions by gender, the estimated parameter for anger was significant at one per cent
level for females.
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Table 6.6: Poisson regression on the role of anger (dependent variable: count burning
decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.415 -3.852*** -3.590*** -4.869***
(0.337) (1.449) (1.382) (1.506)
Anger 0.0579 0.00825 0.0429 0.0417 0.0372 0.345***
(0.0442) (0.0483) (0.0358) (0.0489) (0.0474) (0.113)
Female × anger 0.195** 0.178** 0.253***
(0.0772) (0.0756) (0.0813)
Negative belief 1.614*** 1.773*** 1.905*** 2.488*** 2.434*** 2.558***
(0.311) (0.320) (0.302) (0.418) (0.575) (0.967)
Javanese -0.246 -0.671 -0.391 -0.852
(0.356) (0.525) (0.658) (0.808)
Age 0.0230 0.0332 0.116 -0.0268
(0.0306) (0.0433) (0.0708) (0.0852)
Muslim -0.221 0.0305 -0.259 15.61***
(0.370) (0.492) (0.578) (0.987)
Married -0.460 -0.599* -1.018* -0.000178
(0.295) (0.354) (0.549) (0.570)
Income >AUD 2,000 0.220 0.369 0.580 -0.640
(0.303) (0.417) (0.425) (0.963)
Student -1.102*** -1.493*** -0.950* -0.670
(0.295) (0.410) (0.549) (0.974)
Constant -1.998** -1.269 -1.415 -2.336 -5.090 -22.23***
(0.831) (0.781) (1.315) (1.939) (3.135) (3.714)
Sample All All All Exclude
computer
partner
Male &
Exclude
computer
partner
Female &
Exclude
computer
partner
Observations 127 127 125 125 69 56
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Poisson model was
used because there was no indication of over-dispersion in the data.
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6.5 Robustness Checks
This section checked for alternative mechanisms that could explain the results: the ef-
fects of personal attitudes and beliefs, a mismatch between honorific titles and actual
gender/ethnicity, other sub-traits of aggression and artefact interaction effects. In the
following regressions, decisions against the computer were excluded unless indicated oth-
erwise.
6.5.1 Personal Attitudes and Beliefs
Table 6.7 summarises the regression results that added several measures of personal atti-
tudes and beliefs. Religiosity and Machiavellianism, in particular, have been found to be
correlated with antisocial behaviour in experiments (see Section 5.4).
The inclusion of these variables did not change the sign or significance of the interac-
tion term between anger and gender (Models 1, 3 and 5). In addition, these variables and
their interactions with gender did not seem to have important associations with money
burning (Models 2 and 6), except regarding religiosity (Model 4), where the results are
mixed. Religiosity was positively associated with antisocial behaviour, but the effect was
mediated by gender (religious females tended to behave less antisocially).
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Table 6.7: Panel regression on the role of personal attitudes (dependent variable: burning
decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female partner -0.971** -0.970** -0.975** -0.963** -0.972** -0.976**
(0.405) (0.400) (0.406) (0.404) (0.405) (0.404)
Javanese partner -0.132 -0.133 -0.132 -0.131 -0.130 -0.130
(0.179) (0.178) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.179)
Female -6.897*** 4.421 -6.785*** 14.90** -6.876*** -1.618**
(2.486) (3.150) (2.454) (6.563) (2.530) (0.759)
Anger 0.0411 0.140** 0.0366 0.146** 0.0334 0.148**
(0.0596) (0.0602) (0.0539) (0.0600) (0.0564) (0.0588)
Female × anger 0.337** 0.337** 0.337**
(0.134) (0.135) (0.140)
Machiavellianism -0.0170 0.0279
(0.0350) (0.0281)
Female × Machiavellianism -0.121
(0.0739)
Religiosity 0.0588 0.325*
(0.0836) (0.175)
Female × religiosity -0.437**
(0.179)
Religious fundamentalism -0.000254 -0.0162
(0.0123) (0.0157)
Female × religious fundamentalism 0.0323
(0.0276)
Negative belief 2.853*** 2.501*** 2.864*** 2.653*** 2.855*** 2.570***
(0.679) (0.641) (0.674) (0.699) (0.686) (0.658)
Javanese -0.555 -0.0247 -0.568 -0.398 -0.563 -0.0723
(0.566) (0.544) (0.569) (0.532) (0.559) (0.550)
Age 0.0433 0.00463 0.0415 0.00533 0.0485 0.0337
(0.0449) (0.0471) (0.0453) (0.0439) (0.0447) (0.0505)
Muslim 0.131 -0.219 0.0215 -0.495 0.131 0.0102
(0.515) (0.556) (0.518) (0.567) (0.558) (0.635)
Married -1.253** -1.190* -1.300** -1.416** -1.277** -1.120*
(0.609) (0.695) (0.622) (0.681) (0.622) (0.672)
Income >AUD 2,000 -0.0544 0.0731 -0.0181 0.0721 -0.0335 0.00732
(0.506) (0.531) (0.492) (0.489) (0.494) (0.523)
Student -1.830*** -1.983*** -1.861*** -2.093*** -1.873*** -2.059***
(0.619) (0.632) (0.600) (0.667) (0.603) (0.651)
Constant -1.672 -3.998* -4.313 -14.17** -2.431 -3.617*
(2.014) (2.070) (3.247) (6.614) (1.853) (2.107)
ln(σˆv
2) 0.597 0.683 0.587 0.576 0.599 0.776
(0.516) (0.542) (0.508) (0.553) (0.528) (0.527)
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500
Number of id 125 125 125 125 125 125
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. In (1) to (3) partner
gender was relative to male co-participant while partner ethnic was relative to non-Javanese.
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6.5.2 Mismatched Titles and Ethnicity/Gender
The honorific titles represented ethnicity and gender, and this is common knowledge
among the Indonesian population in general. However, the accuracy of these titles in
predicting ethnicity and gender is subject to population composition (i.e., a large propor-
tion of the population needs to come from either an Acehnese or Javanese background).
Around 50 per cent of the participants were ethnic Javanese, but the rest of the par-
ticipants were very diverse.14 Therefore, the titles should have accurately predicted the
ethnicity and gender of at least the Javanese participants.
The honorifics accurately predicted the ethnicity of all 64 Javanese participants.
These (Javanese) honorifics also correctly predicted gender, except for one participant
who chose Mbak as his or her title. However, not all non-Javanese chose Bang or Kak,
and many preferred typical Javanese honorifics, for an unknown reason. In addition, six
participants’ gender did not match the expected preferred honorifics. This mismatch may
have somehow affected their decisions in the experiment.
Excluding participants with mismatched ethnicity and gender did not change the
results, particularly result 2 (no discrimination was found by ethnicity or gender), where
the Wilcoxon test could not reject the null of same distribution in burning decision by
ethnicity and gender. Table 6.8 indicates that, even after dropping observations with
mismatched ethnicity/gender, the results remained unchanged. Those who misreport
their titles were indifferent with the rest of the sample with respect to their demographic
characteristics (age, gender, marital status and student status) based on the Wilcoxon
test at 5 per cent significance level. Nevertheless, those misreporting ethnicity and gender
tend to burn less in all dimensions (e.g., relative to those who did not misreport, they
burn less of both Javanese and non-Javanese money; vice versa with regard to gender).
14The second highest ethnic group is Sundanese (eight per cent), followed by Minangkabau (five per
cent) and 26 other ethnic groups, such as Papuan, Chinese and Buginese.
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Table 6.8: Panel regression with samples with mismatched honorific titles and actual
ethnicity/gender (dependent variable: burning decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female partner -1.237*** -1.461*** -1.265*** -0.672* -0.890** -0.563
(0.288) (0.306) (0.300) (0.385) (0.396) (0.375)
Male partner -0.683** -0.700** -0.790** (base) (base) (base)
(0.321) (0.275) (0.328)
Javanese partner -0.0562 -0.105 -0.0599 -0.0803 -0.136 -0.0842
(0.158) (0.151) (0.170) (0.203) (0.186) (0.215)
Female -4.515** -2.511 -4.066** -7.142*** -6.336** -6.589**
(1.809) (1.772) (1.836) (2.733) (2.574) (2.803)
Anger 0.0278 0.0581 0.0370 0.000984 0.0391 0.00742
(0.0478) (0.0432) (0.0473) (0.0677) (0.0574) (0.0663)
Female × anger 0.212** 0.115 0.188* 0.339** 0.310** 0.311**
(0.0996) (0.0964) (0.0997) (0.150) (0.138) (0.152)
Negative belief 1.723*** 1.720*** 1.587*** 2.499*** 2.653*** 2.281***
(0.424) (0.455) (0.458) (0.681) (0.724) (0.725)
Javanese -0.290 -0.0542 -0.370 -0.781 -0.518 -0.852
(0.405) (0.365) (0.395) (0.618) (0.563) (0.616)
Age -0.00761 0.00838 -0.0116 0.00936 0.0459 0.00497
(0.0355) (0.0323) (0.0328) (0.0558) (0.0430) (0.0509)
Muslim -0.185 -0.283 -0.249 0.210 0.102 0.117
(0.424) (0.406) (0.432) (0.585) (0.536) (0.597)
Married -0.682 -0.513 -0.516 -1.177* -1.039 -0.987
(0.444) (0.438) (0.483) (0.681) (0.667) (0.754)
Income >AUD 2,000. -0.0285 -0.0597 0.0609 0.0361 0.0111 0.145
(0.368) (0.339) (0.382) (0.565) (0.505) (0.592)
Student -1.230*** -1.067*** -1.228*** -1.716*** -1.779*** -1.741**
(0.426) (0.402) (0.440) (0.656) (0.647) (0.704)
Constant 0.162 -1.320 0.241 -0.491 -2.616 -0.390
(1.565) (1.430) (1.533) (2.231) (1.914) (2.142)
ln(σˆv
2) -0.0705 0.265 -0.128 0.457 0.581 0.436
(0.460) (0.408) (0.501) (0.571) (0.529) (0.590)
Sample Exclude
mismatch
ethnic
Exclude
mismatch
gender
Exclude
mismatch
ethnic &
gender
Exclude
computer &
mismatch
ethnic
Exclude
computer &
mismatch
gender
Exclude
computer &
mismatch
gender &
ethnic
Observations 450 595 420 360 476 336
Number of id 90 119 84 90 119 84
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. In (1) to (3), partner
gender was relative to the computer co-participant, while partner ethnicity was relative to non-Javanese.
6.5.3 Other Sub-traits of Aggression and Artefact Effects
Aside from anger, the other sub-traits of aggression—hostility, physical aggression and
verbal aggression—had no effect on antisocial decisions (Table A.9; to conserve space,
regression tables are presented in the appendix from this point onwards). The aggression
index that combined all four sub-traits also had no significant association with burning
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behaviour. In all instances, the participants tended to reduce the payoffs of male more
than female co-participants.
Finally, it could be that the effect of the interaction term was not limited to being
between gender and anger, yet Table A.10 did not seem to suggest this. Interacting
anger with other demographic characteristics (ethnicity, religion, marital status, income,
age, negative beliefs and students) did not result in significant associations between the
interaction term and antisocial decisions. Still, females were less likely to be a target of
money burning, students were less likely to burn, and negative beliefs positively predicted
antisocial behaviour.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the findings from the Melbourne experiment, which predated
the Aceh study. It is understood that Indonesian migrants have very different demo-
graphic backgrounds than those living in Aceh—particularly their lower probability of
experiencing violent conflict; therefore, these migrants could not be used as a benchmark.
Nonetheless, the observed behaviour reflected the decisions made by a more general popu-
lation. Importantly, the experiment was valuable because it could be used to test whether
the original design could generate meaningful results and identify the factors behind an-
tisocial behaviour.
A significant proportion of the participants chose to destroy others’ money, which vi-
olated the rational prediction of zero money burning, and thus answered the first research
question. Payoff-destruction experiments are often used to explain money destruction as
a result of inequity aversion or pure spite. Given that the participants received an equal
amount of endowment in this experiment, this suggests that pure spite was the main
driver of the money-burning behaviour. Another possible explanation was the vividness
and salience of ethnic identity, but the use of honorifics was aimed at minimising this
effect. Nevertheless, the low burn rate (relative to the prediction from the meta-analysis)
reflected the relative content felt by Indonesian migrants in Australia. In fact, only six
per cent of the participants behaved antisocially when decisions against the computer
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were excluded—a figure that was almost half the result from an equivalent experiment
(Abbink & Herrmann, 2011).
This experiment generated further interesting results, as follows. The first and
second results (no differential or discrimination in antisocial behaviour by ethnicity or
gender) answered the second research question. The result was as expected and, since
this experiment was conducted before the Aceh study, it confirmed the unbiased (towards
specific ethnicity or gender) design of the experiment. It also adds to the other-regarding
preferences literature, where there was a mixed or indifferent effect of gender (Croson &
Gneezy, 2009; Sent & van Staveren, 2018), and specifically to the antisocial behaviour
literature that mostly ignored the role of gender. The absence of out-group discrimination
signalled the positive relationship within the Indonesian migrant community and reflected
the behaviour of a general Indonesian population who had never experienced conflict.
The third result (females were less likely to receive payoff reduction) was not ex-
pected, and only occurred when decisions against the computer were excluded. This result
is similar to the dictator game literature, where women were given more money than men
(Dufwenberg & Muren, 2006). From game design point of view, and assuming that an-
tisocial and altruism are on the same spectrum, the dictator game is diametrical to the
JoD game.
The fourth and fifth results answered the third research question on the antecedents
of antisocial behaviour. The fourth result (females that chose to burn tended to have a
higher score of anger than did males) implied that these females had a different perception
of anger, which was reflected in their behaviour in the experiment. This finding was in
line with the psychology literature, which hypothesises that women view anger as a loss
of control, as opposed to men who view anger as seizing control (Astin et al., 2003;
Litvak et al., 2010). In addition, an antisocial experiment in conflict region (Israel) found
that anger had mixed effects on antisocial behaviour and was conditional on exposure to
violence (Zeitzoff, 2014).
Meanwhile, the fifth result indicated that participants’ tendency to behave anti-
socially was strongly predicted by their expectation regarding their co-participant’s de-
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cisions. This finding was also found in the antisocial behaviour literature (Abbink &
Herrmann, 2011; Prediger et al., 2014). However, only half of those with negative belief
that actually chose the antisocial decision (the proportion was lower than in the afore-
mentioned studies that hover between 81 to 86 per cent). In addition, it also expanded
the literature on intention-based reciprocity pioneered by Rabin (1993).
These results were robust to a battery of tests, such as dropping observations with
mismatched honorific titles and actual gender/ethnicity, using other sub-traits of aggres-
sion to replace anger, interacting anger with other demographic variables and the inclu-
sion of various measures of personal attitudes. However, using bootstrap standard errors
weakened some of the results.
Finally, the findings from this experiment also directly informed the field study in
Aceh. Gender could influence behaviour, as shown in the third and fourth results. How-
ever, this effect could be transmitted through different channels because of the different
population and socioeconomic background. In addition, consistent with past findings, neg-
ative beliefs were also expected to predict antisocial behaviour, and there were no strong
reasons that the participants in Aceh would behave differently. Finally, because of the
unexpected result, the Aceh study did not include a computer co-participant. However,
this creates opportunity for further research on human-machine interactions.
Chapter 7
The Experiment in Aceh
This chapter discusses the results from the main experiment of this thesis. The experi-
ment in Aceh was successfully conducted during April 2018, and some of the results were
published in Chuah, Feeny, Hoffmann, and Sanjaya (2019). Unlike the participants from
the Melbourne experiment, a significant proportion of the Aceh participants had experi-
enced actual conflict. The findings from the study provide support for a comprehensive
reconciliation process that must address both gender and ethno-cultural issues.
7.1 Introduction
Social scientists have been searching for the long-term effect of war on economic perfor-
mance (Miguel & Roland, 2011), human capital (Ichino & Winter-Ebmer, 2004), religiosity
(Henrich, Bauer, Cassar, Chytilova, & Purzycki, 2019) and behaviour (Bauer et al., 2016).
In particular, the economic costs of conflicts can persist for generations when destroyed
social capital reduces future cooperation and trust, especially between former adversary
groups (Bauer et al., 2016; Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003).
Following Bauer et al. (2016), there are three theoretical explanations for how war
affects prosocial behaviour: changes in parochial norms and preferences, changes in eco-
nomic incentives and psychological changes. In the contact literature, regular contact with
out-group members could change someone’s preference, as it is believed to increase empa-
thy or reduce information asymmetry and anxiety (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Changes in
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parochial norms and preferences may also affect behaviour through being hostile towards
the out-group for the benefit of the in-group members (parochial altruism). Inter-group
differentiation, such as parochialism, does not occur naturally, as individuals must be
able to internalise the group’s identity and make inter-group comparisons along relevant
relational attributes (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
This chapter reports the results from a lab-in-the-field experiment on the effect of
the Aceh conflict on antisocial behaviour. The experiment focuses on the elicitation of
antisocial behaviour with a strategy method, which makes it possible to identify differ-
ential behaviour, if any, against ethnic in/out-group members. One controversial aspect
of the Aceh conflict was the targeting of ethnic Javanese (Schulze, 2004). While the
peace-building process in Aceh is considered a success story, it remains unknown to what
extent the grievances among different ethnic groups—particularly between Acehnese and
Javanese—are affecting their behaviour. Together with salient ethnic identities that are
convenient for parochialism to exist, the experiment predicts persistent hostility between
the two ethnic groups involved. Therefore, unlike the Melbourne experiment, participants
in the Aceh study would have directly experienced conflict. In addition, the computer co-
participant was excluded from this study because there was no indication of dissent among
the Melbourne participants and because of the puzzling behaviour observed against the
computer.
The Aceh study sought to answer the following research questions: (1) Do the
participants differentiate in money burning based on ethnicity and gender? (2) What are
the antecedents of antisocial behaviour among the participants? The answers to these
questions have policy implications for national and local governments.
The remaining sections of this chapter are structured as follows. Section 7.2 ex-
amines the current situation in Aceh, which complements Chapter 2’s overview of the
region during the conflict. Section 7.3 explains the methodology, followed by the results
in Section 7.4 and robustness checks in Section 7.5. Section 7.6 extends the analysis
by comparing results with the data from Melbourne. Finally, Section 7.7 concludes the
chapter.
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7.2 Post-conflict Aceh
The 2005 peace agreement ended three decades of Aceh conflict. In addition to improved
economic fairness (in the form of fairer natural resource revenue sharing), Aceh received
political freedom and self-governance short of independence, such as through the estab-
lishment of local political parties. Today, the majority of the democratically elected local
government leaders, including the current Governor of Aceh, are ex-GAM members affili-
ated with the local political parties. As part of the peace memorandum, Aceh is also the
only Indonesian province allowed to fully implement syariah (Islamic law). As stipulated
in Law No. 11/2006, Aceh has also enjoyed special autonomy funds from the national
government from 2008. For the first 15 years, the amount of the fund will be equal to
two per cent of the national General Allocation Fund (the central government’s transfer
to sub-national governments), which will be reduced to one per cent during the last five
years of the implementation. The special autonomy fund drastically increased the region’s
public revenue from just IDR 1.3 trillion in 1999 to IDR 8.4 trillion in 2007. The special
autonomy fund is expected to run until 2026.
Despite the achievements in economic and political aspects, both the national and lo-
cal governments were slow in investigating serious human rights abuses in Aceh (Amnesty
International, 2013). For example, the Aceh’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission only
started its formal public hearing at the end of November 2018—13 years after the conflict
ended. This prolonged process has had a devastating effect on the victims of the con-
flict and their relatives, and has not been helpful in securing long-term peace. Moreover,
women were largely ignored during the peace process, despite their active role during the
insurgency. For example, no women from the Indonesian government or the Acehnese
were present during the early peace process, which resulted in the exclusion of women
or gender issues. The absence of such issues in the peace agreement is unfortunate, as
the experiences of women in Aceh were not limited to replacing men in social roles, but
also included active participation in the war. In addition, no women were included in the
reintegration compensation list of 3,000 ex-combatants (Lee-Koo, 2012).
The effect of violence differs depending on gender, as revealed by a 2006 survey
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of 1,792 individuals, which found that 21 per cent of the women in Aceh suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder—a proportion significantly larger than that among men
(17 per cent) (Grayman, Good, & Good, 2009). Unsurprisingly, the respondents were
almost unanimous in highlighting the Indonesian security forces—the military or police—
as violence perpetrators. There is also evidence of women’s marginalisation following
the 2004 tsunami. The aftermath of the tsunami led to around USD 7 billion in aid
for relief and reconstruction programs, including for the Reconstruction of Aceh Land
Administration System project, which was aimed at restoring land ownership in the region
(World Bank, 2006). The accompanying fieldwork established that female victims of the
tsunami and conflict found themselves in a difficult position to claim land ownership
because of the biased inheritance law and customs (Fitzpatrick, 2012). In some cases,
these women’s own relatives denied their legitimate claims, and village leaders sometimes
agreed with the denial, which led to women feeling powerless.
In Aceh, ethnic violence sometimes arose after the peace agreement, including vio-
lence perpetrated by ethnic minorities, as in the 2008 killing of five KPA members (Komite
Peralihan Aceh; a civil organisation that represents ex-GAM combatants) (World Bank,
2008). There have also been reports of non-violent but conflicting inter-ethnic relations,
with people belonging to ethnic minorities feeling that the local governments were im-
posing Acehnese norms (Ehrentraut, 2010). One common experience of discrimination
against ethnic minorities is alienation through the use of Acehnese language.
The intensity of violence in today’s Aceh is relatively low compared with Indonesia
as a whole (110 versus 143 violent incidents per million people in 2014). However, as
depicted in Figure 7.1, the intensity of violence in Aceh in 2014 spread evenly across all
districts, relative to 2005 when the peace agreement was signed. Vigilantism in the name
of syariah has also become a problem in Aceh. Syariah condemns some aspects of private
and civil life as criminal offences, such as extramarital affairs and alcohol consumption.
It is also used by some locals to justify vigilantism; however, some scholars (e.g., Kloos,
2014) argue that the violent acts are the result of unclear moral authority at the village
level (where most of the vigilantism occurs).
150 Chapter 7. The Experiment in Aceh
Figure 7.1: Number of non-domestic violent incidents per million people in Aceh
Source: Calculated from NVMS and population census.
These facts indicate the ongoing turmoil in the region, despite the many achieve-
ments following the peace agreement. These issues also identify some concerns—particularly
the grievances of women—that could harm Aceh’s reconciliation process. Together, this
information provides the context for the lab-in-the-field experiment, from Aceh’s turbulent
past to today’s fragile peace.
7.3 Methodology
7.3.1 Experimental Design
The Aceh study used the same experimental design (a variation of the JoD minigame)
as in the Melbourne study (see the instructions and questionnaires in Appendix C). In
this game, participants were asked if they were willing to pay to destroy a portion of
their co-participant’s money. Participants made decisions against four different types of
co-participants, identified by their preferred honorific titles (Acehnese and Javanese males
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and females are addressed as Bang and Kak and Mas and Mbak, respectively). Unlike
in Melbourne, the computer co-participant was excluded in the Aceh study. Only one
decision in each pair of participants was implemented, following a coin toss. Sessions were
held simultaneously at two different locations to avoid any post-experiment repercussions.
This was necessary given the sensitivity of the experimental design and the history of
conflict between the two major ethnic groups.
After the decision task, the participants were asked to answer questionnaires regard-
ing war victimisation, SVO and personal attitudes and beliefs (negative belief, Machiavel-
lianism, aggression, religiosity and religious fundamentalism). In particular, questions on
war victimisation were asked because of the direct experience of conflict among the Aceh
participants. Negative beliefs, Machiavellianism and aggression were also asked, given
their importance in predicting antisocial behaviour found in past studies (including the
Melbourne experiment). Questions about SVO were asked because these could be used to
elicit prosocial preferences that could be directly compared with the antisocial behaviour
observed in this experiment. Finally, the two sets of questions on beliefs (religiosity and
religious fundamentalism) were asked because of Aceh’s special autonomy in its imple-
mentation of syariah.
7.3.2 Implementation
Each session had three phases. In the first phase, participants were seated alone, were
asked to sign the consent form and answered the demographic characteristics question-
naire. The questionnaire was generally the same as in Melbourne, except for some irrel-
evant questions that were excluded in the Aceh study (e.g., on length of stay and reason
for staying in Australia). In the second phase, each participant received an equal endow-
ment of IDR 75,000 and asked whether they were willing to pay IDR 3,000 to reduce IDR
30,000 of their co-participant’s money.1 The ratio of cost to money destruction and the
ratio of money reduction to endowment were 10 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively,
which were the same proportions as in the Melbourne experiment. In the final (third)
1The exchange rate was AUD 1 = IDR 10,700. The minimum wage in Aceh was IDR 2.7 million per
month.
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phase, participants were paid a flat fee of IDR 25,000 for completing the post-experimental
questionnaires.
Payments for both the experimental fee and flat fee were made after the third phase
was completed. Combining the flat fee and the experiment’s fee, each participant could at
most receive IDR 100,000, which was roughly equal to a day’s work, and at worst received
IDR 70,000. On average, each participant received a final payment of IDR 97,000.
Participation in the study was voluntary and posters were placed on community no-
tice boards, in local shops and in other public areas a few days before each session. During
the recruitment process, potential participants were told that they would be asked to make
some choices in a decision task, in addition to answering questionnaires. They were also
told that there would be questions about their conflict experience. The participants had
to be at least 25 years old to ensure they could correctly recall their memory of the
conflict, which was expected to increase the accuracy of answers in the self-report war
victimisation questionnaire. They also needed to have lived in Aceh for at least one year
during the height of the conflict (2000 to 2005).
Ten sessions were conducted in April 2018 in 10 randomly chosen villages (five in
each of the two chosen districts, Aceh Timur and Aceh Utara), with around 20 people
participating per session. The two districts were chosen as they share a border and
have similar characteristics, with Acehnese the ethnic majority. More importantly, both
districts suffered less than a two per cent decline in the 2005 GDP as a result of the
2004 tsunami (the average decline in all districts in Aceh was 19.17 per cent according
to Mangkusubroto, Said, Steer, & Hellman, 2005). Two transmigration villages in each
of the districts were randomly selected to ensure a proportional representation of ethnic
Javanese. Transmigration is the government’s policy to resettle families, mainly from the
overpopulated island of Java, to the outer islands of Indonesia, including Aceh. Around
400,000 Javanese people (8.9 per cent of the Aceh population) live in the region, according
to the 2010 population census. This makes this ethnic group the second largest in the
region.
All instructions and forms were written in plain Indonesian language and RAs were
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instructed to follow the procedures. Sessions were conducted in the village’s meunasah
(all-purpose meeting hall) and lasted for approximately two hours. See the photographs
in Figures B.11, B.12 and B.13 in the appendix, which document typical experimental
sessions, payment process and poster placement in Aceh, respectively.
No major political events occurred during the experiments and the most recent
district head elections were held in early 2017. There were also no natural disasters or
other significant events that could have affected behaviour during the study. There was
no indication of resentment during the sessions and, overall, the study progressed well
and finished a few days ahead of schedule.
To conclude, the implementation of the Aceh experiment was similar to the exper-
iment in Melbourne except regarding: (i) the exclusion of the computer co-participant,
(ii) the amount and currency of the fees, (iii) the exclusion of irrelevant questions from
the demographics questionnaire and (iv) the participants being expected to come from
the same village where the session was held.
7.4 Results
A total of 204 participants completed the whole session, with an average age of 38 years.
Around three-quarters were married and they had received an average 11 years of educa-
tion. Approximately 34 per cent of the participants were females. See Table 7.1 for the
summary statistics.
Acehnese was the dominant ethnic group, with 170 participants (83 per cent). There-
fore, despite having a higher proportion of Javanese in the sample (12.7 per cent) relative
to the actual population (8.9 per cent from the 2010 census), the total number of Ja-
vanese was only 26. As a result of the small number of Javanese and other ethnic group
participants in the data, most of the analyses focus only on the Acehnese. The following
sub-sections examine the patterns of conflict experience, patterns of antisocial behaviour
and regression results.
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Table 7.1: Summary statistics, Aceh
Variable Obs. Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
Burn money 204 0.25 0.43 0 1
Conflict experience (injured or killed) 204 0.50 0.50 0 1
Conflict experience (injured and killed) 204 0.25 0.44 0 1
Negative belief 204 0.33 0.47 0 1
Age 204 38.42 11.04 25 72
Acehnese 204 0.83 0.37 0 1
Female 204 0.34 0.47 0 1
Married 204 0.74 0.44 0 1
Years of education 204 11.01 3.73 0 16
Income >IDR 2 million/month 204 0.11 0.32 0 1
7.4.1 Patterns of Conflict Experience
The main measure of conflict experience was derived from the war victimisation survey,
where the variable equalled 1 if the participants or their household members were injured
or killed in 2000 to 2005 and 0 otherwise. This measure was almost absent in the Mel-
bourne experiment, as there were only three (Acehnese) participants who could answer
questions on their Aceh conflict experience.
Half of the participants had experienced war victimisation (bottom right cell in Table
7.2). Acehnese males experienced conflict more than Acehnese females in the sample (56
versus 46 per cent, respectively), but the gap was much higher in the non-Acehnese
sample with (43 versus 17 per cent). In particular, no Javanese females claimed to have
experienced conflict. In contrast, females experienced more conflict than males in the
’other’ ethnic group (neither Acehnese nor Javanese), although this was a very small
sample size.
Table 7.3 displays the results of probit regressions, based on a similar model from
Cassar et al. (2013), where Model 1 indicates that conflict experience was not associated
with any of the explanatory variables except income (at 10 per cent level) when all ob-
servations were used. The coefficient indicates that those with low income were somehow
less prone to be war victims. This finding might lead to the issue of endogeneity if there
were variables omitted from the determinants of conflict experience regression. However,
as shown in the main regressions (Section 7.4.3), income did not predict money-burning
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Table 7.2: Mean conflict experience by ethnicity and gender
Acehnese Non-Acehnese Total
All Javanese Other
(n = 170) (n = 34) (n = 26) (n = 8) (n = 204)
Male (n = 69) 0.56 0.43 0.50 0.17 0.53
Female (n = 135) 0.46 0.17 0.00 0.50 0.43
Total (n = 204) 0.52 0.38 0.42 0.25 0.50
behaviour.
Acehnese females were not significantly associated with conflict experience (Model
2). When the sample of those older than 25 in 2000 was used (Model 3), where par-
ticipants’ education was already predetermined, none of the explanatory variables could
explain conflict experience. The same pattern was also discovered when the data were
restricted to the Acehnese sample (Models 4 to 5).
Finally, one recent study suggested an association between religiosity and war ex-
perience, where this war-sociality hypothesis expects conflict experience would increase
religiosity, proxied by membership of religious group and attendance of religious events
(Henrich et al., 2019). However, the Aceh data only found limited support for this. The
experience of conflict was associated with higher religiosity, but only with regard to the
dimension of consequential religiosity—the belief that one’s behaviour is associated with
religion or religious teaching—as shown in Models 1 and 2 in Table 7.4. This result did
not change significantly when other measures of war experience were used as the explana-
tory variable (Models 3 to 5). However, other dimensions of religiosity and its composite
index had no such association (results not shown).
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Table 7.3: Determinants of conflict experience (dependent variable: conflict experience
[injured or kileld])
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.00695 0.00719 -0.0309 0.000521 -0.0392
(0.00956) (0.00961) (0.0279) (0.0107) (0.0298)
Years of education -0.0269 -0.0306 -0.0785 -0.0362 -0.0587
(0.0288) (0.0285) (0.0512) (0.0304) (0.0530)
Income >IDR 2 million/month 0.619* 0.617* 0.858 0.760** 0.615
(0.322) (0.322) (0.624) (0.356) (0.633)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur 0.279 0.223 -0.370 0.360 -0.614
(0.622) (0.595) (1.120) (0.405) (0.736)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -0.114 -0.139 -0.374 0.000248 -0.587
(0.601) (0.582) (1.158) (0.405) (0.751)
Region lived in 2003: Other Aceh 0.316 0.300 0.375 (base) (base)
(0.629) (0.615) (1.192)
Female -0.226 -0.591 0.110 -0.213 0.236
(0.197) (0.635) (0.352) (0.206) (0.388)
Ethnicity: Javanese -0.359 (base) -0.162
(0.312) (0.535)
Ethnicity: Other -0.795 (base) -0.454
(0.530) (0.780)
Ethnicity: Acehnese (base) 0.416 (base)
(0.306)
Acehnese × female 0.398
(0.668)
Constant 0.0239 -0.334 2.748 0.280 3.212*
(0.769) (0.725) (1.923) (0.716) (1.818)
Sample All All Age >25
in 2000
Acehnese Acehnese
age >25
in 2000
Observations 204 204 67 170 53
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Region lived was
relative to those who moved outside Aceh in 2003 in (1) to (3). Probit models were used in the regressions.
Data at individual level.
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Table 7.4: Consequential religiosity (dependent variable) and conflict experience, Aceh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Conflict experience (injured or killed) 0.823*** 0.816***
(0.249) (0.257)
Conflict experience (injured and killed) 0.786***
(0.251)
Conflict experience (injured) 0.832***
(0.240)
Conflict experience (HH member killed) 0.728***
(0.253)
Age -0.0168 -0.0156 -0.0142 -0.0176
(0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0157)
Female 0.820*** 0.783*** 0.789*** 0.775***
(0.244) (0.245) (0.243) (0.248)
Ethnicity: Javanese 0.503 0.486 0.541 0.478
(0.470) (0.458) (0.467) (0.463)
Ethnicity: Other -0.439 -0.697 -0.472 -0.659
(0.878) (0.894) (0.881) (0.892)
Years of education 0.0532 0.0543 0.0550 0.0514
(0.0377) (0.0384) (0.0386) (0.0378)
Income >IDR 2 million/month 0.133 0.322 0.185 0.274
(0.353) (0.345) (0.360) (0.341)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur 0.456 0.462 0.476 0.465
(0.781) (0.825) (0.784) (0.828)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -0.445 -0.547 -0.371 -0.594
(0.736) (0.774) (0.739) (0.776)
Region lived in 2003: Other Aceh -0.0789 -0.256 -0.107 -0.350
(0.851) (0.871) (0.849) (0.897)
Constant 8.458*** 8.215*** 8.409*** 8.087*** 8.524***
(0.210) (1.063) (1.103) (1.082) (1.090)
Observations 185 185 185 184 184
R2 0.054 0.188 0.176 0.187 0.173
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Ethnicity was
relative to Acehnese. Region lived was relative to those who moved outside Aceh in 2003. OLS were used
in the regressions. Although full sample were used in the regressions, the numbers of observations were
less than 204 since many of the participants did not complete the religiosity questionnaire.
158 Chapter 7. The Experiment in Aceh
7.4.2 Patterns of Antisocial Behaviour
One of four participants chose to burn at least one of their co-participant’s money when
all observations were included.2 This proportion was larger than in the Melbourne exper-
iment (16 per cent; statistically different at 10 per cent using the Chi-square test), but
lower than the prediction from the meta-regression (the expected burn rate was 38 per
cent ± 13 per cent confidence intervals).3
Result 1: The burn rate in Aceh was higher than in Melbourne.
Acehnese tended to burn less than non-Acehnese, and the difference was pronounced
among males, as shown in Figure 7.2. The wide confidence intervals in the non-Acehnese
sample were because of the very small number of observations (particularly among females,
n = 6). Therefore, the following analyses used only the Acehnese sample, unless indicated
otherwise.
Result 2: Acehnese were less likely to behave antisocially than were Javanese partic-
ipants.
Figure 7.3 displays the incidence of money burning for (Acehnese) females and males,
according to the ethnicity of their co-participants and whether the participants had ex-
perienced conflict. The figure suggests there were important out-group effects, with both
females and males being more likely to have burnt money when their co-participant iden-
tified as Javanese (light versus dark teal bars). The findings from the Wilcoxon signed
rank tests indicated that this out-group effect was statistically significant in the case of
males (p-value = 0.0348) yet not females (p-value = 0.1573).
Result 3: Acehnese participants were more likely to behave antisocially against Ja-
vanese co-participant.
This result was also found among the Javanese participants and, in fact, the rate
was higher. On average, 42 and 31 per cent of Javanese burnt Acehnese and Javanese
co-participants, respectively. Nevertheless, the small number of Javanese in the sample
made it difficult to generalise this finding.
The figure also displays large gendered differences in burning for participants who
2The proportion was lower (21 per cent) with the Acehnese sample.
3The rate for Melbourne was for the burning decision of at least one human co-participant.
7.4. Results 159
Figure 7.2: Incidence of burning by ethnicity and gender
Figure 7.3: Incidence of burning by gender, conflict experience and co-participant’s eth-
nicity
Note: Acehnese sample only.
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Table 7.5: Antisocial behaviour, personal attitudes and beliefs; Aceh
All Male Female
Religiosity 0.2618 0.4440 0.6778
Religiosity: ritual 0.2869 0.6674 0.0574*
Religiosity: consequential 0.1688 0.0400** 0.4492
Religiosity: ideological 0.1378 0.7214 0.0154**
Religiosity: experiential 0.7818 0.9168 0.5328
Religious fundamentalism 0.7957 0.1081 0.0362**
Mach-IV 0.1661 0.9103 0.0407**
Aggression 0.5224 0.7970 0.2718
Aggression: anger 0.7319 0.9813 0.4399
Aggression: hostility 0.6796 0.9743 0.4601
Aggression: physical 0.1097 0.4354 0.0946*
Aggression: verbal 0.2071 0.4813 0.2862
Note: The numbers are p-values from the Mann-Whitney test for unmatched data (by money burning
decision). Acehnese only. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
had experienced conflict (light versus dark red). Among females, there was a much higher
incidence of burning for those who had experienced conflict (34 per cent) relative to those
who had not (six per cent) (Mann-Whitney p-value = 0.0043; Fisher’s exact p-value =
0.008). For males, the incidence of burning for those who had experienced conflict was
less than, although similar to, the incidence for those who had not: 20 versus 23 per cent
(Mann-Whitney p-value = 0.6720; Fisher’s exact p-value = 0.813).
Result 4: Acehnese females who had experienced conflict were more likely to burn
money.
Finally, none of the personal attitudes and beliefs were associated with money-
burning (Table 7.5), but some were different by gender, particularly regarding aspects of
religiosity. However, this latter association might be confounded with findings from the
previous sub-section, where consequential religiosity was correlated with conflict experi-
ence.
The following sub-sections generalise and extend these results by controlling for a
number of demographics, conflict experience, personal attitudes and other control vari-
ables.
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7.4.3 Regressions Results
Panel probit random-effect regressions were performed to robustly test some of the results
in the previous sub-section, where the dependent variable was a binary variable taking
the value of 1 if the participant decided to destroy (burn) their co-participant’s stake and
0 otherwise. The use of strategy method made it possible to detect behaviour against
those of different gender or ethnicity. To do this, the data needed to be reshaped into a
panel of individuals and their (four) burning decisions.
Coefficient estimates of six models are presented in Table 7.6. Model 1 presents
the results of a parsimonious model that included the gender and conflict experience (in-
jured or killed) of the Acehnese participant, as well as the gender and ethnicity of their
co-participant. The three subsequent regressions augmented this model with interaction
terms according to the other characteristics of the participant and their co-participant.
The interactions terms were included individually to avoid problems associated with
collinearity. The findings across the different models confirmed a significant out-group
effect. The Acehnese participants were more likely to burn when their co-participant
identified as Javanese relative to Acehnese, which confirmed Result 3. This effect was not
statistically significant in Models 2 and 3, since the ’Javanese partner’ variable was also
included in interaction terms, resulting in collinearity and large standard errors.
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Table 7.6: Main regressions, Aceh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Javanese partner 0.514** 0.498 0.210 0.494** 0.499** 0.497** 0.0119
(0.241) (0.322) (0.386) (0.231) (0.230) (0.236) (0.383)
Conflict experience (injured or killed) 0.523* 0.524* 0.256 -0.499 -0.553 -0.556 -1.146
(0.318) (0.316) (0.434) (0.468) (0.637) (0.646) (0.767)
Female -0.0660 -0.0920 -0.0606 -1.793* -1.542 -1.221 -2.387**
(0.336) (0.447) (0.335) (1.027) (0.966) (0.975) (1.177)
Female partner 0.121 0.122 0.119 0.117 0.120 0.358 0.114
(0.222) (0.221) (0.223) (0.212) (0.212) (0.292) (0.215)
Female × Javanese partner 0.0470 1.234
(0.464) (1.080)
Javanese partner × conflict experience 0.493 0.961
(0.492) (0.631)
Female × conflict experience 2.999*** 2.991** 3.022** 4.234***
(1.115) (1.221) (1.244) (1.464)
Female × female partner -0.668*
(0.404)
Female × Javanese partner × conflict experience -1.805
(1.248)
Negative belief 2.153*** 2.177*** 2.213***
(0.557) (0.557) (0.561)
Age 0.0127 0.0131 0.0125
(0.0251) (0.0254) (0.0257)
Years of education 0.0666 0.0676 0.0660
(0.0626) (0.0634) (0.0638)
Income >IDR 2 million/month 0.405 0.406 0.411
(0.895) (0.906) (0.906)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur -2.097** -2.122** -2.174**
(1.004) (1.022) (1.058)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -1.462 -1.480 -1.519
(0.996) (1.010) (1.046)
Constant -4.477*** -4.470*** -4.311*** -3.202*** -3.417* -3.588** -3.150*
(1.003) (1.011) (0.982) (0.758) (1.779) (1.813) (1.837)
ln(σˆv
2) 2.293*** 2.295*** 2.293*** 1.855*** 1.473*** 1.502*** 1.535***
(0.585) (0.586) (0.574) (0.501) (0.354) (0.356) (0.369)
Observations 680 680 680 680 680 680 680
Number of id 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
Notes: Panel probit regressions with random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Region lived was relative to
those who moved to other regions in Aceh in 2003.
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The results from Model 4, including an interaction term, revealed that, ceteris
paribus, female participants who had experienced conflict were more likely to burn their
co-participant’s money. The coefficient of this term was positive and highly statistically
significant, which supported Result 4. This finding is likely to be the result of women
suffering more from conflict than men, as discussed in the introduction. Among females,
experience of intensive conflict generates persistent hostility. There was also weak evi-
dence of differential money-burning behaviour by gender (Models 4 and 7), with females
tending to burn less.
There is also a weak evidence of differential money-burning behaviour by gender
(Models 4 and 7), where females tend to burn less.
Result 5: Controlling for the interaction between gender and conflict experience,
Acehnese females were less likely to burn money.
The above results were robust to the inclusion of control variables, such as negative
belief, age, income and education in Model 5. Income, in particular, was not correlated
with burning behaviour. Consistent with the Melbourne data and past studies, negative
belief strongly predicted antisocial behaviour.
Result 6: Negative belief positively predicted antisocial behaviour.
When an interaction term between the participant’s own gender and the co-participant’s
gender was included in Model 6, the results remained the same.
Finally, Model 7 contained a three-way interaction between gender, conflict expe-
rience and Javanese partner, and the differential conflict experience of women was still
observed. The insignificance of the estimated parameter of the three-way interaction term
also implied that Acehnese women who had experienced conflict did not necessarily aim
their antisocial decisions against Javanese co-participants.
Result 7: Acehnese females who had experienced conflict did not aim their money
burning towards Javanese co-participants.
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7.5 Robustness Checks
The previous regression results could be sensitive to several issues. This section discusses
several factors that could confound the results: sample selection, alternative measures of
conflict experience, artefact interaction effects and the effect of personal attitudes.
7.5.1 Sample Selection
This study included two issues regarding sample selection. First, this study excluded non-
Acehnese in the previous regressions. Second, sample selections due to age, migration and
mismatched honorifics-ethnicity/gender.
Table 7.7 displays the regression results with all observations, including those from
the Javanese minority, and the results are largely the same, whereby females with conflict
experience tended to be more antisocial. The exclusion of the Javanese sample in previous
regressions was not only due to the small sample size, but also because of the selection
problem, as the ethnic group was targeted during the conflict. In the simplest regression,
Model 1, Acehnese tended to burn less; however, once additional controls were included,
this effect disappeared (Model 2). Interestingly, in all models, but prominently in Model
1, the coefficient sign for the Acehnese dummy variable was negative, which indicated
that non-Acehnese tended to be more spiteful.
Models 3 to 5 indicated that the animosity towards ethnic out-group members (as
indicated by Acehnese × Javanese partner) persisted even after controlling for females
with conflict experience. Meanwhile, Model 5 indicated a three-way interaction between
gender, ethnicity and conflict experience, and the results were basically the same. Note
that the estimated parameter for female × conflict experience was now negative, which
meant that non-Acehnese females who had experienced conflict tended to be less anti-
social. This finding contrasts with Result 4, suggesting that conflict experience affects
females’ behaviour differently by ethnicity. Nonetheless, this finding could be caused by
the small number of non-Acehnese participants and the opposing pattern of war victimi-
sation among non-Acehnese, as shown in Table 7.2 in Section 7.4.1 above.
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Table 7.7: Regression with full sample (dependent variable: burning decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Javanese partner 0.223 0.226 -0.514 -0.512 -0.525
(0.197) (0.194) (0.397) (0.395) (0.405)
Conflict experience (injured or killed) -0.167 -0.247 0.572 -0.256 1.325*
(0.437) (0.467) (0.417) (0.477) (0.801)
Female -1.720* -1.355* -0.0196 -1.396* -1.080
(0.882) (0.780) (0.445) (0.797) (1.516)
Female partner 0.110 0.112 0.112 0.114 0.113
(0.182) (0.179) (0.185) (0.186) (0.186)
Acehnese -1.853*** -0.436 -0.881 -0.950* -0.0337
(0.552) (0.516) (0.568) (0.575) (0.663)
Female × conflict experience 2.756*** 2.460** 2.533** -3.125*
(1.012) (0.991) (1.008) (1.809)
Acehnese × Javanese partner 0.992** 0.996** 1.007**
(0.457) (0.455) (0.463)
Acehnese × female -0.413
(1.773)
Acehnese × conflict experience -2.023*
(1.050)
Acehnese × female × conflict experience 6.158***
(2.183)
Negative belief 2.121*** 2.208*** 2.177*** 2.313***
(0.456) (0.456) (0.464) (0.473)
Age 0.00355 0.00656 0.00384 0.00329
(0.0194) (0.0207) (0.0198) (0.0204)
Years of education 0.0314 0.0499 0.0324 0.0553
(0.0542) (0.0599) (0.0554) (0.0556)
Income>IDR 2 million/month 0.335 0.189 0.340 0.465
(0.688) (0.716) (0.704) (0.732)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur -1.881*** -1.897*** -1.933*** -1.735**
(0.700) (0.699) (0.722) (0.755)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -1.582** -1.353** -1.630** -1.541**
(0.682) (0.667) (0.700) (0.736)
Region lived in 2003: outside Aceh 1.076 1.600 1.101 2.553*
(1.196) (1.250) (1.227) (1.329)
Constant -1.286** -2.009 -2.680* -1.694 -2.815**
(0.652) (1.236) (1.378) (1.280) (1.303)
ln(σˆv
2) 1.777*** 1.278*** 1.410*** 1.336*** 1.259***
(0.422) (0.313) (0.311) (0.318) (0.319)
Observations 816 816 816 816 816
Number of id 204 204 204 204 204
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Region lived was
relative to those who moved to other regions in Aceh in 2003.
166 Chapter 7. The Experiment in Aceh
Table 7.8 displays results regarding selection on age, migration and mismatched
honorifics—ethnicity/gender. There is concern about selection when study participants
are already adults during conflict, and some studies intentionally recruit younger par-
ticipants to address this issue (Islam et al., 2017; Gangadharan et al., 2017). However,
this practice is not universal (see e.g., Bauer et al., 2016; Cassar et al., 2013; Gilligan,
Pasquale, & Samii, 2014; Voors et al., 2012). Nonetheless, when using a sample of partic-
ipants aged younger than 15 in 2000, the results remained relatively unchanged (Model
1).
Next, by excluding those who left Aceh in any years between 2000 and 2005—
something that could not be captured by the ’region lived in 2003’ variable—the results
stayed the same (Model 2). Finally, honorific titles were expected to signal ethnicity
and gender, but there were two Acehnese participants who chose Javanese honorifics
and another one whose preferred honorific did not match with gender. Models 3 and
4 indicated that, even after dropping the observations with mismatched honorifics, the
results remained unchanged.
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Table 7.8: Regression with sample selection (dependent variable: burning decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Javanese partner 0.697* 0.501** 0.499** 0.498**
(0.394) (0.231) (0.230) (0.230)
Conflict experience (injured or killed) -1.130 -0.124 -0.525 -0.524
(1.078) (0.582) (0.632) (0.631)
Female -1.678 -1.302 -1.539 -1.524
(1.449) (0.930) (0.965) (0.967)
Female partner 0.00155 0.121 0.120 0.120
(0.328) (0.212) (0.212) (0.211)
Female × conflict experience 3.375* 2.501** 2.960** 2.942**
(2.019) (1.148) (1.217) (1.216)
Negative belief 1.591** 1.888*** 2.163*** 2.158***
(0.750) (0.526) (0.555) (0.554)
Age 0.204 0.0188 0.0123 0.0121
(0.135) (0.0261) (0.0250) (0.0250)
Years of education 0.114 0.0892 0.0624 0.0618
(0.0894) (0.0612) (0.0627) (0.0628)
Income >IDR 2 million/month 1.482 -0.319 0.395 0.394
(1.335) (0.874) (0.888) (0.887)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur -1.483 -2.149** -2.051** -2.042**
(1.297) (0.971) (0.999) (0.998)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -1.915 -1.305 -1.440 -1.436
(1.462) (0.950) (0.993) (0.991)
Constant -8.764* -3.969** -3.374* -3.363*
(4.644) (1.783) (1.771) (1.769)
ln(σˆv
2) 1.166** 1.401*** 1.467*** 1.465***
(0.493) (0.358) (0.353) (0.353)
Sample Age <15 in
2000
Never
migrate out
of Aceh
Excludes
mismatched
gender
Excludes
mismatched
ethnic &
gender
Observations 304 672 676 672
Number of id 76 168 169 168
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Region lived was
relative to those who moved to other regions in Aceh in 2003. The regression that excluded mismatched
ethnicity gave identical results as in Model 4 because of the overlap in individuals with mismatched
honorifics-gender.
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7.5.2 Alternative Measures of Conflict Experience
This sub-section presents the results when alternative measures of conflict experience
were used. The first was an index based on the intensity of conflict experience. The
war victimisation survey asked about the intensity of conflict experience using a five-
point Likert scale, and participants could answer the survey if they ticked ’yes’ in the
qualifying question (i.e., the eight questions on different dimensions of war victimisation).4
Those who had never experienced any kind of war victimisation during the Aceh conflict
scored zero in intensity.5 Factor analysis was then used to construct this index of conflict
experience for the participants who claimed to have been injured or had their household
members killed. In Table 7.9, Model 1, when the conflict experience index was used, the
estimated parameter for the female × conflict experience index (injured or killed) was
still positive and significant at the 10 per cent level.6
The second measure asked whether either the participants or their household mem-
bers had been injured or killed and, in Model 2, females who were both injured and had
household members killed were still positively associated with more burning, although
the p-value was only 0.115.7 The last two models used a measure of conflict experience
intensity that accounted for all dimension of war victimisation (in Model 3, the data were
included as is; in Model 4, missing values were replaced with the median value of each
type of war experience). In both models, these measures had no significant association
with antisocial behaviour, which indicated that only certain experiences of conflict affect
antisocial decisions.
4A score of 1 indicated that the experience was not affecting at all, while 5 indicated that the experience
was very affecting.
5Some data cleaning was necessary because the surveys were conducted with pen and paper, and some
participants answered the intensity questions even if they had ticked ’no’ in the qualifying question, and
vice versa (i.e., not everyone who ticked ’yes’ answered the questions on intensity). Missing values were
assigned to those who ticked ’yes’ but did not answer the intensity question.
6The estimated parameter for this measure was now negative and significant, which indicated that an
intense experience of conflict reduced antisocial behaviour. However, this finding was likely due to the
loss of observations from those who did not answer questions on war victimisation intensity, despite the
claim that they had experienced conflict.
7This measure was also used in Cassar et al. (2013).
7.5. Robustness Checks 169
Table 7.9: Alternative measures of conflict experience (dependent variable: burning deci-
sion)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Javanese partner 0.518* 0.495** 0.391 0.495**
(0.286) (0.230) (0.286) (0.230)
Female -0.835 -0.171 -0.634 0.206
(0.704) (0.543) (0.724) (0.463)
Female partner 0.207 0.119 0.168 0.119
(0.272) (0.211) (0.290) (0.211)
Conflict experience index (injured or killed) -0.480*
(0.275)
Female × conflict experience index (injured or killed) 1.055*
(0.592)
Conflict experience (injured and killed) -1.040
(0.708)
Female × conflict experience (injured and killed) 1.665
(1.057)
Conflict experience index (all) -0.0449
(0.144)
Female × conflict experience index (all) 0.136
(0.353)
Conflict experience intensity (all; median) 0.101
(0.148)
Female × conflict experience intensity (all; median) 0.0876
(0.221)
Negative belief 2.410*** 2.230*** 2.191*** 2.151***
(0.730) (0.540) (0.709) (0.526)
Age -0.0239 0.0216 -0.0214 0.0229
(0.0288) (0.0266) (0.0301) (0.0262)
Years of education 0.0302 0.0740 0.0198 0.0947
(0.0779) (0.0697) (0.0903) (0.0701)
Income >IDR 2 million/month 1.122 0.356 0.843 0.112
(0.950) (0.856) (0.914) (0.845)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur -1.951* -2.137** -2.044* -1.929**
(1.130) (0.989) (1.239) (0.969)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -1.516 -1.238 -1.390 -1.088
(1.128) (0.948) (1.216) (0.947)
Constant -2.290 -4.086** -2.149 -4.725***
(1.947) (1.885) (2.034) (1.819)
ln(σˆv
2) 1.579*** 1.555*** 1.705*** 1.584***
(0.386) (0.355) (0.402) (0.348)
Observations 596 680 520 680
Number of id 149 170 130 170
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Region lived was
relative to those who moved to other regions in Aceh in 2003.
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7.5.3 Artefact Effects and Personal Attitudes
It was possible that the gendered experience of conflict associated with behaviour was only
an artefact. However, interacting conflict experience with other variables (co-participants’
ethnicity, age, negative beliefs, education and income) did not indicate any significant
correlation with antisocial decisions, as shown in Table A.11 (to conserve space, regression
tables of this sub-section are placed in the appendix). Only female partner × conflict
experience was somehow negatively related with burning behaviour at the 10 per cent
level. This implies that females were less targeted by those who had experienced conflict.
Personal attitudes and beliefs may potentially explain antisocial behaviour. In past
experiments, religiosity and Machiavellianism have been found to be positively associ-
ated with antisocial behaviour (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4). However, unlike this thesis,
these studies were not designed to understand cross-cultural interactions; hence, a money-
burning decision generally indicated an antisocial preference towards general members of
the population. In the Melbourne experiment, females who burnt money tended to have
a higher score of anger than did males. In addition, as shown in Table 7.5, Section 7.4.2,
antisocial behaviour was vary by gender and some personal attitudes and beliefs.
As displayed in Table A.12, antisocial behaviour was not strongly associated with
religiosity, religious fundamentalism, Machiavellianism or aggression.8 This finding was as
expected given the absence of strong correlations of these variables with money-burning
decision as shown in Section 7.4.2 above, although it was different from findings in Mel-
bourne where religiosity was positively associated with spite.9 Only SVO that can pre-
dict spiteful behaviour where individualist and competitive participants tend to be more
antisocial relative to those with prosocial orientation. Some of the attitudes were multidi-
mensional, and Table A.13 displays the regressions that included each of the dimensions.
Consequential religiosity was negatively correlated with antisocial behaviour in Aceh.
From the four dimensions of aggression, physical aggression was negatively related with
antisocial behaviour, yet it is unclear why the effect had an unexpected direction.
8It should be noted that many participants did not complete the questionnaires, which resulted in a
significantly lower number of observations, except regarding SVO.
9This difference might be driven by the different demographics as results from the Wilcoxon rank-sum
test for religiosity was not significantly different between the two sample.
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Finally, Table A.14 displays the regressions that include the interaction between
gender and variables found to affect money-burning differently by gender (religious fun-
damentalism, Machiavellianism, anger and physical aggression).10 Religious fundamental-
ism was negatively associated with money-burning, but female with high score of religious
fundamentalism tended to burn more (Column 1). There were no effects of Machiavel-
lianism and anger, both directly and indirectly (through gender), on antisocial behaviour
(Columns 2 and 3); but female with high score of physical aggression tended to behave
less antisocially (Column 4). Importantly, the main results (the significant coefficients of
Javanese partner and female × conflict experience) remained unchanged.
7.6 Aceh and Melbourne Data Comparison
The previous two sections (Sections 7.4 and 7.5) focus on results from the Aceh experi-
ment. This section presents a deeper comparison of data from both Melbourne and Aceh,
both at the individual and session-level.
The analysis of the Melbourne and Aceh experiments was conducted separately
because of the (expected) differences in the demographics of the participants as indicated
in Table 7.10. In particular, Melbourne participants were expected to have higher levels
of education and younger age profiles, as well as a more fractionalised ethnic groups.
This conjecture was confirmed in Table 7.11 that displays the mean comparison test
between participants in Melbourne and Aceh.11 It is apparent that demographics and
some personal attitudes and beliefs were significantly different. Some of the demographics
that were very different are age (7 years difference on average), share of Javanese (38
percentage points difference) and education (5 years difference). Further, the number of
observations on personal attitudes and beliefs varied highly in Aceh, from 204 (prosocial
orientation) to just 136 (religiosity). This contrasts the Melbourne data, where all 127
participants answered questions regarding personal attitudes and beliefs. Together, these
justified the decision of not pooling data from the two experiments.
10Even though significant in Table 7.5, some dimensions of religiosity were excluded because they were
potentially confounded with conflict experience.
11The result is very similar when the Wilcoxon rank-sum test was used instead.
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Table 7.10: Qualitative sample differences
Demographic characteristics Melbourne Aceh
Residency Expatriate Local
Ethnic group
- Largest Javanese Acehnese
- Second largest Sundanese Javanese
Occupational status (Postgraduate) student Working
Table 7.11: Mean comparison of demographics, personal attitudes and beliefs
Variable Obs. (Aceh) Mean (Aceh) Obs. (Melb.) Mean (Melb.) Mean Diff.
Age 204 38.42 127 31.75 6.67***
Female 204 0.34 127 0.46 -0.12**
Javanese 204 0.13 127 0.50 -0.38***
Married 204 0.74 127 0.63 0.11**
Years of education 204 11.01 126 15.97 -4.95***
Negative belief 204 0.33 127 0.20 0.13***
Prosocial 204 0.65 127 0.87 -0.23***
Religiosity 136 35.96 127 35.50 0.46
Relig. fundamentalism 137 27.82 127 19.83 7.98***
Aggression 143 71.45 127 67.53 3.92**
Mach-IV 160 47.26 127 44.43 2.82***
Aggression: anger 179 16.20 127 16.37 -0.17
Aggression: hostility 175 21.13 127 20.70 0.42
Aggression: physical 161 23.26 127 19.93 3.33***
Aggression: verbal 185 10.81 127 10.53 0.28
Religiosity: ritual 149 8.72 127 8.64 0.09
Religiosity: consequential 185 8.85 127 8.77 0.08
Religiosity: ideological 175 9.23 127 9.49 -0.25*
Religiosity: experiential 191 9.09 127 8.60 0.49***
Notes: Mean difference (Aceh − Melb.) t-test with unequal variances.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
Figure 7.4 depicts the effect size to better visualise the difference in personal atti-
tudes and beliefs. Despite the statistical difference in the mean of some of the variables
(see the last column in Table 7.11), only physical aggression had a medium to large effect
size. However, this relatively large difference was not strongly associated with money-
burning decisions in both Melbourne and Aceh. In Aceh, those who burnt money tended
to have a slightly higher score of physical aggression, but the difference was not statisti-
cally significant (p-value = 0.27). In Melbourne, the difference was even smaller (p-value
= 0.81).
The previous paragraphs in this section focus on the analysis of individual-level data.
Next, the analysis was broadened by aggregating data at the session level. The secondary
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Figure 7.4: Effect size of personal attitudes and beliefs
Notes: Each horizontal red line represents the upper and lower bounds for Cohen’s d. Absolute values
around 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 suggest small, medium and large effect sizes, respectively. Positive values indicate
higher mean in Aceh relative to Melbourne.
data analysis in Chapter 4 suggested that cultural diversity has an association with the
intensity of violence. This finding could be extended to determine how the variable is cor-
related with money-burning decisions, as the experiment captured individuals negative
behaviour, which is often embedded in violent conflict. To achieve this, experimental data
from both Melbourne and Aceh were merged with session-level cultural diversity. Stan-
dard measures of cultural diversity (ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation; EFI and
EPOI) were used because the demographic questionnaire only asked about participants’
ethnicity, and not their language.
At the aggregated (session) level, there was a positive correlation between cultural
diversity and antisocial behaviour in Aceh, but with a wide confidence interval, as depicted
in Figure 7.5. This finding implies a relatively higher incidence of money burning in vil-
lages where Acehnese was not the dominant ethnic group (as sessions with high cultural
diversity had a significant number of non-Acehnese participants). The (steeper) slope
from the Melbourne data could not be interpreted in a similar fashion because Aceh’s
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Figure 7.5: Scatter diagram of EFI and mean burn rate at session level
EFIs reflected the villages’ cultural diversity, which was not the case for Melbourne (as
participants could come from any suburb in the region). In addition, EFIs from Mel-
bourne were always larger than Aceh, which indicates the culturally diverse participants
attending the sessions held in Melbourne.
This observation was confirmed in the individual-level regressions using Aceh data,
where, in the simplest model (Model 1, Table 7.12) EFI positively predicted money-
burning decisions. This result held when more variables were controlled (Model 2), in-
cluding the interaction between gender and conflict experience. However, the addition of
negative belief and demographics altered the result and the variable became insignificant
(Model 3). Using EPOI instead of EFI generated a similar result and there was no
non-linear association observed from the data (results not shown).
Despite the relatively consistent finding of the negative effect of cultural diversity
on antisocial behaviour, this simple exercise could not be generalised beyond the sample
because of the small number of experimental sessions and the assumption that the ethnic
composition in the sessions reflected the actual composition in the villages. Therefore,
this finding should only be seen as indicative of the way in which cultural diversity that
captures ethnic grievances is associated with individuals’ antisocial behaviour.
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Table 7.12: Regressions on cultural diversity and antisocial behaviour (dependent variable:
burning decision)
(1) (2) (3)
EFI 2.950* 3.109** 2.058
(1.623) (1.407) (1.434)
Javanese partner 0.241 0.222 0.224
(0.221) (0.197) (0.194)
Female partner 0.117 0.108 0.111
(0.199) (0.182) (0.180)
Conflict experience (injured or killed) -0.255 -0.289
(0.429) (0.458)
Female -1.806** -1.656*
(0.747) (0.860)
Female × conflict experience 2.834*** 2.693***
(0.920) (1.015)
Negative belief 2.179***
(0.464)
Age 0.00357
(0.0197)
Years of education 0.0103
(0.0567)
Income >IDR 2 million/month -0.0488
(0.655)
ln(σˆv
2) 2.616 1.840*** 1.472***
(2.245) (0.458) (0.330)
Constant -4.666 -3.122*** -3.804***
(4.216) (0.670) (1.201)
Observations 816 816 816
Number of id 204 204 204
Notes: Panel probit regressions with random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p <
0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. All observations included. Acehnese dummy variable was excluded
because it was highly correlated with EFI.
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the results from the Aceh experiment, where 25 per cent of the
participants made the money-burning decision. This burn rate was comparatively larger
than in the Melbourne study; but because of the different demographics, participants’
experience of conflict may not necessarily explain this finding. Further, although most
of the participants were Acehnese, they were less likely to burn money than were non-
Acehnese (particularly Javanese) participants.
The main result of this study is that, while the Acehnese were less likely to behave
antisocially, they tended to be more antisocial when they made decisions against non-
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Acehnese, hence answering the first research question. This parochial behaviour was
not particularly surprising, given the history of the conflict, but it is dismaying because
the region has been experiencing relative peace for the past 14 years. Nonetheless, the
strained inter-ethnic relationship is not a new issue in post-conflict Aceh, yet is poorly
covered by both the media and the research community (Ansori, 2012; Miller, 2008). It
is also important to note that the strained relationship is not only between Acehnese and
Javanese, but also with other minority groups in Aceh.
The Aceh study elicited participants’ (self-reported) conflict experience, where 50
per cent of the participants claimed to have experienced conflict. However, a regression
analysis could not find variables that have consistent associations with conflict experience,
except regarding income, yet only weakly. Income was positively associated with conflict
experience at 10 per cent level, but the variable did not significantly predict antisocial
decision. In addition, there was a positive association between consequential religiosity
and conflict experience, which was similar to a recent study (Henrich et al., 2019). This
result indicates the tendency of participants who experienced conflict to believe that
religion plays an influential part on their lives.
This study also found that antisocial behaviour was moderated by differential gender
experiences during the conflict. Acehnese women were socially active during the insur-
gency and took over the social roles of men. Some were even directly engaged in combat.
However, they were marginalised in the aftermath of the conflict and, in a patriarchal
society such as Aceh (and Indonesia in general), the return of men from war meant that
the women were forced to return to their traditional roles as housewives and followers.
In fact, women were more likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder than men
in post-conflict Aceh (Grayman et al., 2009). These factors eventually led to grievances
that were likely to drive the higher number of burning decisions made by women, relative
to men, who experienced conflict.
This finding also answered the second research question on the antecedents of antiso-
cial behaviour. Personal attitudes did not seem to be an important factor that predicted
spite. Only consequential religiosity and physical aggression were negatively associated
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with money burning. However, this result might be biased by the strong correlation
between consequential religiosity and conflict experience. In addition, there was an indi-
cation that some dimensions of personal attitudes and belief (religious fundamentalism
and physical aggression) affected antisocial behaviour differently by gender.
A comparison between Melbourne and Aceh data confirms the very different demo-
graphics of the participants, particularly regarding age, education and ethnic composition,
which justified the decision of analysing the two data independently. In addition, some
personal attitudes and beliefs were different, although only physical aggression that had
large effect size. This large difference in physical aggression manifested slightly in the
Aceh participants who made the antisocial decision, but the difference in the money-
burning was not statistically significant. Finally, session-level cultural diversity was also
positively associated with antisocial behaviour, yet only weakly.
The policy implication of this study spans two ways. First, the slow progress in the
implementation of policies that ensure long-term peace is aggravated by the finding on
ethnic discrimination in this study. In light of the Law No. 11/2006 on Governance of Aceh
that states that each ethnic group must be treated equally in political, economic, social
and cultural matters, the governments should facilitate policies that would help restore the
strained inter-ethnic relationship. Second, the different antisocial behaviour by conflict
experience and gender was consistent with the history of the Aceh conflict. In addition,
conflict settlement and reconciliation processes in post-conflict regions have devoted little
attention to the differential experiences and needs of women, who, as a group, have not
been represented (Lee-Koo, 2012). This implores the need for the empowerment of females
in post-conflict process. Together, the policy implication of this study is that institutions
could better ameliorate the effects of conflict by explicitly addressing gendered experiences
and grievances, in addition to the inter-ethnic reconciliation policy that is usually a part
of such processes.
Part IV
Discussion
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Chapter 8
Discussion and Policy
Recommendations
This final part summarises the thesis, elaborates the contributions and policy lessons of
the research, and discusses the study limitations and directions for future research.
8.1 Introduction
This thesis is the first study on the antecedents and consequences of conflict in Indonesia.
A brief account on the history of conflict was presented, as the literature has identified
three main factors that contribute to violent conflict: institutional arrangements of the
security force, economic motives and ethnic grievances. Regarding the latter, the Aceh
insurgency was marked by controversial anti-Javanese sentiment, which led to large outmi-
gration. In recent years, there have been indications of detrimental inter-ethnic relations
in the region. In addition, the Aceh conflict was marked by the exclusion of women from
the peace process—despite their role and experience during the conflict—which may have
affected their behaviour.
The empirical investigations examined the antecedents of violence using secondary
data analysis, and the consequences of conflict experience using lab-in-the-field experi-
ments. A survey of cross-country and country studies was conducted to gain insights to
the possible factors that contribute to violence in post-conflict Indonesia. A review of the
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literature on antisocial behaviour and a meta-analysis provided the necessary theoretical
and empirical guides for the experiments. An antisocial behaviour experiment was used,
as the observed behaviour reflected the dark side of actual conflict.
The main experiment focused on eliciting antisocial behaviour in Aceh. The Aceh
conflict was characterised by the persecution of ethnic Javanese, and the experiment was
designed to capture out-group discrimination based on ethnicity and gender. Prior to the
Aceh study, another experiment was conducted with Indonesian citizens in Melbourne,
Australia, to observe behaviour in a community with no conflict background and to iden-
tify the antecedents of such behaviour. This experiment was also conducted to identify
potential implementation problems and pitfalls that could affect the fieldwork in Aceh.
Meanwhile, the secondary data analysis was conducted using the most comprehen-
sive data on violence in the country. The study complemented the micro experimental
analysis on the effect of violence on behaviour by identifying the general, macro factors
affecting violence intensity during a period in which the country enjoys relative peace.
The remainder of this chapter only consists of two sections, Sections 8.2 and 8.3,
which summarise the analysis on the antecedents and consequences of violence, respec-
tively. In each section, the main empirical findings are discussed alongside the research
contributions, policy implications, limitations and suggested directions for future research.
8.2 Summary of the Antecedents of Violence
8.2.1 Main Findings
The secondary data analysis revealed an inverted-U relationship between the intensity of
violence with cultural diversity during a period in which the country enjoys relative peace.
This association was also observed across the different measures of cultural diversity, with
and without accounting for ethnolinguistic similarities. Nonetheless, most of the districts
lay in the increasing region, thereby suggesting a positive association between cultural
diversity and violence. These findings were robust to different measures of violence, the
inclusion of relevant explanatory variables and the use of instrumental variable method.
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However, the non-linear association was sensitive to regional fixed effects, where in-
come inequality became a significant factor that contributed to the intensity of violence.
In addition, when a lagged dependent variable was included, the significance of cultural
diversity disappeared. The study also found three variables that were negatively associ-
ated with the intensity of violence: the size of the economy, the number of worship places
(a proxy for religious institution) and the share of Javanese (a proxy for the transmigra-
tion program). However, more work is needed to identify the mechanism that drives this
association.
8.2.2 Contributions
The analysis contributes to the economics of conflict literature by providing new in-
sights regarding the association between cultural diversity and the intensity of violence in
post-conflict Indonesia, even after accounting for ethnolinguistic similarities. The curvi-
linear relationship aligns with the seminal work of Horowitz (1985), which suggested a
non-monotonic association between ethnic groups and conflict, and was the first to be
observed at country level (for a cross-country study, see Mason et al., 2011). The finding
that cultural diversity matters is consistent with previous studies that found a positive re-
lationship between violence and fractionalisation (Pierskalla & Sacks, 2017; Tajima, 2013).
It also provides an identification strategy by using the out-of-Taiwan and out-of-Africa
hypotheses to explain the variations in cultural diversity.
The study indicated that the Esteban and Ray (2011) model of conflict cannot fully
explain the intensity of violence. The model was used with cross-country data, where
the coefficients for both F and P were positive and significant (Esteban et al., 2012),
yet only the latter was confirmed with the Indonesian data. The study also highlighted
the potentially damaging effect of income inequality, which is similar to the finding in a
previous study (Indra et al., 2019). However, the current study findings suggested that
the association between the intensity of violence and income inequality was subject to
regional variations.
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8.2.3 Policy Implications
The findings of this research have the following policy implications. The finding regarding
the role of cultural diversity is linked with Indonesian policies, such as Law No. 5/2017 on
Cultural Advancement, which, while considering cultural diversity as the nations wealth
and identity, must also adhere to the principle of tolerance. Specifically, some aspects
of cultural diversity are prioritised in the 2019 Government Work Plan through social
conflict management activities, which include conflict prevention, conflict termination
and post-conflict rehabilitation. The programs include the establishment of national and
sub-national action plans, inter-religious dialogues, community empowerment in 250 vul-
nerable locations and land-related conflict resolution. However, the implementation of
social conflict management action plans varies by location. For example, in Aceh, Jakarta
and the Special Region of Yogyakarta, the only relevant planned actions are socialisation
events and dialogues on religious tolerance. Meanwhile, in East Java and Lampung, the
protection of women and children from social conflicts has become the focus. Addition-
ally, there are formal institutions, such as the regional leader coordination forums, that
cooperate in addressing conflict and violence at local levels.
Given that existing laws and formal institutions are already in place, new poli-
cies should be aimed at incorporating cultural diversity into relevant programs, while
encouraging intercultural dialogues. For example, in the context of religious education,
an innovative proposal for teaching a multiculturalist theology has been envisaged to
promote the positive value of diversity (Baidhawy, 2007). Considering such innovations
within the context of this research highlights the need for governments (both central and
sub-national) and communities to carefully account for the issue of cultural diversity in
their decision-making processes. This has occurred via the regional leader coordination
forums—consisting of local executive, legislative, police, judiciary and military leaders—
which actively engaged in pre-emptive measures prior to the recent local and national
elections. Nonetheless, challenges remain in promoting the issue nationally, as Law No.
23/2014 on Regional Governance mandates cultural affairs to be managed by sub-national
governments, while retaining security affairs as the responsibility of the central govern-
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ment.
Finally, the rising inequality should not be considered lightly, as evidenced by the
secondary data analysis. The existing fiscal policy is argued to be neutral in its effect on
income inequality, and spending should be aimed at programs with strong effects such
as conditional cash transfer for the poor(World Bank, 2016). More importantly, basic
provision of services should be improved in the education and health sectors, as they are
argued to have high economic returns for the poor.
8.2.4 Limitations
This analysis included some limitations, as follows. First, the empirical model was not ex-
plicitly derived from a mathematical model of conflict. This approach was selected for two
reasons. First, existing studies could readily provide the theoretical basis. Thus, rather
than building a formal theoretical model from the ground up, this thesis focused on using
relevant research—both qualitative and quantitative—to guide the empirical model. Sec-
ond, most economics of conflict theories are based on rational agents maximising payoff,
and the empirical models use large datasets of cross-country observations. Such rational
economics models may not be relevant if the outcome of interest is small-scale violence,
as the cost of mobilising people would be too high given the (small) prize. In addition,
in post-conflict Indonesia, models with representative agents may not be relevant, as
the eruptions of small-scale violence do not rely on elites or state actors (Barron, 2019).
Therefore, although model building is a very important research agenda in the field, it
was not the objective of this thesis.
Second, there was a time gap in the data analysis between the main explanatory
variable (cultural diversity), taken from the 2010 population census, and the violence
data (2014). This was unavoidable because the census is decennial, while the violence
data covered all provinces only in 2014. Although the curvilinear relationship was still
observed when using 2010 data, the number of observations was severely reduced to
only around 154 districts (31 per cent of the 2014 data). The panel data analysis also
assumed a relatively unchanged population distribution. Therefore, the findings should
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be interpreted with caution. In addition, the NVMS is no longer collecting data, which
made it impossible to extend the analysis to any year beyond 2014.
8.2.5 Suggested Directions for Future Research
Developments in the literature influenced this research as it progressed. This sub-section
reflects on the research process, which, in conjunction with the research limitations, opens
the opportunity for future research.
A number of qualitative studies suggest that one of the main sources of violence
is related to an institutional factor regarding the military. However, this issue was not
directly considered in the thesis, since the last major military reforms happened more than
a decade ago, in 2004, whereas this thesis was concerned with small-scale violence, which
has been argued elsewhere to be unrelated to support from local or central elites. There
is also already a study tackling this issue in the context of communal violence during
the transition era (Tajima, 2013). Nonetheless, whether institutional arrangements of the
military are associated with conflict remains a valid and interesting question that merits
future research.
The secondary data analysis used data from the NVMS, which is no longer updated,
since 2015 onwards. In the future, the findings from this study can be compared when
violence data are extracted from other sources, such as the village census. Other data
(e.g., GDELT, 2018; ICEWS, 2018) can also be used for cross-country comparisons.
All the literature reviewed in this thesis focused on finding conflict determinants, yet
one promising future research area is the use of machine learning techniques to predict
conflict. To date, there has been one study on conflict prediction in Indonesia (and
Colombia as a comparison) using sub-national level data from the NVMS and Podes
(Bazzi, Blair, et al., 2019). In the future, big-data, such as from GDELT (2018), would
provide richer data at even more disaggregated levels that could be used to predict conflict.
The effect of cultural diversity could also be investigated at the individual level
using experimental method. For example, cultural diversity has been found to affect
public goods contributions, conditional on the levels of group conflict (Espinosa, Fata´s,
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& Ubeda, 2019). Such study would improve understandings of the cultural drivers of
conflict, which would not be attainable using observational data.
8.3 Summary of the Behavioural Consequences of
Violence
8.3.1 Main Findings
The macro analysis (antecedents of violence) using secondary data was complemented
with the micro analysis using a novel lab-in-the-field antisocial experimental game. Two
experiments were conducted in Melbourne and Aceh using a modified version of the JoD
minigame (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011).
Data from the Melbourne experiment indicated that, overall, one in four participants
were willing to behave antisocially. However, the inclusion of the computer co-participant
made the observed antisocial behaviour against the human co-participant small in com-
parison. The burn rate against the former (20 per cent) was more than three times that
against the latter (six per cent). As a result of this unexpected finding, as well as the
absence of upset participants, the computer was removed in the Aceh experiment.
Nonetheless, the study supported past findings on the predictive power of negative
beliefs on antisocial behaviour and the tendency of students to behave more rationally
than non-students (i.e., less likely to burn money). There were also gender effects, with
females burning less than males (when decisions against the computer were excluded), and
with female participants with a high score of anger tending to behave more antisocially.
Finally, the Melbourne data did not indicate discrimination against those of different
ethnicity or gender and, together with the low burn rate, suggested a relatively harmonious
relationship among Indonesian migrants in Australia.
The lab-in-the-field experiment in Aceh indicated a similar burn rate as in Mel-
bourne, with one in four participants choosing money burning. However, this rate was
actually higher, given that there was no computer co-participant in Aceh. The data indi-
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cated discrimination against ethnic out-group members, yet the more important finding
was the higher antisocial behaviour of females who had experienced conflict. This last
finding was robust to different measures of conflict experience and potential selection
problems. Negative beliefs also predicted antisocial behaviour, which was consistent with
past studies and the Melbourne experiment.
8.3.2 Contributions
These experiments contribute to the antisocial behaviour literature on several grounds.
The higher payoff-destruction against the computer co-participant in the Melbourne ex-
periment signalled individuals differential behaviour when facing a machine. Although the
inclusion of computers as random decision makers in antisocial behaviour experiments is
not new (see e.g., Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009; Alma˚s et al., 2019), most studies did not allow
participants to make decisions against them. While this finding is not conclusive, it opens
a new area for further research.
The experiments ability to discriminate by ethnicity and gender adds to the anti-
social behaviour literature, which often ignores these roles. There was robust evidence of
antisocial behaviour aimed at ethnic out-group members in the Aceh experiment. This
was unsurprising given the history of conflict. However, the fact that parochialism re-
mains after more than 10 years of peace suggests that existing policy interventions, if any,
are not so effective in bringing together the different ethnic groups. This finding adds to
the economics of conflict literature, with a previous study finding that the participants
exhibited lower prosociality when their co-participants cultural identity was revealed and
when memories of the 1999 to 2000 conflict in Ambon, Indonesia, were activated (Werner
& Lambsdorff, 2019). It also presents a similar story to another study that observed
worsened trust in polarised societies (Waldmann, 2003).
Meanwhile, the finding that women who experienced the Aceh conflict behaved more
antisocially than men implies that conflict experience is perceived differently by gender.
This finding is supported by the 2006 survey, which indicated that 21 and 17 per cent
of the women and men in Aceh suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, respectively
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(Grayman et al., 2009). It also aligns with studies in other post-conflict regions that found
that women suffer greater physical (Ghobarah et al., 2003; Plu¨mper & Neumayer, 2006)
and mental (Kimhi, Eshel, Zysberg, & Hantman, 2010; Kimhi & Shamai, 2006) health
harm, including post-traumatic stress disorder. This differential traumatic experience
might be driven by the gender-based violence used as a war tactic (Strachan & Haider,
2015). Moreover, no women were included in the reintegration compensation list of 3,000
ex-combatants. Together, these issues seem to have influenced the antisocial behaviour
among the Aceh participants.
The fact that, in the Melbourne experiment, females that chose to burn money
tended to have higher score of anger than did males implies the different perception of
anger by gender. This might be explained by the psychology literature, which hypothesises
that, while men view anger as seizing control, women view anger as a loss of control (Astin
et al., 2003; Litvak et al., 2010). Anger was also central to the analysis of Zeitzoff (2014)
who found a combined effect of violence exposure and anger on antisocial behaviour,
although the author did not specifically discuss gender difference.
Finally, some findings confirmed the general results from other relevant studies. For
example, negative belief as a strong predictor of spiteful behaviour was also found in past
studies (Abbink & Herrmann, 2011; Prediger et al., 2014). In addition, the tendency
of students to behave more rationally and selfishly than non-students (Belot, Duch, &
Miller, 2015) was confirmed in the Melbourne data, where students were less likely to
burn money.
8.3.3 Policy Implications
The Melbourne experiment indicated the relative harmony among Indonesian migrants,
which supports the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia. In addition, the pos-
itive association between student status and lower antisocial behaviour provides support
for the promotion of higher education, especially for overseas students.
The results from the Aceh experiment will assist the local government in under-
standing the current dynamics of the intercommunity relationship in at least two ways.
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First, the study suggests that the long-term effect of past inter-ethnic tension on cur-
rent behaviour has not yet become the focus of current administrations. The finding on
ethnic discrimination agrees with qualitative studies that indicated strained inter-ethnic
relationships in Aceh. Together, these findings are of policy relevance, since Article 211
of Law No. 11/2006 on the Governance of Aceh stipulates the governments (national and
sub-national) should not only recognising the various ethnic groups, but also protecting
and respecting ethnic diversity in Aceh. The law also states each ethnic group must be
treated equally in political, economic, social and cultural matters. Therefore, the gov-
ernments should devote more attention to policies that would help restore the strained
relationship. This could be achieved, for example, by facilitating intercultural dialogues
and programs that would bring people from all ethnic groups together.
Second, the different conflict experiences of females, which was reflected in their
behaviour, were consistent with Acehs experience, in which women were side-lined during
the peace process despite their involvement during the conflict. This signifies the need
to push for the increased involvement of females in post-conflict resolution and the peace
process, given that they, as a group, have suffered as much as, if not more than, their
male counterparts. This finding also offers lessons for other post-conflict regions, where
gender issues can be better addressed during the resolution and reconciliation process.
8.3.4 Limitations
The number of antisocial behaviour experiments was very low at the beginning of this
research in 2016. Consequently, there was limited information that could be used to
predict behaviour, apart from the meta-analysis (which was relatively simple because of
the small number of observations and lack of data on standard deviations). This effectively
reduced the meta-analysis to using only simple OLS regressions to find the correlations
between the burn rate and a few experimental characteristics. Together with the small
sample size, the meta-analysis could only be used as a rough guide in identifying the
factors that may explain variations in the burn rate.
The data from the Melbourne experiment could not be compared directly with the
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Aceh data, given the very different population and the computerised co-participant in the
former experiment. In addition, with only 127 observations, the sample size was fairly
small, which rendered it difficult to conduct a reliable analysis by ethnicity (except by
simply comparing Javanese with non-Javanese) or of those who only burnt their human
co-participants money.
Given the limited resources, the Aceh experiment was conducted only in two districts
(out of 23 districts/municipalities in Aceh), which limits the generalisation of the results
to the whole region. The size of the non-Acehnese sample (particularly Javanese) was also
relatively small, which rendered the side-by-side comparison with the Acehnese sample
less reliable. Nevertheless, the proportion of Javanese in the sample was larger than that
in the population (12.7 versus 8.9 per cent, respectively).
Finally, the design of the experiment was country-specific which could not be reliably
implemented with non-Indonesian participants. The results, therefore, only reflected the
dynamics of inter-ethnic relationships within Indonesian communities.
8.3.5 Suggested Directions for Future Research
The Melbourne experiment observed interactions among Indonesians, which was useful
to understand within-community cohesion. An experiment that enabled interactions be-
tween migrants and the host communities would have direct policy relevance that would
complement this study.
The unexpected findings regarding decisions against the computer in the Melbourne
experiment create the opportunity for further research to identify the driving factors.
For example, participants may act impulsively, dislike computers or be curious about
computers making human decisions. This research would also fall within the general
experimental study on humanmachine interactions (M. T. P. Adam, Teubner, & Gimpel,
2018; Gogoll & Uhl, 2018).
The use of the aggression questionnaire to reveal anger limited the interpretation
of the finding that angers interaction with gender drives antisocial behaviour. Therefore,
this study could be advanced, for example, by using priming method to evoke anger (or
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other emotions) (Zeitzoff, 2014).
The Aceh study was a cross-cultural, antisocial experiment designed to capture out-
group biases stemming from specific historical instances. It was not meant to test the
accuracy of the Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) JoD utility function. In addition, an antisocial
experiment that captured inter-group conflict (e.g., Abbink & Dog˘an, 2018) would provide
further evidence on antisocial behaviour at the group level.
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Table A.1: Selected cross-country studies on conflict antecedents
Source Coverage Dependent variable Cultural diversity and institutional regressors Main findings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Easterly (2001) 1960-1990 (321
country-years)
War casualties per
capita, genocide
dummy
ELF (data from ANM), institutional quality
index, political rights
Quality of institution cancelled out the effect of
ethnic diversity in explaining war casualties and
genocide.
Elbadawi and
Sambanis
(2002)
1960-1999
(750 five-year-
countries)
Dummy civil war
prevalence (onset
and/or continuation)
ELF (ANM), squared ELF, ethnic domi-
nance (Vanhanen, 1999), ethnic heterogene-
ity, Polity, squared Polity
Low income was associated with higher proba-
bility of conflict. Institutional quality and ELF
had no direct effect on civil war prevalence.
Probability of civil war was higher in countries
with both low level of democracy and ethnic het-
erogeneity.
Fearon and
Laitin (2003)
1945-1999 (6,610
country-years)
Dummy violent civil
conflict
ELF, share of population belonging to the
largest ethnic group, number of distinct lan-
guages spoken by groups exceeding 1 per cent
of the population, democracy (Polity IV)
Income was a strong predictor of civil con-
flict. Ethnic heterogeneity did not explain con-
flict. Past (1950s) conflicts contributed to recent
(1990s) civil conflicts. Democracy had no effect
in predicting civil conflict.
Collier and Ho-
effler (2004)
1960-1999
(750 five-year-
countries)
Dummy civil war (in-
ternal conflict with at
least 1,000 casualties)
ELF (ANM), religious fractionalisation, eth-
nic polarisation, ethnic dominance, political
repression (Polity III), political openness
Greed factors (income) predicted the probability
of civil war occurrence better than did grievance
factors (e.g., ethnic diversity). The openness of
political institutions was associated with a lower
probability of conflict.
Fearon (2004) 1945-1999 Duration of civil war
(years)
Ethnic fractionalisation, democracy (Polity
IV)
Ethnic fractionalisation did not affect duration
of wars, but wars between dominant and inva-
sive ethnic groups and peripheral ethnic groups
tended to last longer. Democracy had no effect
in predicting civil conflict.
Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol
(2005)
1960-1999 in 138
countries
Dummy civil war
(UCDP/PRIO)
ELF, ethnic polarisation, religious fractional-
isation, religious polarisation, democracy
In predicting civil war onset, ethnic and religious
polarisation captured ethnic heterogeneity bet-
ter than did ELF. No effect of democracy.
Cederman and
Girardin (2007)
1945-1999 in
Eurasian and
North African
countries
Dummy dyadic ethnic
conflict (conflict with at
least 25 people killed;
UCDP/PRIO)
Ethnic and religious fractionalisation, ethnic
exclusion index, democracy (Polity IV)
Countries with a higher degree of ethnonational-
ist configuration had a higher likelihood to have
conflict. The probability of ethnic conflict was
negatively associated with income. Democracy
was positively correlated with civil war onset.
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Source Coverage Dependent variable Cultural diversity and institutional regressors Main findings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fearon et al.
(2007)
1945-1999 in
Eurasian and
North African
countries; 1945-
1999 in 161
countries
Civil war onset Ethnic fractionalisation, democracy, minority
rule (by ethnic group in power or by head of
state)
The study was a response to Cederman and Gi-
rardin (2007) study. Countries led by minor-
ity ethnic groups were only slightly more likely
to encounter civil wars, but this was subject to
the very low numbers of minority-ruled coun-
tries that experienced civil wars.
Buhaug et al.
(2008)
1946-1999 in
Eurasia and
North Africa
(33,882 geo-
referenced poly-
gons)
Dummy dyadic ethnic
conflict (conflict with at
least 25 people killed;
UCDP/PRIO)
Demographic balance, democracy (Polity IV) The probability of ethnic conflict was positively
associated with the peripheral groups relative
size, distance from the capital and democracy.
Prolonged peaceful years were associated with
lower ethnic conflict occurrence.
Weidmann,
Rød, and Ced-
erman (2010)
1946-1989 (8,969
geo-referenced
polygons)
Dummy dyadic ethnic
conflict (conflict with at
least 25 people killed;
UCDP/PRIO)
Power balance Ethnic groups with high power balance were
more likely to engage in conflict with the gov-
ernment.
Mason et al.
(2011)
1945-1999 (1,174
peace-years)
Duration of peace after
civil war
Ethnic fractionalisation, squared ethnic frac-
tionalisation, Polity IV, squared Polity IV
There was a time-varying effect of past con-
flict outcomes and a non-linear effect of eth-
nic fractionalisation on peace duration. Limited
support for the role of democracy in sustained
peace.
Desmet et al.
(2012)
1945-1999 in 149
countries
Onset of civil war Linguistic fractionalisation and polarisation
with group distance, religious fractionalisa-
tion, legal origins
Deep cultural divide/cleavage was important
in explaining conflicts, while shallow cultural
divide was important in explaining economic
growth.
Esteban et al.
(2012)
1960-2008 in 138
countries
Dummy internal con-
flict (UCDP/PRIO)
Ethnic fractionalisation, polarisation,
Greenberg-Gini index, democracy, lack of
executive constraints, autocracy, political
rights, civil liberty
Ethnic polarisation and fractionalisation were
positively and significantly associated with the
likelihood of conflict. There were no significant
institutional variables that can predict internal
conflict.
Note: Sorted by year of publication.
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Table A.2: Number of districts/municipalities in NVMS, 2005-2014
Province 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Aceh 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Bali 9
Banten 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 8
Bengkulu 10
DI Yogyakarta 5
DKI Jakarta 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Gorontalo 6
Jambi 11
Jawa Barat 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 26
Jawa Tengah 35
Jawa Timur 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Kalimantan Barat 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Kalimantan Selatan 13
Kalimantan Tengah 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Kalimantan Timur 9 9 9
Kalimantan Utara 5 5 5
Kep. Bangka Belitung 7
Kep. Riau 7
Lampung 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Maluku 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Maluku Utara 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Nusa Tenggara Barat 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Nusa Tenggara Timur 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Papua 26 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 29 29
Papua Barat 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Riau 11
Sulawesi Barat 5
Sulawesi Selatan 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Sulawesi Tengah 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Sulawesi Tenggara 12
Sulawesi Utara 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Sumatera Barat 19
Sumatera Selatan 15
Sumatera Utara 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Total 287 289 289 289 289 290 290 304 304 495
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Table A.3: Variables definitions and sources
Variable name in Stata Definition Sources
lndv pop Log non-domestic violent incidents per million
people
NVMS and population census
lndcv pop Log non-domestic collective violent incidents
per million people
lkill ndv pop Log non-domestic violent incidents with casu-
alties per million people
ndv Number of non–domestic violent incidents
violent conflict Number of violent conflict
kill vio conf Number of people killed from violent conflict
gini 05 1014 Greenberg-Gini index (δ = 0.05)
Population census and
Ethnologue
gini 5 1014 Greenberg-Gini index (δ = 0.5)
f 1014 Ethnolinguistic fractionalisation index
p 1014 Ethnolinguistic polarisation index
rf 10 Religious fractionalisation
Census
efi 1014 Ethnic fractionalisation index
epoi 1014 Ethnic polarisation index
javanese prop 1014 Share of Javanese
urban Urban district (>50% of population living in
urban areas)
lpop Log of population
ratio gini Gini ratio for income inequality
BPS
hdi new Human Development Index
lrev tot bn Log total government revenue
World Bank’s INDO-DAPOER
unemployment rate Unemployment rate
pov rate Poverty rate
service provision ip Index of public service delivery
rd iw new Relative deprivation in income-welfare gap World Bank’s INDO-DAPOER
and BPSlgrdp Log real GDP (including oil & gas)
trust Trust index Susenas 2014 Module on Social
Resilience
worship place Number of worship place Podes
new district Dummy for new district (=1 if created in 2000-
2014)
Ministry of Home Affairs and
Ministry of Finance
distance taiwan Distance from Taiwan
GADM
distance africa Distance from Addis Ababa
elev mean Mean elevation
CGIAR-SRTM
elev stdev Variation in elevation
latitude Absolute latitude
area Area (’000 km2)
Notes: Collective violent incident is defined as events that involved at least 10 people. Violent con-
flict includes resource conflict, governance conflict, electoral conflict, identity (ethno-communal) conflict,
vigilante and separatism.
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Table A.4: Distribution of ethnolinguistic groups by region in 2010
Region
Largest ethnolinguistic
group (share)
No. of local
languages
No. of
pairs
Mean of
dmn G F P EFI
Java-Bali Javanese (48%) 8 8 0.312 0.032 0.162 0.013 0.182
Kalimantan Banjar (28%) 53 1,378 0.078 0.076 0.586 0.017 0.674
Maluku Ambonese (47%) 79 3,081 0.357 0.435 0.514 0.15 0.722
Nusa Tenggara Sasak (32%) 74 2,701 0.428 0.066 0.431 0.02 0.355
Papua Indonesian (44%) 149 11,026 0.815 0.222 0.435 0.068 0.665
Sulawesi Bugis (19%) 97 4,656 0.079 0.102 0.475 0.04 0.462
Sumatera Indonesian (27%) 41 214 0.434 0.047 0.426 0.015 0.508
Notes: In each region, languages originated from different regions were excluded in the calculation of
language pairs. Number of languages was taken from Ethnologue and calculated after matching for
different language names and availability of speakers from census data. Indonesian language has the
most speakers in Papua because of the large number of migrants and the many but small ethnic groups
in the region. The language also has the largest number of speakers in Sumatera because it was based
on the Malay language originated from the region. δ = 0.05 was used for the calculation of G and P .
Source: Calculated from census 2010 and Ethnologue.
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Table A.5: First-stage regressions results (dependent variable: log nondomestic violence per capita)
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
G G2 G G2 G G2 G G2
Distance from Taiwan -0.000257 -3.61e-05 0.000173 0.000117 0.000572** 0.000226*
(0.000216) (0.000102) (0.000227) (0.000118) (0.000238) (0.000121)
Absolute latitude -0.126* -0.0539 -1.358*** -0.546*** -1.211*** -0.501***
(0.0707) (0.0370) (0.323) (0.179) (0.325) (0.176)
Distance from Taiwan x Absolute latitude 0.000398*** 0.000161*** 0.000340*** 0.000138***
(9.09e-05) (4.95e-05) (8.87e-05) (4.72e-05)
Squared distance from Taiwan 3.07e-08 1.97e-09 -4.87e-08 -2.75e-08 -1.07e-07*** -4.15e-08**
(3.26e-08) (1.55e-08) (3.62e-08) (1.89e-08) (3.76e-08) (1.91e-08)
Squared absolute latitude 0.0645 0.0367 -0.104* -0.0367 -0.114** -0.0464*
(0.0607) (0.0315) (0.0561) (0.0272) (0.0480) (0.0236)
Distance from Africa -0.000585* 3.71e-05
(0.000302) (0.000162)
Squared distance from Africa 2.65e-08** 2.20e-10
(1.18e-08) (6.27e-09)
Trust index -0.168*** -0.0609** -0.117** -0.0421 -0.154*** -0.0621** -0.0533 -0.0215
(0.0538) (0.0249) (0.0551) (0.0262) (0.0576) (0.0271) (0.0550) (0.0264)
Gini ratio for income inequality 0.163 0.00966 0.284** 0.0606 0.147 -0.00524 -0.208* -0.182**
(0.130) (0.0696) (0.117) (0.0619) (0.126) (0.0687) (0.125) (0.0757)
Human Development Index -0.00347*** -0.00128** -0.00339*** -0.00109* -0.00293** -0.00102* 0.00208 0.00124*
(0.00128) (0.000579) (0.00131) (0.000599) (0.00128) (0.000583) (0.00138) (0.000682)
Unemployment rate 0.854*** 0.401*** 0.798*** 0.373*** 0.689*** 0.343*** 0.595*** 0.296***
(0.210) (0.101) (0.206) (0.101) (0.220) (0.107) (0.171) (0.0859)
Log district GDP -0.0283*** -0.0146*** -0.0274*** -0.0144*** -0.0297*** -0.0156*** -0.0163*** -0.00937***
(0.00608) (0.00311) (0.00611) (0.00310) (0.00606) (0.00316) (0.00499) (0.00249)
Urban district -0.00302 -0.00392 -0.00252 -0.00543 -0.000835 -0.00400 -0.0217* -0.0134**
(0.0137) (0.00616) (0.0140) (0.00632) (0.0138) (0.00624) (0.0129) (0.00627)
Constant 1.427*** 0.471*** 0.759*** 0.301*** 0.859** 0.298 2.792 -0.633
(0.357) (0.170) (0.174) (0.0826) (0.376) (0.191) (1.837) (1.015)
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. The term ’Model’ in the first row refers to the column number of Table 4.4.
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Table A.6: Negative binomial regressions (dependent variable: number of non-domestic
violence)
(1) (2) (3)
G 0.580 6.506*** 4.227***
(0.613) (1.830) (1.319)
G2 -12.53*** -7.346***
(3.161) (2.385)
Log population 0.850*** 0.842*** 0.663***
(0.0651) (0.0632) (0.0539)
Trust index -0.458
(0.382)
Gini ratio for income inequality 2.464**
(1.015)
HDI 0.0692***
(0.00986)
Log unemployment rate 0.856
(1.629)
Log district GDP per capita 0.0540
(0.0793)
Urban district 0.156
(0.114)
Constant -7.104*** -7.247*** -9.408***
(0.845) (0.844) (1.329)
ln(α) -0.0298 -0.0712 -0.469***
(0.0959) (0.0986) (0.0684)
Observations 495 495 495
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Significance of ln(α)
indicates over-dispersion in the outcome data.
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Table A.7: Payoff destruction experiment data for the meta-analysis
Source Region Burn rate JoD Students One-shot Costly WP n Σn w
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Abbink and Herrmann (2011) Europe 10.80 1 1 1 1 0 69 131 0.53
Abbink and Herrmann (2011) Europe 25.80 1 1 1 1 0 62 131 0.47
Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) Europe 23.95 1 1 0 0 0 40 40 1.00
Alm˚as et al. (2019) America 6.00 1 1 1 0 1 864 1859 0.46
Alm˚as et al. (2019) Africa 18.00 1 1 1 0 1 995 1859 0.54
Baillon et al. (2013) Europe 38.78 1 1 1 1 0 51 153 0.33
Baillon et al. (2013) Europe 17.65 1 1 1 1 0 49 153 0.32
Baillon et al. (2013) Europe 18.87 1 1 1 1 0 53 153 0.35
Basurto et al. (2016) America 54.00 1 0 1 1 0 127 127 1.00
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Celik Katreniak, et al. (2018) Europe 32.00 1 0 1 1 0 222 1411 0.16
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Celik Katreniak, et al. (2018) Europe 42.00 1 0 1 1 0 346 1411 0.25
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Celik Katreniak, et al. (2018) Africa 53.00 1 0 1 1 0 426 1411 0.30
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Celik Katreniak, et al. (2018) Africa 59.00 1 0 1 1 0 417 1411 0.30
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Chytilova´, and Zelinsky (2018) Europe 44.50 1 0 1 1 0 148 740 0.20
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Chytilova´, and Zelinsky (2018) Europe 69.50 1 0 1 1 0 108 740 0.15
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Chytilova´, and Zelinsky (2018) Europe 22.00 1 0 1 1 0 188 740 0.25
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Chytilova´, and Zelinsky (2018) Europe 64.00 1 0 1 1 0 66 740 0.09
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Chytilova´, and Zelinsky (2018) Europe 21.00 1 0 1 1 0 82 740 0.11
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Chytilova´, and Zelinsky (2018) Europe 77.50 1 0 1 1 0 42 740 0.06
Bauer, Cahl´ıkova´, Chytilova´, and Zelinsky (2018) Europe 23.50 1 0 1 1 0 106 740 0.14
Diamond and Blackwell (2017) America 22.00 1 1 1 0 0 18 74 0.24
Diamond and Blackwell (2017) America 0.00 1 1 1 0 0 21 74 0.28
Diamond and Blackwell (2017) America 17.00 1 1 1 0 0 35 74 0.47
Dickinson and Masclet (2019) Europe 33.33 1 1 1 1 1 27 123 0.22
Dickinson and Masclet (2019) Europe 33.33 1 1 1 1 1 96 123 0.78
Dickinson et al. (2018) Europe 16.66 0 1 1 1 0 12 48 0.25
Dickinson et al. (2018) Europe 33.33 0 1 1 1 0 12 48 0.25
Dickinson et al. (2018) Europe 58.33 0 1 1 1 0 12 48 0.25
Dickinson et al. (2018) Europe 75.00 0 1 1 1 0 12 48 0.25
D. Fehr (2018) Europe 20.00 0 1 1 1 0 88 248 0.35
D. Fehr (2018) Europe 28.00 0 1 1 1 0 88 248 0.35
D. Fehr (2018) Europe 42.00 0 1 1 1 0 72 248 0.29
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Source Region Burn rate JoD Students One-shot Costly WP n Σn w
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Gangadharan et al. (2018) Asia-Oceania 19.40 0 1 0 1 1 160 370 0.43
Gangadharan et al. (2018) Asia-Oceania 9.50 0 1 0 1 1 210 370 0.57
Gangadharan et al. (2019) America 16.10 0 1 0 1 0 66 186 0.35
Gangadharan et al. (2019) America 10.30 0 1 0 1 0 60 186 0.32
Gangadharan et al. (2019) America 10.60 0 1 0 1 0 60 186 0.32
Jauernig and Uhl (2019) Europe 52.20 1 1 1 0 0 23 286 0.08
Jauernig and Uhl (2019) Europe 26.80 1 1 1 0 0 41 286 0.14
Jauernig and Uhl (2019) Europe 22.10 1 1 1 0 0 222 286 0.78
Jauernig et al. (2016) Europe 40.00 1 1 1 0 0 70 218 0.32
Jauernig et al. (2016) Europe 48.53 1 1 1 0 0 68 218 0.31
Jauernig et al. (2016) Europe 35.00 1 1 1 0 0 80 218 0.37
Karakostas and Zizzo (2016) Europe 37.69 1 1 0 1 0 390 390 1.00
Kebede and Zizzo (2015) Africa 8.27 0 0 1 1 0 240 360 0.67
Kebede and Zizzo (2015) Africa 11.89 0 1 1 1 0 60 360 0.17
Kebede and Zizzo (2015) Africa 5.47 0 1 1 1 0 60 360 0.17
Kessler et al. (2012) Europe 15.50 1 1 1 0 1 606 606 1.00
Prediger et al. (2014) Africa 23.30 1 0 1 1 0 60 120 0.50
Prediger et al. (2014) Africa 40.00 1 0 1 1 0 60 120 0.50
Vicente and Vilela (2019) Africa 24.00 1 0 1 1 1 353 353 1.00
Zeballos (2018) America 55.00 0 0 1 1 0 285 285 1.00
Zeitzoff (2014) Europe 68.63 1 0 1 1 0 51 98 0.52
Zeitzoff (2014) Europe 57.45 1 0 1 1 0 47 98 0.48
J. Zhang et al. (2019) America 9.38 1 1 1 0 0 64 124 0.52
J. Zhang et al. (2019) America 15.00 1 1 1 0 0 60 124 0.48
L. Zhang and Ortmann (2016) Asia-Oceania 28.00 1 1 1 0 0 47 143 0.33
L. Zhang and Ortmann (2016) Asia-Oceania 15.00 1 1 1 0 0 48 143 0.34
L. Zhang and Ortmann (2016) Asia-Oceania 17.00 1 1 1 0 0 48 143 0.34
Zizzo (2003) Europe 72.41 0 1 1 1 0 87 87 1.00
Zizzo and Fleming (2011) Europe 55.09 0 1 1 1 0 216 216 1.00
Zizzo and Oswald (2001) Europe 62.50 0 1 1 1 0 116 116 1.00
Notes: Average burn rate and total observation were used for studies that did not indicate the number of observations per experimental treatment. WP = working
paper.
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Table A.8: Counts of antisocial behaviour and mean of anger, Melbourne
Number of burning decisions 0 1 2 3 4 Σ
Females 55 5 6 1 2 69
16.61 27.00 18.25 17.00 22.00 17.00
Males 51 1 4 1 1 58
15.62 18.00 17.33 22.00 9.00 15.84
Total 106 6 10 2 3 127
16.09 19.50 17.70 19.50 13.33 16.37
Notes: Numbers in italic refer to mean score of anger. Decisions against computer co-participant were
excluded from the table.
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Table A.9: Panel regression on the role of aggression, Melbourne (dependent variable:
burning decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female partner -0.974** -0.971** -0.975** -0.971**
(0.402) (0.401) (0.402) (0.401)
Javanese partner -0.136 -0.135 -0.137 -0.134
(0.179) (0.178) (0.179) (0.179)
Female 1.551 -0.673 1.603 -1.898
(2.189) (2.107) (2.279) (2.475)
Hostility 0.0112
(0.0563)
Female × hostility -0.107
(0.102)
Physical 0.00225
(0.0636)
Female × physical 0.000450
(0.102)
Verbal -0.0838
(0.0946)
Female × verbal -0.236
(0.223)
Aggression index 0.00128
(0.0216)
Female × aggression 0.0179
(0.0356)
Negative belief 2.373*** 2.397*** 2.547*** 2.444***
(0.644) (0.657) (0.678) (0.667)
Javanese -0.204 -0.323 -0.317 -0.362
(0.576) (0.556) (0.547) (0.573)
Age 0.0273 0.0312 0.0249 0.0340
(0.0503) (0.0503) (0.0512) (0.0493)
Muslim -0.139 -0.0608 0.00914 -0.0350
(0.519) (0.527) (0.533) (0.513)
Married -1.020 -1.066 -0.853 -1.106
(0.721) (0.700) (0.692) (0.709)
Income >AUD 2,000 0.101 0.189 0.258 0.186
(0.546) (0.556) (0.564) (0.562)
Student -1.865*** -1.769*** -1.691*** -1.758***
(0.654) (0.596) (0.621) (0.604)
Constant -1.630 -1.682 -0.836 -1.807
(1.954) (1.990) (1.976) (2.119)
ln(σˆv
2) 0.877* 0.886* 0.832* 0.880*
(0.489) (0.501) (0.476) (0.509)
Observations 500 500 500 500
Number of id 125 125 125 125
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Partner gender was
relative to male co-participant while partner ethnic was relative to non-Javanese.
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Table A.10: Panel regression on artefact effects, Melbourne (dependent variable: burning
decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female partner -0.973** -0.970** -0.976** -0.972** -0.973** -0.972** -0.973**
(0.405) (0.405) (0.403) (0.404) (0.403) (0.404) (0.405)
Javanese partner -0.133 -0.137 -0.131 -0.131 -0.132 -0.132 -0.131
(0.180) (0.178) (0.179) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.181)
Female -0.954* -0.887* -0.845* -0.924* -0.884* -0.950* -0.882*
(0.536) (0.503) (0.502) (0.515) (0.517) (0.533) (0.519)
Negative belief 2.637*** 2.491*** 2.545*** 2.593*** 2.585*** 3.697 2.539***
(0.687) (0.606) (0.647) (0.665) (0.663) (2.345) (0.674)
Javanese -1.024 -0.0558 -0.122 -0.0172 -0.0577 -0.145 -0.00529
(2.638) (0.524) (0.531) (0.573) (0.557) (0.551) (0.576)
Age 0.0250 0.0303 0.0232 0.0179 -0.0832 0.0159 0.0183
(0.0491) (0.0451) (0.0445) (0.0463) (0.189) (0.0481) (0.0482)
Muslim -0.153 -3.219 -0.184 -0.255 -0.191 -0.148 -0.302
(0.648) (2.182) (0.528) (0.562) (0.559) (0.511) (0.574)
Married -1.207* -1.204* -3.883* -1.158* -1.123 -1.165* -1.206*
(0.663) (0.630) (2.039) (0.669) (0.684) (0.672) (0.651)
Income >AUD 2,000 0.0902 0.000778 0.0957 -0.973 0.0551 -0.00241 0.0334
(0.536) (0.500) (0.526) (2.007) (0.527) (0.533) (0.521)
Student -2.039*** -2.039*** -2.135*** -2.065*** -2.070*** -2.034*** -4.158**
(0.661) (0.617) (0.646) (0.647) (0.653) (0.659) (2.061)
Anger 0.115* 0.0130 0.0450 0.107 -0.0357 0.161** 0.0600
(0.0666) (0.0859) (0.0908) (0.0746) (0.356) (0.0708) (0.0869)
Javanese × anger 0.0512
(0.145)
Muslim × anger 0.179
(0.122)
Married × anger 0.153
(0.113)
Income >AUD 2,000 × anger 0.0574
(0.116)
Age × anger 0.00549
(0.0104)
Negative belief × anger -0.0665
(0.136)
Student × anger 0.121
(0.118)
Constant -3.009 -1.390 -1.637 -2.606 -0.0264 -3.516* -1.789
(1.893) (1.985) (2.153) (2.115) (6.383) (2.040) (2.429)
ln(σˆv
2) 0.802 0.696 0.720 0.789 0.778 0.799 0.789
(0.522) (0.507) (0.538) (0.528) (0.531) (0.523) (0.529)
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Number of id 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. Partner gender was
relative to male co-participant while partner ethnic was relative to non-Javanese.
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Table A.11: Panel regression on artefacts effects, Aceh (dependent variable: burning
decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Javanese partner 0.203 0.507** 0.494** 0.494** 0.494** 0.495**
(0.360) (0.237) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230) (0.230)
Conflict experience (injured or killed) 0.285 1.007* 0.752 1.304 0.980 0.732
(0.551) (0.578) (0.605) (1.603) (1.606) (0.490)
Female 0.200 0.184 0.184 0.185 0.193 0.132
(0.465) (0.474) (0.468) (0.468) (0.461) (0.469)
Female partner 0.117 0.612* 0.119 0.118 0.118 0.119
(0.212) (0.360) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211) (0.211)
Negative belief 2.134*** 2.181*** 2.371*** 2.092*** 2.155*** 2.096***
(0.538) (0.536) (0.860) (0.539) (0.542) (0.524)
Age 0.0215 0.0222 0.0204 0.0320 0.0230 0.0196
(0.0259) (0.0262) (0.0256) (0.0311) (0.0268) (0.0260)
Years of education 0.0841 0.0843 0.0863 0.0845 0.111 0.0856
(0.0680) (0.0688) (0.0675) (0.0676) (0.124) (0.0665)
Income >IDR 2 million/month 0.0871 0.112 0.0450 0.0577 0.117 1.272
(0.886) (0.891) (0.866) (0.871) (0.868) (1.529)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur -1.996** -2.026** -2.007** -1.996** -1.988** -2.040**
(0.970) (0.993) (0.976) (0.969) (0.962) (0.964)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -1.028 -1.027 -1.040 -1.005 -1.019 -0.986
(0.926) (0.946) (0.934) (0.928) (0.920) (0.919)
Javanese partner × conflict experience 0.478
(0.461)
Female partner × conflict experience -0.785*
(0.443)
Negative belief × conflict experience -0.416
(0.996)
Age × conflict experience -0.0191
(0.0411)
Years of education × conflict experience -0.0364
(0.129)
Income × conflict experience -1.589
(1.638)
Constant -4.697*** -5.255*** -4.920*** -5.247*** -5.252** -4.850***
(1.797) (1.867) (1.795) (1.862) (2.341) (1.778)
ln(σˆv
2) 1.581*** 1.635*** 1.574*** 1.573*** 1.579*** 1.565***
(0.348) (0.359) (0.345) (0.356) (0.350) (0.346)
Observations 680 680 680 680 680 680
Number of id 170 170 170 170 170 170
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
228 Chapter A. Appendix Tables
Table A.12: Panel regression on the role of personal attitudes, Aceh (dependent variable:
burning decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Javanese partner 0.401 0.457* 0.733*** 0.627** 0.505**
(0.277) (0.260) (0.269) (0.245) (0.232)
Conflict experience (injured or killed) -0.409 0.0356 0.100 -0.281 -0.901
(0.761) (0.706) (0.652) (0.654) (0.647)
Female -2.208 -1.117 -0.938 -1.991* -1.261
(1.661) (1.049) (0.968) (1.141) (0.933)
Female partner 0.243 0.184 0.151 0.00790 0.124
(0.326) (0.231) (0.227) (0.260) (0.213)
Female × conflict experience 3.262 2.215* 2.267* 3.476** 3.065**
(2.044) (1.325) (1.208) (1.450) (1.190)
Negative belief 1.696** 2.025*** 1.768*** 1.683*** 2.278***
(0.693) (0.648) (0.644) (0.602) (0.629)
Age 0.0392 0.0308 0.0233 0.00391 0.0124
(0.0348) (0.0256) (0.0308) (0.0273) (0.0240)
Years of education 0.166* 0.0985 0.147** 0.0488 0.0865
(0.0964) (0.0788) (0.0725) (0.0711) (0.0671)
Income >IDR 2 million/month -1.572 0.0115 -0.110 0.147 0.432
(1.471) (0.927) (0.926) (0.853) (0.853)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur -1.657 -2.095* -2.351** -0.922 -2.384**
(1.684) (1.116) (1.065) (1.168) (0.975)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -1.365 -1.585 -1.449 -0.830 -1.486
(1.678) (1.082) (1.024) (1.171) (0.930)
Religiosity -0.101
(0.0926)
Religious fundamentalism -0.0229
(0.0160)
Machiavellianism -0.0475
(0.0305)
Aggression -0.00890
(0.0197)
SVO: individual 2.776**
(1.332)
SVO: competitive 2.495***
(0.845)
SVO: indeterminate 0.754
(0.534)
Constant -2.749 -3.593* -2.877 -2.781 -3.891**
(4.085) (1.887) (2.660) (2.493) (1.729)
ln(σˆv
2) 2.021*** 1.423*** 1.465*** 1.290*** 1.383***
(0.501) (0.410) (0.431) (0.429) (0.351)
Observations 456 456 544 476 680
Number of id 114 114 136 119 170
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. SVO was relative to
those with prosocial orientation.
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Table A.13: Panel regression on the role of personal attitudes sub-traits/dimensions, Aceh (dependent variable: burning decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (8)
Javanese partner 0.520* 0.465* 0.464* 0.523** 0.566** 0.763*** 0.561** 0.480**
(0.291) (0.238) (0.239) (0.242) (0.238) (0.259) (0.237) (0.215)
Conflict experience (injured or killed) -0.159 0.359 -0.173 -0.109 -0.300 -0.873 -0.453 -0.500
(0.685) (0.664) (0.541) (0.566) (0.573) (0.710) (0.648) (0.666)
Female -2.099 -0.799 -2.349** -1.425 -1.352 -2.299* -1.557 -1.501
(1.758) (0.929) (1.067) (0.928) (0.902) (1.216) (0.977) (0.968)
Female partner 0.228 0.133 0.132 0.126 0.0841 0.00347 0.0817 0.137
(0.305) (0.229) (0.230) (0.222) (0.218) (0.242) (0.218) (0.240)
Female × conflict experience 3.131 2.331** 3.067** 2.480** 2.679** 4.291*** 2.888** 2.925**
(2.014) (1.141) (1.285) (1.152) (1.130) (1.551) (1.222) (1.222)
Negative belief 1.451** 1.996*** 1.662*** 1.849*** 1.671*** 2.077*** 2.065*** 2.351***
(0.685) (0.539) (0.520) (0.530) (0.539) (0.638) (0.585) (0.593)
Age 0.0416 0.0193 0.0178 0.0162 0.0157 -0.00303 0.0161 0.00620
(0.0330) (0.0249) (0.0262) (0.0247) (0.0239) (0.0274) (0.0249) (0.0282)
Years of education 0.118 0.135** 0.135** 0.0958 0.0471 -0.0341 0.0498 0.0666
(0.0886) (0.0685) (0.0654) (0.0631) (0.0632) (0.0730) (0.0688) (0.0747)
Income >IDR 2 million/month -1.924 -0.414 -0.187 -0.442 -0.0975 0.775 0.298 0.738
(1.418) (0.910) (0.807) (0.865) (0.848) (0.906) (0.894) (0.903)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur -2.156 -1.610 -1.891* -2.023** -1.565 -2.017* -1.975* -1.745
(1.586) (1.081) (1.019) (0.985) (1.042) (1.085) (1.012) (1.196)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -1.419 -1.437 -1.509 -1.385 -0.960 -1.684 -1.387 -1.366
(1.587) (1.077) (0.983) (0.958) (1.018) (1.105) (1.008) (1.156)
Religiosity: ritual 0.587
(0.624)
Religiosity: consequential -0.420**
(0.167)
Religiosity: ideological -0.315
(0.204)
Religiosity: experiential 0.165
(0.204)
Aggression: hostility -0.0295
(0.0370)
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Aggression: physical -0.111**
(0.0496)
Aggression: verbal -0.0114
(0.0629)
Aggression: anger -0.0517
(0.0698)
Constant -11.00 -1.379 -1.070 -5.430** -2.919 1.073 -3.330* -2.665
(6.959) (2.227) (2.687) (2.400) (1.960) (2.140) (1.990) (2.685)
ln(σˆv
2) 1.959*** 1.344*** 1.249*** 1.449*** 1.365*** 1.408*** 1.541*** 1.457***
(0.462) (0.366) (0.402) (0.366) (0.385) (0.407) (0.373) (0.394)
Observations 504 624 584 640 592 532 628 600
Number of id 126 156 146 160 148 133 157 150
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table A.14: Panel regression on the role of personal attitudes and gender, Aceh (depen-
dent variable: burning decision)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Javanese partner 0.456* 0.731*** 0.480** 0.764***
(0.258) (0.268) (0.215) (0.260)
Conflict experience (injured or killed) 0.0548 0.00985 -0.556 -0.820
(0.690) (0.637) (0.664) (0.698)
Female -3.072** 4.464 -0.534 2.258
(1.323) (3.670) (2.494) (2.137)
Female partner 0.184 0.153 0.137 0.00206
(0.231) (0.227) (0.240) (0.242)
Female × conflict experience 2.182* 2.677** 3.062*** 4.393***
(1.249) (1.177) (1.166) (1.619)
Negative belief 1.691*** 1.591** 2.323*** 2.009***
(0.633) (0.634) (0.592) (0.628)
Age 0.0312 0.0333 0.00840 -0.00596
(0.0254) (0.0306) (0.0272) (0.0276)
Years of education 0.0714 0.126* 0.0613 -0.0509
(0.0840) (0.0713) (0.0806) (0.0782)
Income >IDR 2 million/month 0.170 -0.0207 0.700 0.794
(0.928) (0.902) (0.893) (0.889)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Timur -2.267** -2.257** -1.610 -1.696
(1.057) (1.022) (1.140) (1.076)
Region lived in 2003: Aceh Utara -1.860* -1.646 -1.305 -1.337
(1.026) (1.025) (1.143) (1.081)
Religious fundamentalism -0.0456**
(0.0186)
Female × religious fundamentalism 0.0690*
(0.0367)
Mach-IV 0.00449
(0.0433)
Female × Mach-IV -0.126
(0.0772)
Aggression: anger -0.0255
(0.0748)
Female × anger -0.0670
(0.151)
Aggression: physical -0.0584
(0.0598)
Female × physical aggression -0.219**
(0.0995)
Constant -2.365 -5.185* -3.155 -0.0825
(1.979) (3.092) (2.402) (2.259)
ln(σˆv
2) 1.308*** 1.395*** 1.453*** 1.367***
(0.434) (0.418) (0.397) (0.401)
Observations 456 544 600 532
Number of id 114 136 150 133
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Figure B.1: Trust and violence in 2014
Source: Calculated from 2014 survey on social resilience and NVMS 2014.
Figure B.2: The dispersal of Austronesian-speaking people
Source: Chambers (2013).
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Figure B.3: Distribution of violence in Java-Bali, 2005 and 2014
Source: Calculated from NVMS and population census.
Figure B.4: Distribution of violence in Nusa Tenggara, 2005 and 2014
Source: Calculated from NVMS and population census.
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Figure B.5: Distribution of violence in Sumatera, 2005 and 2014
Source: Calculated from NVMS and population census.
Figure B.6: Distribution of violence in Kalimantan, 2005 and 2014
Source: Calculated from NVMS and population census.
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Figure B.7: Distribution of violence in Sulawesi, 2005 and 2014
Source: Calculated from NVMS and population census.
Figure B.8: Distribution of violence in Maluku, 2005 and 2014
Source: Calculated from NVMS and population census.
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Figure B.9: Distribution of violence in Papua, 2005 and 2014
Source: Calculated from NVMS and population census.
Figure B.10: Language tree of major languages
Notes: The branching stopped at the last common branch of the languages. Language names in
parentheses.
Source: Ethnologue.
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Figure B.11: Typical experimental sessions in Aceh
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Figure B.12: Documentations from Aceh (payments)
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Figure B.13: Poster placement
Appendix C
Experimental Instructions
Melbourne Experiment
241
Form A 
 
Date:     __________  
Participant number:   __________  
 
1. Age at last birthday:   ______ year 
2. Sex:     1. Male / 2. Female 
3. Religion:    1. Islam / 2. Christian / 3. Catholics /  
4. Other: _______ 
4. Ethnic identity:   1. Acehnese / 2. Javanese / 3. Gayo / 4. Alas /  
5. Lainnya: _____ 
5. Salutation you most identify with: 1. Bang / 2. Kak / 3. Mas / 4. Mbak 
6. Employment status:   1. Working / 2. Not working 
7. Approximately how much do you earn per month (in $) 
      □ 1. Less than 1000 
□ 2. 1000-1999 
□ 3. 2000-2999 
□ 4. 3000-4000 
□ 5. More than 4000 
8. Marital status:     □ 1. Not married □ 2. Married 
      □ 3. Separated  □ 4. Divorced 
□ 5. Widow/er  □ 6. Cohabitating 
9. Highest completed education:  □ 1. No/not yet in school 
□ 2. Elementary school or equivalent 
□ 3. Junior high school or equivalent 
□ 4. Senior high school or equivalent  
□ 5. Pesantren/meunasah/madrasah 
□ 6. University 
□ 7. Others 
10. Length of stay in Australia:   _______ year, _____ month 
11. Reason for staying in Australia:   □ 1. Education  □ 2. Work  
□ 3. Follow family  □ 4. Other  
Form B 
 
Date:     __________  
Participant number:   __________  
 
Please now decide if you want to reduce your co-participant’s money by $10, in which case 
you have to pay $1, OR leave the money as it is, in which case you do not have to pay. 
My decision is (tick one): 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay. 
□ 2. to reduce their money by $10 and pay $1. 
 
  
Form C 
 
Date:     __________  
Participant number:   __________  
Decision implemented: __________ (filled in by investigator) 
Please now consider the five different statements below. In each case, please decide if you 
want to reduce your co-participant’s money by $10, in which case you have to pay $1, OR 
leave the money as it is, in which case you do not have to pay. 
1. If my co-participant most identifies with the salutation of “mas”, my decision is: (tick one) 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay. 
□ 2. to reduce their money by $10 and pay $1. 
2. If my co-participant most identifies with the salutation of “mbak”, my decision is: (tick one) 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay. 
□ 2. to reduce their money by $10 and pay $1. 
3. If my co-participant most identifies with the salutation of “bang”, my decision is: (tick one) 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay. 
□ 2. to reduce their money by $10 and pay $1. 
4. If my co-participant most identifies with the salutation of “kak”, my decision is: (tick one) 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay. 
□ 2. to reduce their money by $10 and pay $1. 
5. If my co-participant is the computer, my decision is: (tick one) 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay. 
□ 2. to reduce their money by $10 and pay $1. 
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 fi
ni
sh
ed
, p
le
as
e 
ra
ise
 y
ou
r h
an
d 
an
d 
th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
or
 w
ill
 co
lle
ct
 th
e 
fo
rm
 fr
om
 y
ou
. 
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In
st
ru
ct
io
n 
Sh
ee
t: 
De
cis
io
n 
Ta
sk
s  
(R
ea
d 
af
te
r a
ll 
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
s f
in
ish
ed
 w
ith
 Fo
rm
 A
) 
 1.
 
SI
M
UL
TA
NE
OU
S 
SE
SS
IO
N 
Be
lo
w
 a
re
 th
e 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 d
ec
isi
on
 ta
sk
s. 
 Le
t u
s r
ea
d 
th
em
 to
ge
th
er
 ca
re
fu
lly
. A
t a
ny
 ti
m
e,
 if
 y
ou
 d
o 
no
t u
nd
er
st
an
d,
 p
le
as
e 
ra
ise
 y
ou
r h
an
d.
 
 At
 th
is 
ve
ry
 m
om
en
t, 
an
ot
he
r s
es
sio
n 
w
ith
 e
xa
ct
ly
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 d
ec
isi
on
 ta
sk
s i
s t
ak
in
g 
pl
ac
e 
in
 a
no
th
er
 v
ill
ag
e 
in
 A
ce
h.
 T
hi
s v
ill
ag
e 
is 
in
 a
no
th
er
 d
ist
ric
t o
f A
ce
h,
 a
t l
ea
st
 5
0 
ki
lo
m
et
er
s a
w
ay
 fr
om
 y
ou
. 
Th
e 
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
s i
n 
th
is 
ot
he
r v
ill
ag
e 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
in
vi
te
d 
to
 ta
ke
 p
ar
t t
he
 sa
m
e 
w
ay
 a
s y
ou
 a
nd
 h
av
e 
to
 fi
ll 
in
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
fo
rm
s a
s y
ou
. T
he
y 
ar
e 
no
w
 w
ith
 a
no
th
er
 te
am
 o
f o
ur
 in
ve
st
ig
at
or
s, 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
or
de
r o
f 
st
ag
es
 in
 th
e 
se
ss
io
n 
as
 y
ou
. 
 
2.
 C
O
-
PA
RT
IC
IP
AN
T 
Ea
ch
 o
f y
ou
 in
 th
is 
vi
lla
ge
 w
ill
 b
e 
ra
nd
om
ly
 m
at
ch
ed
 w
ith
 a
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
ot
he
r v
ill
ag
e.
 T
hi
s 
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 is
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
.  
Yo
u 
w
ill
 n
ev
er
 b
e 
to
ld
 th
e 
na
m
e 
of
 th
e 
ot
he
r v
ill
ag
e 
no
r t
he
 id
en
tit
y 
of
 
yo
ur
 co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t. 
 Li
ke
w
ise
, y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 w
ill 
ne
ve
r b
e 
to
ld
 th
e 
na
m
e 
of
 y
ou
r v
ill
ag
e 
no
r y
ou
r 
id
en
tit
y.
  Y
ou
 a
nd
 y
ou
r v
ill
ag
e 
w
ill
 a
lw
ay
s r
em
ai
n 
an
on
ym
ou
s, 
an
d 
vi
ce
 v
er
sa
. 
 
3.
 E
ND
OW
M
EN
T 
In
 th
is 
ta
sk
, y
ou
 h
av
e 
be
en
 g
iv
en
 ID
R 
75
,0
00
. T
hi
s i
s y
ou
r m
on
ey
. B
ut
 a
t t
he
 m
om
en
t w
e 
w
ill
 k
ee
p 
th
is 
m
on
ey
 o
n 
yo
ur
 b
eh
al
f. 
Yo
ur
 co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t i
n 
th
e 
ot
he
r v
ill
ag
e 
ha
s a
lso
 b
ee
n 
gi
ve
n 
ID
R 
75
,0
00
. S
im
ila
rly
, i
t 
is 
be
in
g 
ke
pt
 o
n 
th
ei
r b
eh
al
f b
y 
th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
or
s i
n 
th
ei
r v
ill
ag
e.
 
 
4.
 P
AY
OF
F 
RE
DU
CT
IO
N 
Yo
u 
w
ill
 h
av
e 
th
e 
op
po
rt
un
ity
 to
 re
du
ce
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
’s 
m
on
ey
 o
r t
o 
le
av
e 
it 
as
 it
 is
. Y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 a
lso
 h
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
op
po
rt
un
ity
 to
 re
du
ce
 y
ou
r m
on
ey
 o
r l
ea
ve
 it
 a
s i
t i
s. 
It 
is 
im
po
rt
an
t t
o 
no
te
 
th
at
 e
ve
n 
th
ou
gh
 b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
s i
n 
th
e 
pa
ir 
w
ill
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
de
cis
io
n 
w
he
th
er
 to
 re
du
ce
 o
r l
ea
ve
 th
e 
ot
he
r’s
 m
on
ey
, o
nl
y 
th
e 
de
cis
io
n 
m
ad
e 
by
 o
ne
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t i
n 
ea
ch
 p
ai
r w
ill
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
 F
or
 e
ac
h 
pa
ir,
 
w
e 
w
ill 
de
cid
e 
w
ho
se
 d
ec
isi
on
 is
 im
pl
em
en
te
d 
by
 to
ss
in
g 
a 
co
in
, a
fte
r b
ot
h 
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
s h
av
e 
m
ad
e 
th
ei
r 
de
cis
io
ns
. I
f h
ea
ds
 co
m
es
 u
p,
 y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
 w
ill
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
 If
 ta
ils
 co
m
es
 u
p,
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
’s 
de
cis
io
n 
w
ill
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
 T
he
 co
in
 to
ss
 w
ill
 b
e 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
in
 th
is 
vi
lla
ge
 a
fte
r F
or
m
 C
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
co
m
pl
et
ed
 a
nd
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
co
nv
ey
ed
 to
 th
e 
ot
he
r v
ill
ag
e 
vi
a 
a 
ph
on
e 
ca
ll 
fo
r i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n.
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5.
 C
OS
T 
OF
 
PA
YO
FF
 
RE
DU
CT
IO
N 
No
w
, i
f y
ou
 d
ec
id
e 
to
 re
du
ce
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
’s 
m
on
ey
, y
ou
 w
ill
 h
av
e 
to
 p
ay
 ID
R 
3,
00
0.
 T
hi
s c
om
es
 o
ut
 
of
 y
ou
r i
ni
tia
l I
DR
 7
5,
00
0.
  B
y 
pa
yi
ng
 ID
R 
3,
00
0,
 y
ou
 w
ill
 re
du
ce
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
’s 
m
on
ey
 b
y 
ID
R 
30
,0
00
.  
Th
is 
co
m
es
 o
ut
 o
f t
he
ir 
in
iti
al
 ID
R 
75
,0
00
. I
f y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
 is
 N
O
T 
th
e 
on
e 
ch
os
en
 fo
r i
m
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n,
 y
ou
 
w
ill 
no
t h
av
e 
to
 p
ay
 a
s y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
 w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
  Y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 w
ill
 fa
ce
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
de
cis
io
n,
 w
he
th
er
 to
 re
du
ce
 o
r l
ea
ve
 y
ou
r m
on
ey
 a
s i
t i
s. 
 T
he
y 
w
ill
 a
lso
 h
av
e 
to
 p
ay
 ID
R 
3,
00
0 
to
 re
du
ce
 
yo
ur
 m
on
ey
 b
y 
ID
R 
30
,0
00
. N
ei
th
er
 p
ar
ty
 h
as
 to
 p
ay
 if
 th
ey
 d
ec
id
e 
to
 le
av
e 
th
e 
m
on
ey
 a
s i
t i
s. 
Yo
u 
w
ill
 
re
ce
iv
e 
in
 ca
sh
 a
t t
he
 e
nd
 o
f t
he
 se
ss
io
n 
w
ha
te
ve
r p
ar
t o
f y
ou
r i
ni
tia
l I
DR
 7
5,
00
0 
th
at
 h
as
 n
ot
 b
ee
n 
sp
en
t 
or
 d
ed
uc
te
d.
 
 
6.
 S
UM
M
AR
Y 
He
re
 is
 a
 su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 h
ow
 y
ou
r p
ay
m
en
t w
ill
 b
e 
ca
lcu
la
te
d 
(n
um
be
r a
fte
r s
em
ico
lo
n 
is 
yo
ur
 co
-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
’s 
m
on
ey
): 
 
De
cis
io
n 
Yo
ur
 p
ay
m
en
t (
in
 ID
R 
‘0
00
) i
f: 
Yo
u 
Yo
ur
 co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t 
Yo
ur
 d
ec
isi
on
 is
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
 
Yo
ur
 d
ec
isi
on
 is
 n
ot
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
Le
av
e 
Le
av
e 
75
; 7
5 
75
; 7
5 
Le
av
e 
Re
du
ce
 
75
; 7
5 
45
; 7
2 
Re
du
ce
 
Le
av
e 
72
; 4
5 
75
; 7
5 
Re
du
ce
 
Re
du
ce
 
72
; 4
5 
45
; 7
2 
  
7.
 E
XA
M
PL
E 
He
re
 a
re
 so
m
e 
ex
am
pl
es
 to
 h
el
p 
yo
u 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 th
e 
ab
ov
e:
 
 Ex
am
pl
e 
1:
 
• 
If 
bo
th
 y
ou
 a
nd
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 d
ec
id
e 
to
 p
ay
 ID
R 
3,
00
0 
to
 re
du
ce
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r’s
 m
on
ey
 a
nd
 y
ou
r 
de
cis
io
n 
w
as
 ch
os
en
 b
y 
co
in
 to
ss
 to
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d,
 y
ou
 w
ill
 e
ar
n 
ID
R 
72
,0
00
 (=
ID
R 
75
,0
00
-ID
R 
3,
00
0)
 
an
d 
yo
ur
 co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t w
ill
 e
ar
n 
ID
R 
45
,0
00
 (=
 ID
R 
75
,0
00
 –
 ID
R 
30
,0
00
); 
• 
As
 y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
 w
as
 ch
os
en
 b
y 
th
e 
co
in
 to
ss
 to
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d,
 th
e 
de
cis
io
n 
m
ad
e 
by
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d;
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• 
Ho
w
ev
er
, i
f y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
 w
as
 n
ot
 ch
os
en
 b
y 
co
in
 to
ss
 to
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
(a
nd
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
’s 
w
as
), 
th
en
 y
ou
 w
ill
 e
ar
n 
ID
R 
45
,0
00
 w
hi
le
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 e
ar
ns
 ID
R 
72
,0
00
. 
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
2:
 
• 
Le
t’s
 sa
y 
th
at
 y
ou
 d
ec
id
e 
to
 re
du
ce
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
’s 
m
on
ey
 if
 th
ey
 sa
tis
fy
 a
 ce
rt
ai
n 
cr
ite
rio
n 
(fo
r 
e.
g.
, t
he
ir 
ge
nd
er
 is
 m
al
e)
 a
nd
 th
at
 y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
 w
as
 ch
os
en
 b
y 
co
in
 to
ss
 to
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d;
 
• 
In
 th
is 
ca
se
, i
f t
he
 co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t d
oe
s n
ot
 sa
tis
fy
 th
e 
cr
ite
rio
n 
(i.
e.
 th
ey
 a
re
 fe
m
al
e)
, t
he
n 
bo
th
 w
ill
 
re
ta
in
 ID
R 
75
,0
00
. 
• 
If 
th
e 
co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t d
oe
s s
at
isf
y 
th
e 
cr
ite
rio
n 
(i.
e.
 th
ey
 a
re
 m
al
e)
, t
he
n 
yo
u 
w
ill
 e
ar
n 
ID
R 
72
,0
00
 (=
ID
R 
75
,0
00
-ID
R 
3,
00
0)
 a
nd
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 w
ill
 e
ar
n 
ID
R 
45
,0
00
 (=
ID
R 
75
,0
00
-ID
R 
30
,0
00
). 
 Do
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
an
y 
qu
es
tio
ns
? 
  I
f s
o,
 p
le
as
e 
ra
ise
 y
ou
r h
an
d.
 
 
8.
 P
RA
CT
IC
E 
No
w
, l
et
 u
s p
er
fo
rm
 a
 tr
ia
l r
un
, j
us
t t
o 
ch
ec
k 
yo
ur
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 o
f t
he
se
 in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
. T
hi
s i
s j
us
t a
 tr
ia
l, 
so
 
yo
ur
 a
ns
w
er
s w
ill
 n
ot
 a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
r f
in
al
 p
ay
m
en
t. 
 
Tr
ia
l r
un
 
Pl
ea
se
 ti
ck
 o
ne
 b
ox
 to
 in
di
ca
te
 y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
 fo
r e
ac
h 
st
at
em
en
t b
el
ow
 
If 
m
y 
co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t i
s a
 m
al
e,
 m
y 
de
cis
io
n 
is 
□
 
to
 le
av
e 
th
ei
r m
on
ey
 a
s i
t i
s a
nd
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
to
 p
ay
  
□
 
to
 re
du
ce
 th
ei
r m
on
ey
 b
y 
ID
R 
30
,0
00
 a
nd
 p
ay
 ID
R 
3,
00
0 
If 
m
y 
co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t i
s a
 fe
m
al
e,
 m
y 
de
cis
io
n 
is 
□
 
to
 le
av
e 
th
ei
r m
on
ey
 a
s i
t i
s a
nd
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
to
 p
ay
  
□
 
to
 re
du
ce
 th
ei
r m
on
ey
 b
y 
ID
R 
30
,0
00
 a
nd
 p
ay
 ID
R 
3,
00
0 
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 9.
 
CO
M
PR
EH
EN
SI
ON
 
QU
IZ
 
No
w
, t
he
 in
ve
st
ig
at
or
 w
ill
 fl
ip
 a
 co
in
. S
in
ce
 th
is 
is 
ju
st
 a
 tr
ia
l r
un
, i
t w
ill
 b
e 
do
ne
 o
nl
y 
on
ce
 a
nd
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
e 
w
ill 
ap
pl
y 
to
 e
ve
ry
on
e.
 R
ec
al
l t
ha
t i
f h
ea
ds
 co
m
es
 u
p,
 y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
 w
ill
 b
e 
th
e 
on
e 
ch
os
en
 fo
r 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n.
 
  No
w
, t
ha
t y
ou
 k
no
w
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
e 
of
 th
e 
co
in
 to
ss
, p
le
as
e 
an
sw
er
 th
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
co
m
pr
eh
en
sio
n 
qu
iz 
be
lo
w
. A
ga
in
, t
hi
s i
s j
us
t t
o 
ch
ec
k 
th
at
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
un
de
rs
to
od
 th
e 
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
. 
   
Co
m
pr
eh
en
sio
n 
qu
iz 
 
Q
1:
 M
y 
co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t i
s i
n 
th
is 
vi
lla
ge
. T
ru
e/
fa
lse
? 
 
Q
2:
 M
y 
co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t k
no
w
s w
he
re
 I 
liv
e.
 T
ru
e/
fa
lse
? 
 
Q
3:
 R
eg
ar
dl
es
s o
f t
he
 o
ut
co
m
e 
of
 th
e 
co
in
 to
ss
, m
y 
de
cis
io
ns
 w
ill
 a
lw
ay
s b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
 T
ru
e/
fa
lse
? 
 
No
w
 co
ns
id
er
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
e 
of
 th
e 
co
in
 to
ss
: 
 
Q
4:
 If
 m
y 
co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t i
s w
ill
in
g 
to
 p
ay
 ID
R 
3,
00
0 
to
 re
du
ce
 m
y 
m
on
ey
, m
y 
ea
rn
in
g 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
ID
R 
__
__
__
__
__
__
. 
 
Q
5:
 M
y 
co
-p
ar
tic
ip
an
t w
ill
 e
ar
n 
ID
R_
__
__
__
__
__
 if
 sh
e 
is 
a 
fe
m
al
e.
 
 
 It 
is 
im
po
rt
an
t t
ha
t y
ou
 a
re
 a
bl
e 
to
 a
ns
w
er
 a
ll 
th
es
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 b
ef
or
e 
yo
u 
st
ar
t t
he
 d
ec
isi
on
 ta
sk
s. 
 If 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 p
ro
bl
em
s a
ns
w
er
in
g 
th
es
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
, p
le
as
e 
ra
ise
 y
ou
r h
an
d.
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 10
. S
TA
RT
 FO
RM
 
B 
Be
fo
re
 w
e 
st
ar
t t
he
 d
ec
isi
on
 ta
sk
s, 
pl
ea
se
 re
m
em
be
r t
ha
t y
ou
 w
ill
 re
ce
iv
e 
yo
ur
 p
ay
m
en
t a
fte
r a
ll 
th
e 
de
cis
io
n 
ta
sk
s a
nd
 su
rv
ey
 q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 a
re
 co
m
pl
et
ed
. I
t i
s v
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t t
o 
ke
ep
 in
 m
in
d 
yo
ur
 d
ec
isi
on
s 
ar
e 
ab
so
lu
te
ly
 p
riv
at
e 
an
d 
w
ill
 n
ot
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
to
 a
ny
on
e 
be
sid
es
 th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
or
s. 
 Ho
w
ev
er
, i
f y
ou
 fe
el
 u
nc
om
fo
rt
ab
le
 m
ak
in
g 
th
e 
de
cis
io
ns
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 a
bo
ve
, y
ou
 a
re
 fr
ee
 to
 w
ith
dr
aw
 fr
om
 
th
is 
se
ss
io
n.
  P
le
as
e 
le
t t
he
 in
ve
st
ig
at
or
s k
no
w
 if
 y
ou
 w
an
t t
o 
do
 so
.  
 No
w
, p
le
as
e 
op
en
 Fo
rm
 B
. P
le
as
e 
tic
k 
on
e 
bo
x t
o 
in
di
ca
te
 y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
. M
ak
e 
su
re
 y
ou
 w
rit
e 
yo
ur
 
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 n
um
be
r b
ef
or
e 
yo
u 
st
ar
t. 
 W
he
n 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 fi
ni
sh
ed
, p
le
as
e 
ra
ise
 y
ou
r h
an
d.
 T
he
 in
ve
st
ig
at
or
 w
ill
 co
lle
ct
 F
or
m
 B
 fr
om
 y
ou
 a
nd
 g
iv
e 
yo
u 
Fo
rm
 C
. 
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. S
TA
RT
 FO
RM
 
C 
Ag
ai
n,
 in
 F
or
m
 C
, p
le
as
e 
tic
k 
on
e 
bo
x t
o 
in
di
ca
te
 y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
 fo
r e
ac
h 
st
at
em
en
t. 
M
ak
e 
su
re
 y
ou
 w
rit
e 
yo
ur
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t n
um
be
r b
ef
or
e 
yo
u 
st
ar
t. 
 
12
. C
OI
N 
TO
SS
 
W
he
n 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 fi
ni
sh
ed
, p
le
as
e 
ra
ise
 y
ou
r h
an
d.
 T
he
 in
ve
st
ig
at
or
 w
ill
 co
m
e 
to
 y
ou
 to
 to
ss
 th
e 
co
in
 a
nd
 
no
te
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
e 
of
 th
e 
co
in
 to
ss
 o
n 
Fo
rm
 C
. T
hi
s t
el
ls 
yo
u 
w
he
th
er
 y
ou
r d
ec
isi
on
s w
ill
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d.
 
Th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
or
 w
ill
 th
en
 co
lle
ct
 F
or
m
 C
 fr
om
 y
ou
. O
nc
e 
Fo
rm
 C
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
co
lle
ct
ed
, t
he
 d
ec
isi
on
s t
as
ks
 a
re
 
co
m
pl
et
e.
  
 
13
. S
TA
RT
 FO
RM
 
D 
W
hi
le
 w
e 
ar
e 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
yo
ur
 p
ay
m
en
t, 
w
e 
w
ou
ld
 li
ke
 y
ou
 to
 fi
ll 
in
 th
e 
su
rv
ey
 q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 in
 F
or
m
 D
. 
Pl
ea
se
 n
ow
 o
pe
n 
Fo
rm
 D
 a
nd
 a
ns
w
er
 a
ll 
th
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
fo
rm
. M
ak
e 
su
re
 y
ou
 w
rit
e 
yo
ur
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t 
nu
m
be
r b
ef
or
e 
yo
u 
st
ar
t. 
 If 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 p
ro
bl
em
s a
ns
w
er
in
g 
th
es
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
, p
le
as
e 
ra
ise
 y
ou
r h
an
d.
 
 W
he
n 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 fi
ni
sh
ed
 fi
lli
ng
 in
 th
e 
su
rv
ey
 q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 (F
or
m
 D
), 
pl
ea
se
 ra
ise
 y
ou
r h
an
d 
an
d 
th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
or
 w
ill
 co
m
e 
an
d 
co
lle
ct
 th
e 
fo
rm
 fr
om
 y
ou
. 
 
CO
IN
 IS
 T
OS
SE
D 
HE
RE
 
8 
 14
. F
IN
IS
H 
(P
AY
M
EN
T)
 
No
w
, y
ou
 a
re
 re
ad
y 
fo
r p
ay
m
en
t. 
W
e 
w
ill
 p
ay
 th
e 
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
s o
ne
 b
y 
on
e,
 in
 th
e 
pr
iv
ac
y 
of
 th
e 
ne
xt
 ro
om
. 
Yo
u 
w
ill
 a
lso
 b
e 
de
br
ie
fe
d 
af
te
r p
ay
m
en
t. 
Pl
ea
se
 w
ai
t i
n 
yo
ur
 se
at
 u
nt
il 
th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
or
s t
el
l y
ou
 it
 is
 y
ou
r 
tu
rn
 to
 g
o 
to
 th
e 
ne
xt
 ro
om
 fo
r p
ay
m
en
t. 
  P
le
as
e 
do
 n
ot
 le
av
e 
yo
ur
 se
at
 u
nt
il 
in
st
ru
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
in
ve
st
ig
at
or
s. 
  
 W
he
n 
yo
u 
le
av
e,
 p
le
as
e 
br
in
g 
yo
ur
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t s
lip
, t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
sh
ee
t a
nd
 y
ou
r o
w
n 
be
lo
ng
in
gs
.  
Pl
ea
se
 le
av
e 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 e
lse
 b
eh
in
d.
 
 W
e 
ho
pe
 y
ou
 e
nj
oy
ed
 th
is 
se
ss
io
n 
an
d 
w
e 
th
an
k 
yo
u 
ve
ry
 m
uc
h 
fo
r t
ak
in
g 
pa
rt
. 
 
  
Form A 
 
Date:     __________  
Participant number:   __________  
 
1. Age at last birthday:   ______ year 
2. Sex:     1. Male / 2. Female 
3. Religion:    1. Islam / 2. Christian / 3. Catholics /  
4. Other: ____________ 
4. Ethnic identity:   1. Acehnese / 2. Javanese / 3. Gayo / 4. Alas / 
5. Other: __________ 
5. Salutation you most identify with: 1. Bang / 2. Kak / 3. Mas / 4. Mbak 
6. Employment status:   1. Working / 2. Not working 
7. Approximately how much do you earn per month (in IDR): 
□ 1. <1 million 
□ 2. 1-2 million 
□ 3. 2-3 million 
□ 4. 3-4 million 
□ 5. >4 million 
8. Marital status:    □ 1. Not married □ 2. Married   
□ 3. Separated  □ 4. Divorced   
□ 5. Widow/er  □ 6. Cohabitating 
9. Highest completed education: □ 1. No/not yet in school 
□ 2. Elementary school or equivalent 
□ 3. Junior high school or equivalent 
□ 4. Senior high school or equivalent 
□ 5. Pesantren/meunasah/madrasah 
□ 6. University 
□ 7. Others  
Form B 
 
Date:     __________  
Participant number:   __________  
 
Please now decide if you want to reduce your co-participant’s money by IDR 30,000, in which 
case you have to pay IDR 3,000, OR leave the money as it is, in which case you do not have to 
pay. 
My decision is (tick one): 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay.  
□ 2. to reduce their money by IDR 30,000 and pay IDR 3,000. 
  
Form C 
 
Date:     __________  
Participant number:   __________  
Decision implemented: __________ (filled in by investigator) 
 
Please now consider the four different statements below. In each case, please decide if you 
want to reduce your co-participant’s money by IDR 30,000, in which case you have to pay IDR 
3,000, OR leave the money as it is, in which case you do not have to pay. 
 
1. If my co-participant most identifies with the salutation of “mas”, my decision is: (tick one) 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay.  
□ 2. to reduce their money by IDR 30,000 and pay IDR 3,000. 
 
2. If my co-participant most identifies with the salutation of “mbak”, my decision is: (tick one) 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay.  
□ 2. to reduce their money by IDR 30,000 and pay IDR 3,000. 
 
3. If my co-participant most identifies with the salutation of “bang”, my decision is: (tick one) 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay.  
□ 2. to reduce their money by IDR 30,000 and pay IDR 3,000. 
 
4. If my co-participant most identifies with the salutation of “kak”, my decision is: (tick one) 
□ 1. to leave their money as it is and not have to pay.  
□ 2. to reduce their money by IDR 30,000 and pay IDR 3,000. 
 
  
Appendix D
Questionnaires
257
Fo
rm
 D
 
Su
rv
ey
 q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
 
 Da
te
:  
 
 
 
__
__
__
__
__
  
Pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 n
um
be
r: 
  
__
__
__
__
__
  
 Pa
rt
 1
 
Pl
ea
se
 a
ns
w
er
 th
es
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
. 
Do
 y
ou
 th
in
k 
th
at
 y
ou
r c
o-
pa
rt
ici
pa
nt
 is
 w
ill
in
g 
to
 p
ay
 ID
R 
3,
00
0 
to
 re
du
ce
 y
ou
r I
DR
 7
5,
00
0?
 (T
ick
 o
ne
.) 
□
 
1.
 Y
es
 
□
 
2.
 N
o 
Pa
rt
 2
 
Th
es
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 a
re
 re
la
te
d 
w
ith
 y
ou
r e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
Ac
eh
 co
nf
lic
t (
du
rin
g 
an
d 
be
fo
re
 th
e 
20
05
 p
ea
ce
 tr
ea
ty
). 
If 
yo
u 
ne
ve
r l
iv
ed
 in
 A
ce
h 
in
 2
00
0-
20
05
 th
en
 y
ou
 d
o 
no
t n
ee
d 
to
 a
ns
w
er
 th
es
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 a
nd
 p
le
as
e 
go
 to
 P
ar
t 3
. 
W
he
re
 d
o 
yo
u 
liv
e 
in
: 
 
 
 
Ye
ar
 
Pr
ov
in
ce
 
Di
st
ric
t/
m
un
ici
pa
lit
y 
20
00
 
 
 
20
01
 
 
 
20
02
 
 
 
20
03
 
 
 
20
04
 
 
 
20
05
 
 
 
  
Ti
ck
 Y
es
/N
o 
in
 e
ac
h 
qu
es
tio
n.
 F
or
 e
ac
h 
qu
es
tio
n 
w
he
re
 y
ou
 a
ns
w
er
 “Y
es
”,
 p
le
as
e 
cir
cle
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 n
um
be
r 1
-5
 th
at
 su
its
 y
ou
. 
1.
 
W
er
e 
yo
u 
or
 a
ny
 m
em
be
r o
f y
ou
r h
ou
se
ho
ld
 in
ju
re
d 
as
 a
 re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
co
nf
lic
t?
 
□
 1
. Y
es
 
□
 2
. N
o 
 
---
 If
 Y
es
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s t
he
 in
cid
en
t a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
? 
No
 a
ffe
ct
   
   
   
   
1 
   
   
   
 2
   
   
   
   
3 
   
   
   
  4
   
   
   
   
5 
   
   
   
  M
aj
or
 a
ffe
ct
 
 
 
 
2.
 
W
as
 a
ny
 m
em
be
r o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
 k
ill
ed
 a
s a
 re
su
lt 
of
 th
is 
co
nf
lic
t?
 
□
 1
. Y
es
 
□
 2
. N
o 
 
---
 If
 Y
es
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s t
he
 in
cid
en
t a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
? 
No
 a
ffe
ct
   
   
   
   
1 
   
   
   
 2
   
   
   
   
3 
   
   
   
  4
   
   
   
   
5 
   
   
   
  M
aj
or
 a
ffe
ct
 
 
 
 
3.
 
Di
d 
yo
ur
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 h
av
e 
to
 m
ov
e/
fle
e 
w
ith
in
 A
ce
h 
as
 a
 re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
co
nf
lic
t?
 
□
 1
. Y
es
 
□
 2
. N
o 
 
---
 If
 Y
es
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s t
he
 in
cid
en
t a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
? 
No
 a
ffe
ct
   
   
   
   
1 
   
   
   
 2
   
   
   
   
3 
   
   
   
  4
   
   
   
   
5 
   
   
   
  M
aj
or
 a
ffe
ct
 
 
 
 
4.
 
Di
d 
yo
ur
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 h
av
e 
to
 m
ov
e/
fle
e 
ou
ts
id
e 
Ac
eh
 a
s a
 re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
co
nf
lic
t?
 
□
 1
. Y
es
 
□
 2
. N
o 
 
---
 If
 Y
es
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s t
he
 in
cid
en
t a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
? 
No
 a
ffe
ct
   
   
   
   
1 
   
   
   
 2
   
   
   
   
3 
   
   
   
  4
   
   
   
   
5 
   
   
   
  M
aj
or
 a
ffe
ct
 
 
 
 
5.
 
Di
d 
yo
ur
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 su
ffe
r p
ro
pe
rt
y 
lo
ss
 o
r d
es
tr
uc
tio
n 
(in
clu
di
ng
 
ho
us
e/
ap
ar
tm
en
t) 
as
 a
 re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
co
nf
lic
t?
 
□
 1
. Y
es
 
□
 2
. N
o 
 
---
 If
 Y
es
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s t
he
 in
cid
en
t a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
? 
No
 a
ffe
ct
   
   
   
   
1 
   
   
   
 2
   
   
   
   
3 
   
   
   
  4
   
   
   
   
5 
   
   
   
  M
aj
or
 a
ffe
ct
 
 
 
 
6.
 
Ha
ve
 y
ou
 p
er
so
na
lly
 w
itn
es
se
d 
an
y 
ar
m
ed
 cl
as
he
s o
r f
ig
ht
s i
n 
yo
ur
 v
ill
ag
e 
sin
ce
 
th
e 
Pe
ac
e 
Ag
re
em
en
t i
n 
20
05
? 
□
 1
. Y
es
 
□
 2
. N
o 
 
---
 If
 Y
es
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s t
he
 in
cid
en
t a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
? 
No
 a
ffe
ct
   
   
   
   
1 
   
   
   
 2
   
   
   
   
3 
   
   
   
  4
   
   
   
   
5 
   
   
   
  M
aj
or
 a
ffe
ct
 
       
 
 
7.
 
Di
d 
yo
u 
pe
rs
on
al
ly
 fi
gh
t i
n 
th
e 
civ
il 
co
nf
lic
t i
n 
Ac
eh
 fr
om
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
Pe
ac
e 
Ag
re
em
en
t i
n 
20
05
? 
□
 1
. Y
es
 
□
 2
. N
o 
 
---
 If
 Y
es
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s t
he
 in
cid
en
t a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
? 
No
 a
ffe
ct
   
   
   
   
1 
   
   
   
 2
   
   
   
   
3 
   
   
   
  4
   
   
   
   
5 
   
   
   
  M
aj
or
 a
ffe
ct
 
 
 
 
8.
 
Di
d 
yo
u 
pe
rs
on
al
ly
 ta
ke
 p
ar
t i
n 
ar
m
ed
 cl
as
he
s o
r f
ig
ht
 in
 A
ce
h 
af
te
r t
he
 P
ea
ce
 
Ag
re
em
en
t i
n 
20
05
? 
□
 1
. Y
es
 
□
 2
. N
o 
 
---
 If
 Y
es
, t
o 
w
ha
t e
xt
en
t d
oe
s t
he
 in
cid
en
t a
ffe
ct
 y
ou
? 
No
 a
ffe
ct
   
   
   
   
1 
   
   
   
 2
   
   
   
   
3 
   
   
   
  4
   
   
   
   
5 
   
   
   
  M
aj
or
 a
ffe
ct
 
 
 
 
  
 
Pa
rt
 3
 
Pl
ea
se
 ti
ck
 o
ne
 b
ox
 fo
r e
ac
h 
st
at
em
en
t 
St
ro
ng
ly
 d
isa
gr
ee
 
1 
 
  2
  
    
3 
 
    
  4
  
    
  5
   
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 a
gr
ee
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1.
 
Ne
ve
r t
el
l a
ny
on
e 
th
e 
re
al
 re
as
on
 y
ou
 d
id
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 u
nl
es
s i
t i
s u
se
fu
l t
o 
do
 so
. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
 
Th
e 
be
st
 w
ay
 to
 h
an
dl
e 
pe
op
le
 is
 to
 te
ll 
th
em
 w
ha
t t
he
y 
w
an
t t
o 
he
ar
. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.
 
On
e 
sh
ou
ld
 ta
ke
 a
ct
io
n 
on
ly
 w
he
n 
su
re
 it
 is
 m
or
al
ly
 ri
gh
t. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.
 
M
os
t p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
ba
sic
al
ly
 g
oo
d 
an
d 
ki
nd
. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
It 
is 
sa
fe
st
 to
 a
ss
um
e 
th
at
 a
ll 
pe
op
le
 h
av
e 
a 
vi
cio
us
 st
re
ak
 a
nd
 it
 w
ill
 co
m
e 
ou
t w
he
n 
th
ey
 a
re
 
gi
ve
n 
a 
ch
an
ce
. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.
 
Ho
ne
st
y 
is 
th
e 
be
st
 p
ol
icy
 in
 a
ll 
ca
se
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
7.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
no
 e
xc
us
e 
fo
r l
yi
ng
 to
 so
m
eo
ne
 e
lse
. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.
 
Ge
ne
ra
lly
 sp
ea
ki
ng
, p
eo
pl
e 
w
on
’t 
w
or
k 
ha
rd
 u
nl
es
s t
he
y’
re
 fo
rc
ed
 to
 d
o 
so
. 
 
 
 
 
 
9.
 
Al
l i
n 
al
l, 
it 
is 
be
tte
r t
o 
be
 h
um
bl
e 
an
d 
ho
ne
st
 th
an
 to
 b
e 
im
po
rt
an
t a
nd
 d
ish
on
es
t. 
 
 
 
 
 
10
. 
W
he
n 
yo
u 
as
k 
so
m
eo
ne
 to
 d
o 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 fo
r y
ou
, i
t i
s b
es
t t
o 
gi
ve
 th
e 
re
al
 re
as
on
s f
or
 w
an
tin
g 
it 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 g
iv
in
g 
re
as
on
s w
hi
ch
 ca
rr
y 
m
or
e 
w
ei
gh
t. 
 
 
 
 
 
11
. 
M
os
t p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 g
et
 a
he
ad
 in
 th
e 
w
or
ld
 le
ad
 cl
ea
n,
 m
or
al
 li
ve
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
12
. 
An
yo
ne
 w
ho
 co
m
pl
et
el
y 
tr
us
ts
 a
ny
on
e 
el
se
 is
 a
sk
in
g 
fo
r t
ro
ub
le
. 
 
 
 
 
 
13
. 
Th
e 
bi
gg
es
t d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
m
os
t c
rim
in
al
s a
nd
 o
th
er
 p
eo
pl
e 
is 
th
at
 th
e 
cr
im
in
al
s a
re
 
st
up
id
 e
no
ug
h 
to
 g
et
 ca
ug
ht
. 
 
 
 
 
 
14
. 
M
os
t p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
br
av
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
15
. 
It 
is 
w
ise
 to
 fl
at
te
r i
m
po
rt
an
t p
eo
pl
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
16
. 
It 
is 
po
ss
ib
le
 to
 b
e 
go
od
 in
 a
ll 
re
sp
ec
ts
. 
 
 
 
 
 
17
. 
It 
is 
no
t t
ru
e 
to
 sa
y 
th
at
 a
 su
ck
er
 is
 b
or
n 
ev
er
y 
m
in
ut
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
18
. 
It 
is 
ha
rd
 to
 g
et
 a
he
ad
 w
ith
ou
t c
ut
tin
g 
co
rn
er
s h
er
e 
an
d 
th
er
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
19
. 
Pe
op
le
 su
ffe
rin
g 
fro
m
 in
cu
ra
bl
e 
di
se
as
es
 sh
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f b
ei
ng
 p
ut
 p
ai
nl
es
sly
 to
 
de
at
h.
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
. 
M
os
t p
eo
pl
e 
fo
rg
et
 m
or
e 
ea
sil
y 
th
e 
de
at
h 
of
 th
ei
r p
ar
en
ts
 th
an
 th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f t
he
ir 
pr
op
er
ty
. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Pa
rt
 4
 
Pl
ea
se
 ti
ck
 o
ne
 b
ox
 fo
r e
ac
h 
st
at
em
en
t 
St
ro
ng
ly
 d
isa
gr
ee
 
1 
 
  2
  
    
3 
 
    
  4
  
    
  5
   
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 a
gr
ee
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1.
 
I a
m
 a
n 
ev
en
-te
m
pe
re
d 
pe
rs
on
. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
 
I h
av
e 
th
re
at
en
ed
 p
eo
pl
e 
I k
no
w
. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.
 
Gi
ve
n 
en
ou
gh
 p
ro
vo
ca
tio
n,
 I 
m
ay
 h
it 
an
ot
he
r p
er
so
n.
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.
 
W
he
n 
fru
st
ra
te
d,
 I 
le
t m
y 
irr
ita
tio
n 
sh
ow
. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.
 
Ot
he
r p
eo
pl
e 
al
w
ay
s s
ee
m
 to
 g
et
 th
e 
br
ea
ks
. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.
 
I f
la
re
 u
p 
qu
ick
ly
 b
ut
 g
et
 o
ve
r i
t q
ui
ck
ly
. 
 
 
 
 
 
7.
 
So
m
e 
of
 m
y 
fri
en
ds
 th
in
k 
I a
m
 a
 h
ot
he
ad
. 
 
 
 
 
 
8.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
pe
op
le
 w
ho
 p
us
he
d 
m
e 
so
 fa
r t
ha
t w
e 
ca
m
e 
to
 b
lo
w
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
9.
 
W
he
n 
pe
op
le
 a
re
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 n
ice
 to
 m
e,
 I 
w
on
de
r w
ha
t t
he
y 
w
an
t. 
 
 
 
 
 
10
. I
 k
no
w
 th
at
 "f
rie
nd
s"
 ta
lk
 a
bo
ut
 m
e 
be
hi
nd
 m
y 
ba
ck
. 
 
 
 
 
 
11
. A
t t
im
es
 I 
fe
el
 I 
ha
ve
 g
ot
te
n 
a 
ra
w
 d
ea
l o
ut
 o
f l
ife
. 
 
 
 
 
 
12
. I
 a
m
 so
m
et
im
es
 e
at
en
 u
p 
w
ith
 je
al
ou
sy
. 
 
 
 
 
 
13
. I
 a
m
 su
sp
ici
ou
s o
f o
ve
rly
 fr
ie
nd
ly
 st
ra
ng
er
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
14
. I
 so
m
et
im
es
 fe
el
 li
ke
 a
 p
ow
de
r k
eg
 re
ad
y 
to
 e
xp
lo
de
. 
 
 
 
 
 
15
. I
 te
ll 
m
y 
fri
en
ds
 o
pe
nl
y 
w
he
n 
I d
isa
gr
ee
 w
ith
 th
em
. 
 
 
 
 
 
16
. I
 w
on
de
r w
hy
 so
m
et
im
es
 I 
fe
el
 so
 b
itt
er
 a
bo
ut
 th
in
gs
. 
 
 
 
 
 
17
. O
nc
e 
in
 a
 w
hi
le
, I
 ca
n’
t c
on
tr
ol
 th
e 
ur
ge
 to
 st
rik
e 
an
ot
he
r p
er
so
n.
 
 
 
 
 
 
18
. I
 so
m
et
im
es
 fe
el
 th
at
 p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
la
ug
hi
ng
 a
t m
e 
be
hi
nd
 m
y 
ba
ck
. 
 
 
 
 
 
19
. I
 ca
n 
th
in
k 
of
 n
o 
go
od
 re
as
on
 fo
r e
ve
r h
itt
in
g 
a 
pe
rs
on
. 
 
 
 
 
 
20
. I
 h
av
e 
be
co
m
e 
so
 m
ad
 th
at
 I 
ha
ve
 b
ro
ke
n 
th
in
gs
. 
 
 
 
 
 
21
. I
f I
 h
av
e 
to
 re
so
rt
 to
 v
io
le
nc
e 
to
 p
ro
te
ct
 m
y 
rig
ht
s, 
I w
ill
. 
 
 
 
 
 
22
. I
 h
av
e 
tr
ou
bl
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 m
y 
te
m
pe
r. 
 
 
 
 
 
23
. W
he
n 
pe
op
le
 a
nn
oy
 m
e,
 I 
m
ay
 te
ll 
th
em
 w
ha
t I
 th
in
k 
of
 th
em
. 
 
 
 
 
 
24
. I
 ca
n’
t h
el
p 
ge
tti
ng
 in
to
 a
rg
um
en
ts
 w
he
n 
pe
op
le
 d
isa
gr
ee
 w
ith
 m
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
25
. I
 o
fte
n 
fin
d 
m
ys
el
f d
isa
gr
ee
in
g 
w
ith
 p
eo
pl
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
26
. I
 g
et
 in
to
 fi
gh
ts
 a
 li
ttl
e 
m
or
e 
th
an
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
pe
rs
on
. 
 
 
 
 
 
27
. S
om
et
im
es
 I 
fly
 o
ff 
th
e 
ha
nd
le
 fo
r n
o 
go
od
 re
as
on
. 
 
 
 
 
 
28
. I
f s
om
eb
od
y 
hi
ts
 m
e,
 I 
hi
t b
ac
k.
 
 
 
 
 
 
29
. M
y 
fri
en
ds
 sa
y 
th
at
 I’
m
 so
m
ew
ha
t a
rg
um
en
ta
tiv
e.
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 5
 
Im
ag
in
e 
th
at
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
be
en
 ra
nd
om
ly
 p
ai
re
d 
w
ith
 a
no
th
er
 p
er
so
n,
 w
ho
m
 w
e 
w
ill
 re
fe
r t
o 
sim
pl
y 
as
 th
e 
‘‘O
th
er
.’’
 T
hi
s o
th
er
 p
er
so
n 
is 
so
m
eo
ne
 
yo
u 
do
 n
ot
 k
no
w
 a
nd
 th
at
 y
ou
 w
ill
 n
ot
 k
no
w
in
gl
y 
m
ee
t i
n 
th
e 
fu
tu
re
. B
ot
h 
yo
u 
an
d 
th
e 
‘‘O
th
er
’’ 
pe
rs
on
 w
ill
 b
e 
m
ak
in
g 
ch
oi
ce
s b
y 
cir
cli
ng
 e
ith
er
 
th
e 
le
tte
r A
, B
, o
r C
. Y
ou
r o
w
n 
ch
oi
ce
s w
ill
 p
ro
du
ce
 p
oi
nt
s f
or
 b
ot
h 
yo
ur
se
lf 
an
d 
th
e 
‘‘O
th
er
’’ 
pe
rs
on
. L
ik
ew
ise
, t
he
 o
th
er
’s 
ch
oi
ce
 w
ill
 p
ro
du
ce
 
po
in
ts
 fo
r h
im
/h
er
 a
nd
 fo
r y
ou
. E
ve
ry
 p
oi
nt
 h
as
 v
al
ue
: t
he
 m
or
e 
po
in
ts
 y
ou
 re
ce
iv
e,
 th
e 
be
tte
r f
or
 y
ou
, a
nd
 th
e 
m
or
e 
po
in
ts
 th
e 
‘‘O
th
er
’’ 
re
ce
iv
es
, 
th
e 
be
tte
r f
or
 h
im
/h
er
.  
Fo
r e
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
ni
ne
 ch
oi
ce
 si
tu
at
io
ns
, c
irc
le
 A
, B
, o
r C
, d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 co
lu
m
n 
yo
u 
pr
ef
er
 m
os
t: 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
(1
) 
Yo
u 
ge
t 
Ot
he
r g
et
s 
48
0 80
 
54
0 
28
0 
48
0 
48
0 
 
(4
) 
Yo
u 
ge
t 
Ot
he
r g
et
s 
50
0 
10
0 
56
0 
30
0 
49
0 
49
0 
 
(7
) 
Yo
u 
ge
t 
Ot
he
r g
et
s 
51
0 
51
0 
56
0 
30
0 
51
0 
11
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
(2
) 
Yo
u 
ge
t 
Ot
he
r g
et
s 
56
0 
30
0 
50
0 
50
0 
50
0 
10
0 
 
(5
) 
Yo
u 
ge
t 
Ot
he
r g
et
s 
56
0 
30
0 
50
0 
50
0 
49
0 90
 
 
(8
) 
Yo
u 
ge
t 
Ot
he
r g
et
s 
55
0 
30
0 
50
0 
10
0 
50
0 
50
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C 
(3
) 
Yo
u 
ge
t 
Ot
he
r g
et
s 
52
0 
52
0 
52
0 
12
0 
58
0 
32
0 
 
(6
) 
Yo
u 
ge
t 
Ot
he
r g
et
s 
50
0 
50
0 
50
0 
10
0 
57
0 
30
0 
 
(9
) 
Yo
u 
ge
t 
Ot
he
r g
et
s 
48
0 
10
0 
49
0 
49
0 
54
0 
30
0 
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Pl
ea
se
 a
ns
w
er
 th
es
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 
1.
 
Ho
w
 m
an
y 
tim
es
 h
av
e 
yo
u 
at
te
nd
ed
 re
lig
io
us
 se
rv
ice
s d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pa
st
 w
ee
k?
 _
__
__
 ti
m
es
. 
 
2.
 
W
he
n 
yo
u 
ha
ve
 a
 se
rio
us
 p
er
so
na
l p
ro
bl
em
, h
ow
 o
fte
n 
do
 y
ou
 ta
ke
 re
lig
io
us
 a
dv
ice
 o
r t
ea
ch
in
g 
in
to
 co
ns
id
er
at
io
n?
 
□
 
1.
 A
lm
os
t a
lw
ay
s 
□
 
2.
 U
su
al
ly 
□
 
3.
 S
om
et
im
es
 
□
 
4.
 N
ev
er
 
 
3.
 
Do
 y
ou
 a
gr
ee
 w
ith
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
at
em
en
t?
 “R
el
ig
io
n 
gi
ve
s m
e 
a 
gr
ea
t a
m
ou
nt
 o
f c
om
fo
rt
 a
nd
 se
cu
rit
y 
in
 li
fe
.”
 
□
 
1.
 S
tr
on
gl
y 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
□
 
2.
 D
isa
gr
ee
 
□
 
3.
 U
nc
er
ta
in
 
□
 
4.
 A
gr
ee
 
□
 
5.
 S
tr
on
gl
y 
ag
re
e 
 
4.
 
Ho
w
 m
uc
h 
in
flu
en
ce
 w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 sa
y 
th
at
 re
lig
io
n 
ha
s o
n 
th
e 
w
ay
 th
at
 y
ou
 ch
oo
se
 to
 a
ct
 a
nd
 th
e 
w
ay
 th
at
 y
ou
 ch
oo
se
 to
 sp
en
d 
yo
ur
 ti
m
e 
ea
ch
 d
ay
? 
□
 
1.
 N
o 
in
flu
en
ce
 
□
 
2.
 A
 sm
al
l i
nf
lu
en
ce
 
□
 
3.
 S
om
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 
□
 
4.
 A
 fa
ir 
am
ou
nt
 o
f i
nf
lu
en
ce
 
□
 
5.
 A
 la
rg
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 
 
5.
 
W
hi
ch
 o
f t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
at
em
en
ts
 co
m
es
 cl
os
es
t t
o 
yo
ur
 b
el
ie
f a
bo
ut
 G
od
? 
□
 
1.
 I 
am
 su
re
 th
at
 G
od
 re
al
ly
 e
xi
st
s a
nd
 th
at
 H
e 
is 
ac
tiv
e 
in
 m
y 
lif
e 
□
 
2.
 A
lth
ou
gh
 I 
so
m
et
im
es
 q
ue
st
io
n 
Hi
s e
xi
st
en
ce
, I
 d
o 
be
lie
ve
 in
 G
od
 a
nd
 b
el
ie
ve
 H
e 
kn
ow
s o
f m
e 
as
 a
 p
er
so
n 
□
 
3.
 I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
 if
 th
er
e 
is 
a 
pe
rs
on
al
 G
od
, b
ut
 I 
do
 b
el
ie
ve
 in
 a
 h
ig
he
r p
ow
er
 o
f s
om
e 
ki
nd
 
□
 
4.
 I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
 if
 th
er
e 
is 
a 
pe
rs
on
al
 G
od
 o
r a
 h
ig
he
r p
ow
er
 o
f s
om
e 
ki
nd
, a
nd
 I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
 if
 I 
ev
er
 w
ill
 
□
 
5.
 I 
do
n’
t b
el
ie
ve
 in
 a
 p
er
so
na
l G
od
 o
r i
n 
a 
hi
gh
er
 p
ow
er
 
  
6.
 
Du
rin
g 
th
e 
pa
st
 y
ea
r, 
ho
w
 o
fte
n 
ha
ve
 y
ou
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 a
 fe
el
in
g 
of
 re
lig
io
us
 re
ve
re
nc
e 
or
 d
ev
ot
io
n?
 
□
 
1.
 A
lm
os
t d
ai
ly 
□
 
2.
 F
re
qu
en
tly
 
□
 
3.
 S
om
et
im
es
 
□
 
4.
 R
ar
el
y 
□
 
5.
 N
ev
er
 
 
7.
 
W
hi
ch
 o
f t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
be
st
 d
es
cr
ib
es
 y
ou
r p
ra
ct
ice
 o
f p
ra
ye
r o
r r
el
ig
io
us
 m
ed
ita
tio
n?
 
□
 
1.
 P
ra
ye
r i
s a
 re
gu
la
r p
ar
t o
f m
y 
da
ily
 li
fe
 
□
 
2.
 I 
us
ua
lly
 p
ra
y 
in
 ti
m
es
 o
f s
tr
es
s o
r n
ee
d 
bu
t r
ar
el
y 
at
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 ti
m
e 
□
 
3.
 I 
pr
ay
 o
nl
y 
du
rin
g 
fo
rm
al
 ce
re
m
on
ie
s 
□
 
4.
 I 
ne
ve
r p
ra
y 
 
8.
 
W
hi
ch
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
st
at
em
en
ts
 co
m
es
 cl
os
es
t t
o 
yo
ur
 b
el
ie
f a
bo
ut
 li
fe
 a
fte
r d
ea
th
 (i
m
m
or
ta
lit
y)
? 
□
 
1.
 I 
be
lie
ve
 in
 a
 p
er
so
na
l l
ife
 a
fte
r d
ea
th
, a
 so
ul
 e
xi
st
in
g 
as
 a
 sp
ec
ifi
c i
nd
iv
id
ua
l s
pi
rit
 
□
 
2.
 I 
be
lie
ve
 in
 a
 so
ul
 e
xi
st
in
g 
af
te
r d
ea
th
 a
s a
 p
ar
t o
f a
 u
ni
ve
rs
al
 sp
iri
t 
□
 
3.
 I 
be
lie
ve
 in
 a
 li
fe
 a
fte
r d
ea
th
 o
f s
om
e 
ki
nd
, b
ut
 I 
re
al
ly
 d
on
’t 
kn
ow
 w
ha
t i
t w
ou
ld
 b
e 
lik
e 
□
 
4.
 I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
 w
he
th
er
 th
er
e 
is 
an
y 
ki
nd
 o
f l
ife
 a
fte
r d
ea
th
, a
nd
 I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
 if
 I 
w
ill
 e
ve
r k
no
w
 
□
 
5.
 I 
do
n’
t b
el
ie
ve
 in
 a
ny
 k
in
d 
of
 li
fe
 a
fte
r d
ea
th
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Pl
ea
se
 ti
ck
 o
ne
 b
ox
 fo
r e
ac
h 
qu
es
tio
n.
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 d
isa
gr
ee
 
1 
 
  2
  
    
3 
 
    
4 
 
    
5 
 
    
6 
 
    
7 
 
    
8 
 
    
9 
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 a
gr
ee
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1.
 
Go
d 
ha
s g
iv
en
 h
um
an
ity
 a
 co
m
pl
et
e,
 u
nf
ai
lin
g 
gu
id
e 
to
 h
ap
pi
ne
ss
 a
nd
 sa
lv
at
io
n,
 
w
hi
ch
 m
us
t b
e 
to
ta
lly
 fo
llo
w
ed
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
 
No
 si
ng
le
 b
oo
k 
of
 re
lig
io
us
 te
ac
hi
ng
s c
on
ta
in
s a
ll 
th
e 
in
tr
in
sic
, f
un
da
m
en
ta
l t
ru
th
s 
ab
ou
t l
ife
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.
 
Th
e 
ba
sic
 ca
us
e 
of
 e
vi
l i
n 
th
is 
w
or
ld
 is
 S
at
an
, w
ho
 is
 st
ill
 co
ns
ta
nt
ly
 a
nd
 fe
ro
cio
us
ly
 
fig
ht
in
g 
ag
ai
ns
t G
od
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.
 
It 
is 
m
or
e 
im
po
rt
an
t t
o 
be
 a
 g
oo
d 
pe
rs
on
 th
an
 to
 b
el
ie
ve
 in
 G
od
 a
nd
 th
e 
rig
ht
 re
lig
io
n.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
pa
rt
icu
la
r s
et
 o
f r
el
ig
io
us
 te
ac
hi
ng
s i
n 
th
is 
w
or
ld
 th
at
 a
re
 so
 tr
ue
, y
ou
 ca
n’
t 
go
 a
ny
 “d
ee
pe
r”
 b
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 a
re
 th
e 
ba
sic
, b
ed
ro
ck
 m
es
sa
ge
 th
at
 G
od
 h
as
 g
iv
en
 
hu
m
an
ity
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.
 
W
he
n 
yo
u 
ge
t r
ig
ht
 d
ow
n 
to
 it
, t
he
re
 a
re
 b
as
ica
lly
 o
nl
y 
tw
o 
ki
nd
s o
f p
eo
pl
e 
in
 th
e 
w
or
ld
: t
he
 R
ig
ht
eo
us
, w
ho
 w
ill
 b
e 
re
w
ar
de
d 
by
 G
od
; a
nd
 th
e 
re
st
, w
ho
 w
ill
 n
ot
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.
 
Sc
rip
tu
re
s m
ay
 co
nt
ai
n 
ge
ne
ra
l t
ru
th
s, 
bu
t t
he
y 
sh
ou
ld
 N
OT
 b
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 
co
m
pl
et
el
y,
 li
te
ra
lly
 tr
ue
 fr
om
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 to
 e
nd
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.
 
To
 le
ad
 th
e 
be
st
, m
os
t m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l l
ife
, o
ne
 m
us
t b
el
on
g 
to
 th
e 
on
e,
 fu
nd
am
en
ta
lly
 
tr
ue
 re
lig
io
n.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
9.
 
“S
at
an
” i
s j
us
t t
he
 n
am
e 
pe
op
le
 g
iv
e 
to
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
ba
d 
im
pu
lse
s. 
Th
er
e 
re
al
ly
 is
 n
o 
su
ch
 th
in
g 
as
 a
 d
ia
bo
lic
al
 “P
rin
ce
 o
f D
ar
kn
es
s”
 w
ho
 te
m
pt
s u
s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
. 
W
he
ne
ve
r s
cie
nc
e 
an
d 
sa
cr
ed
 sc
rip
tu
re
 co
nf
lic
t, 
sc
ie
nc
e 
is 
pr
ob
ab
ly
 ri
gh
t. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
. T
he
 fu
nd
am
en
ta
ls 
of
 G
od
’s 
re
lig
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ev
er
 b
e 
ta
m
pe
re
d 
w
ith
, o
r c
om
pr
om
ise
d 
w
ith
 o
th
er
s’ 
be
lie
fs
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
. A
ll 
of
 th
e 
re
lig
io
ns
 in
 th
e 
w
or
ld
 h
av
e 
fla
w
s a
nd
 w
ro
ng
 te
ac
hi
ng
s. 
Th
er
e 
is 
no
 p
er
fe
ct
ly
 
tr
ue
, r
ig
ht
 re
lig
io
n.
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Pl
ea
se
 te
ll 
us
 w
hy
 y
ou
 m
ad
e 
th
e 
de
cis
io
n 
yo
u 
di
d 
(fe
el
 fr
ee
 to
 w
rit
e 
in
 a
ny
 o
th
er
 co
m
m
en
ts
 y
ou
 m
ig
ht
 li
ke
 to
 m
ak
e 
ab
ou
t t
he
 e
xp
er
im
en
t) 
         
